Daily Report

Central Eurasia

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FBIS-SOV-92-057 *24 March 1992*

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Confusion Surrounding Kravchuk Stance Viewed

MK2403090592 Moscow KOMMERSANT in Russian No. 12 16-23 Mar 92 p 22

[Lyudmila Beletskaya and Aleksey Kucherenko report: "Putting a Brave Face on It. Ukraine Still Has the Bomb"]

[Text] On 18 March INTERFAX reported that in a telephone conversation with Boris Yeltsin Leonid Kravchuk had announced the lifting of the embargo on the removal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine to Russia. Kravchuk denied this report 20 March.

As KOMMERSANT's correspondent learned at INTERFAX, the information had come not first hand but from a representative of one faction of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet who had been present at a closed meeting with the president 18 March. KOMMERSANT was unable to obtain confirmation from other participants in the meeting: No one could remember any clear-cut statement having been made, although there may have been "discussions on the topic" which boiled down to saying that Ukraine's position is inconclusive [neokonchatelnyy] and that at one moment Kravchuk states one thing, then on the telephone he assures Yeltsin of something else (which is perfectly plausible—if you believe Kravchuk's remark that their last telephone conversation was 16 February). Observers note that even the transcript did not make things totally clear: Boris Nikolayevich's speech was full of grimaces [mimika] expressing the gamut of emotions evoked in the president by his Ukrainian colleague's inconsistency.

Some experts believe that, even if this conversation did not take place, it would have been worth inventing it on the eve of the Kiev summit. Kravchuk's statement of 13 March (which KOMMERSANT reported in No. 11) justifying the embargo on the grounds of the instability of the situation in Russia (in such cases there is usually a reference to Zhirinovskiy) caused a surge of anxiety in the West. The story goes that the Ukrainian president was not unduly serious and hoped merely to show that he is vigilant on questions of national and international security, but he failed to make the requisite adjustment for his Western audience, which has no sense of humor at all when it comes to anything nuclear. Thus the INTERFAX report can be regarded as a prophetic error.

There are 1,420 strategic nuclear warheads in Ukraine and 2,390 tactical warheads. There are 176 ICBM's—130 RS-18's and 46 RS- 22's—in 90 silos in Khmelnitskiy and Nikolayev Oblasts. In Uzin (Kiev Oblast) there are 30 heavy bombers each carrying six cruise missiles. If it were not for its proclaimed nuclear-free status, Ukraine would be third in the nuclear club after the United States and the Russian Federation.

In observers' opinion, Kravchuk may well soon actually abandon the embargo after first attempting to use nuclear weapons as a trump card in the bargaining over the fleet. There is also an opportunity to issue a reminder about the fair division of secondary resources: Together with the warheads, Russia is also getting a lot of valuable metals, including nonferrous metals. Viktor Antonov, minister for questions of the defense complex and conversion, told KOMMERSANT's correspondent that if the missiles are destroyed in Russia, Ukraine "will lay claim to some of the assets recovered from them."

Kazakhstan To Retain Arms as 'Bargaining' Chip

AU2003134492 Paris AFP in English 1339 GMT 20 Mar 92

[Text] Rome, March 20 (AFP)—Kazakhstan intends to use the strategic nuclear weapons deployed on its territory as a bargaining counter in arms reduction talks, President Nursultan Nazarbayev said in an interview published here Friday [20 March]. The weapons will not be destroyed in order that Kazakhstan "will be able to take part in strategic arms reductions talks along with Russia and the United States", Nazarbayev told the LA STAMPA daily.

"Kazakhstan did not become an atomic power by its own will", Nazarbayev commented.

"On our territory at Semipalatinsk, from 1949 onwards, 467 nuclear tests were carried out. We want to become a denuclearised state, and we have closed Semipalatinsk. But as regards the strategic missiles, we have asked for the status quo."

Nazarbayev argued that Kazakhstan "is entitled to belong to the nuclear club because tests on its territory were being carried out 18 months before the signing of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty" in May 1968.

Earlier this year Kazakhstan, along with Ukraine and Belarus, agreed to transfer all tactical nuclear weapons to Russia where they would be dismantled and destroyed by Russian experts.

Nazarbayev told LA STAMPA that "the transfer to Russia would cost billions of rubles which Kazakhstan does not have". He added that there was "no control mechanism for the elimination of nuclear weapons."

"Common sense requires that the reduction in strategic nuclear forces should be in line with the defensive needs of the Commonwealth (of Independent States), notions which unfortunately do not for the moment exist", he concluded.

Nuclear Industry Tests Chinese Market

LD2303200392 Moscow TASS in English 1921 GMT 23 Mar 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Kirillov]

[Text] Beijing March 23 TASS—The Russian section turned out to be one of the most popular at an international exhibition of the nuclear industry, drawing to a close in Beijing today.

Chinese specialists were especially interested in the over-1000 reactor for 1,000 megawatts and the act-500 nuclear heating station, Nikolay Babaev, scientific secretary of the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry, told ITAR TASS. "These are our two best exhibits", Babaev explained.

The Chinese took an interest in all aspects of peaceful use of the atom—from production of fuel for nuclear power stations to burying radioactive wastes, he said. The Russian side also offered China unique technology to increase the life of nuclear power stations from 30 years to 50.

Last December China commissioned its first nuclear power station and is now constructing two more. The Chinese prefer barter deals - to exchange equipment for consumer goods and are also prepared to pay hard currency, Babaev said.

Some of the proposals were rather exotic, he added. At one instance, the Chinese offered to swap Russian nuclear technology for a Chinese restaurant, they offered to open in any Russian city, promising to supply food directly from Beijing.

They were seriously interested in returning to Dubna after thirty-odd years to the well-known center of nuclear research. The Chinese, in turn, offered to share their experience in converting nuclear industry to civilian uses. In China, half of the nuclear industry is working for civilian purposes, earning profits. A large delegation of nuclear experts is now visiting China to discuss nuclear issues.

U.S. Cooperation on Supercollidor Cited

PM2303163992 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 19 Mar 92 First Edition p 8

[Gennadiy Dernovoy report under the "Cooperation" rubric: "Our Physicists Will Assist America"]

[Text] A session of the Russian-U.S. working group on a superconducting supercollider—a giant double colliding-beam accelerator—was held recently in Protvino, the physicists' city near Moscow. This group was set up last year by the former USSR Ministry of Atomic Power Engineering and Industry (now the Russian Minatom and the U.S. Department of Energy to coordinate efforts to create a supercollider in the state of Texas.

The Americans began building an underground tunnel 87 km long a year ago, and it is planned to commission the accelerator in the year 2000. A similar accelerator, albeit of more modest dimensions, has been under construction in Protvino since the beginning of the eighties, and its construction is now nearing completion. A U.S. delegation headed by W. Hess, chief of the High-Energy and Nuclear Physics Agency, familiarized itself with the progress of construction with great interest.

During the session the participants examined in detail questions of preparing an intergovernmental agreement which will lay down the procedure and conditions for the participation of Russian institutes in the construction and operation of the future U.S. supercollider.

Experts Give Reassurances on AES Safety

PM2003144192 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 Mar 92 Morning Edition p 5

[Letter by group of nuclear scientists: "Once More On The Risk of An Accident at Soviet Nuclear Electric Power Stations"—first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] IZVESTIYA (issue No. 27) published an article entitled "The Risk of Accidents at Soviet AES's [nuclear electric power stations] Is 100 Times Greater than at Western Stations" which, citing Swedish specialists, presented alarming assessments of the state of our nuclear stations. A group of specialists with a somewhat different viewpoint have sent the editorial office a response to that report and we submit it to readers' attention today.

When speaking about the need to increase the safety of Chernobyl-type reactors (RBMK [high-power pressure-tube reactors] reactors), the Swedish scientists were pursuing a noble aim: namely, **to attract foreign investors to work on modernizing the RBMK reactors in the conditions of financial crisis in the countries of the former USSR.** Since February last year we, together with Sweden, have been implementing the "Barselina" joint program which includes probability analysis of the safety of the first unit of the "Barseback" nuclear power station [in Sweden] and the second unit of the Ignalina AES (Lithuania). In September, the Swedish Government allocated 15 million kronor for cooperation in the sphere of reactor safety and radiation protection.

The Swedish experts' statement that the "chance of an accident at an AES in the former USSR is one in 1,000, whereas at Swedish stations it is one in 100,000" is no sensation and does not shock specialists, as was said in the newspaper. The first generation of RBMK reactors was designed over 30 years ago and in accordance with the norms and regulations existing then. First generation reactors at Western nuclear power stations are in a similar situation now. Both for the former and the latter, the likelihood of a serious accident is approximately the same, according to the specialists.

Since the Chernobyl accident, AES's with RBMK-type reactors have been modernized substantially. **According to estimates, the likelihood of a serious accident after the renovation of the first unit at the Leningrad AES has decreased by a factor of approximately 100.**

Now a few words about the methods of probability assessment known as "probability risk analysis" [PRA]. PRA is a method of highlighting the greatest weaknesses in systems and designs and the most dangerous potential accident scenarios. Thus, and only thus, is how specialists regard the results of PRA. PRA is an analytical

method, an instrument. The results of PRA should not be the subject of sensational press "revelations" because their oversimplified interpretation reduces society to panic. For example, in the framework of this approach, the risk of a fatality in a road accident is also 100 times greater than in railroad accidents.

A conclusion on the safety of AES's with RBMK-type reactors (like the safety of any AES in principle) can be made only by specialists after a range of scientific studies. It should be taken into account that there are no reactors at foreign nuclear power stations that are exactly identical to ours. Similar designs were used by the Americans, as in our country, to produce plutonium before 1987. Tube-type and graphite reactors are well known from the experience of their operation in Britain, France, and Canada. Therefore, the specialists' expert findings on the general problems of the nuclear power industry should be viewed with great caution.

Representatives of Britain, France, Italy, Germany, Finland, Lithuania, Russia, and Ukraine, as well as observers from the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] and the EC Commission, adopted in Moscow last October a decision on the organization of an international project whose ultimate aim is to increase safety in the operation of AES's with RBMK reactors. It is planned to conduct an analysis of the safety of AES's with RBMK reactors (including PRA) at the very first stage of the implementation of this project.

As for the Swedish authorities' reaction to the experts' conclusion, it is aimed not at the total "preparation of the Swedish public for the fact that there could be an accident not far from the borders," but at planning emergency measures in the event of an accident at an AES. Such work is being or already has been conducted in most countries operating nuclear power stations. **The Swedish authorities have organized a group of specialists which could go to the scene of an accident at a nuclear power station in Europe or elsewhere in the world and assess on the spot the scale of that accident and the assistance needed to eliminate the after-effects.**

In conclusion, we would like to rectify two inaccuracies in the IZVESTIYA article: There are 16 RBMK reactors in operation at AES's on the territory of Russia, Ukraine, and Lithuania, and the St. Petersburg AES has no problems with the loss of highly skilled cadres.

[Signed] A. Yeperin, director of the Leningrad AES; Ye. Adamov, director of the NIKIET [expansion unknown] and general designer; V. Kurnosov, director of the VNIPIET [expansion unknown] and general planner; Ye. Velikhov, director of the I.V. Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy and scientific leader; and A. Abagyan, director of the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of AES's.

Nuclear Issues

Leningrad Nuclear Power Station Shuts Down

LD2403052992 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0443 GMT 24 Mar 92

[By unidentified ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Moscow, 24 Mar (TASS)—At 0237 on 24 March 1992 the automatic accident protection device kicked in on the third unit of the Leningradskaya AES [nuclear power station] which was working at a nominal capacity level. The reason was damage to one of the technological channels of the the reactor chamber.

The systems for the discharge and transfer of the reactor in a subcritical state operated in the established manner.

According to preliminary assessments, it was reported to ITAR- TASS at the Public Relations Information Directorate of the Russian Federation Ministry of Atomic Energy, the event comes under the third class of the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] seven-point scale.

The release of radiation in the form of inert gases and iodine into the air via the AES purification filters does not exceed the requirements of the sanitary norms for such installations.

In keeping with regulations, the personnel at the nuclear station are carrying out standard operations on shutdown cooling of the unit that has stopped. [Moscow TASS in English at 0939 GMT on 24 March in a related report adds: "An accident which occurred early on Tuesday at the Leningrad power plant was 'envisaged in the project,' the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry told TASS on Tuesday. It was a 'projected accident,' it added without elaboration."]

Nearby Facilities 'Contaminated'

LD2403123392 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1100 GMT 24 Mar 92

[Report by correspondent Denis Gurinskiy]

[Text] At 0237 in the morning, due to a sharp rise in technological pressure in the reactor plant of the third power set of the Leningradskaya nuclear power station, located in the settlement of Sosnovyy Bor, there was an accidental leak of iodine, gas and nucleides into the atmosphere.. According to a report handed to the mayor of St Petersburg, it was also recorded that the permissible norm for the radioactive level inside the power set had been exceeded fourfold at the moment of the accident. Representatives of the station reported that 100 micro-roentgens per hour had been recorded at the reactor site, as against a norm of 25, and in the surrounding area of the set 50-60 micro-roentgens per hour, as against a norm of 15.

The wind was blowing in the direction of Finland at that moment, at 5 meters per second. The emission of the reactor's technological components into the atmoshpere consisted of the following, in relation to the norm: for gas—six times, for iodine—ten times, and for nucleides—three times. The Leningradskaya nuclear power station management deny any serious leak of radioactive raw material from the reactor, but admit that the accident has contaminated nearby facilities and soil with ordinary chemical compounds. In their report to Mayor Sobchak, the station management also said that the station's automatic protection system instantly stopped the third power set, and that were no casualties as a result of the accident.

Radio Russia's correspondent was told at the nuclear power station's operational headquarters that the station's third power set is currently being cooled, and is to undergo many months of capital reconstruction. At the power set special units of the station's technicians and of the civil defense headquarters are intensively carrying out immediate decontamination operations. The first assessments of the accident at the nuclear power station last night say that the incident is classified by the IAEA as a reactor accident of the third level of danger.

Radioactive 'Wind' Headed to Moscow

LD2403095392 Moscow TASS in English 0945 GMT 24 Mar 92

[Moscow TASS in English at 1106 GMT on 24 March kills the following item]

[Text] Moscow March 24 TASS—The radioactive leak from the Leningrad nuclear power plant, which occurred early on Tuesday [24 March], should be moving towards Moscow if the Russian State Meteorological Centre was correct in its weather forecast. The wind was reported to be blowing in the south-east direction at a speed of 3-7 metres per second.

Atomic Ministry Releases Statement

LD2403124192 Moscow TASS in English 1233 GMT 24 Mar 92

[Text] Moscow March 24 TASS—Follows the official English-language text of the statement of the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry on the incident at the Leningradskaya nuclear power, received by TASS from the ministry's press centre on Tuesday [24 March].

On March 24, 1992, at 2.37 A.M. at unit No 3 of Leningradskaya NPP [nuclear power plant] which worked at nominal parameters reactor emergency protection actuated on damage of one of the fuel channels.

Reactor load reduction and bringup to subcritical conditions were done under rules.

By the preliminary evaluation the event is classified as level 3, INES [International Nuclear Event Scale] scale.

Releases of inert gases and iodium to the environment through NPP aerosole filters do not exceed the requirements of sanitary rules and regulations for facilities of this type.

In accordance with the regulations the NPP personnel is executing the regular operations of cooling down of the stopped unit.

By special appointment of the minister, V. Mikhailov, an investigating commission began to work on 24.03.92 at Leningradskaya NPP.

Situation Said 'Normal'

LD2403105992 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1000 GMT 24 Mar 92

[Excerpts] As we have already reported, the third unit of the Leningradskaya nuclear plant was shut down last night. Our correspondent contacted Sosnovyy Bor, where the plant is located, and spoke to Aleksandr Genrikhovich Petrov, who is responsible for safety at the plant. This is what he had to say:

[Begin Petrov recording] [passage omitted] The situation at the plant and outside the plant in the town of Sosnovyy Bor is normal, in no way different from normal. The general background radiation in the town does not exceed 18 microroentgen per hour. So, further actions will be as follows: The unit will have to be cooled down for 48 hours, and after that normal repair work will start so as to replace a duct. This will take several days. I can say that the inhabitants of St. Petersburg and those who live around the Leningradskaya nuclear plant have no grounds for concern. [end recording] [Moscow TASS in English at 1333 GMT on 24 March in a related report adds: "There were and will be no radioactive leaks, exceeding the norm, into the atmosphere and the Gulf of Finland," according to the official on duty at the Leningradskaya nuclear power plant, where an incident happened early on Tuesday. "I state as a professional that the electronic protection system of the plant was activated as programmed," Anatoliy Kuznetsov told TASS on Tuesday. "The level of radiation on the territory surrounding the plant, in Sosnovyy Bor, in St. Petersburg, where our monitoring groups are stationed, is in between 14 and 19 microroentgen," he added.]

Cloud '10 Times Above Normal'

LD2403131292 Stockholm Sveriges Radio Network in Swedish 1130 GMT 24 Mar 92

[Report from Helsinki by reporter Kristina Gustafsson]

[Excerpt] At 0030 Swedish time part of the reactor core [as heard] was damaged in one of the old reactors at the Sosnovyy Bor nuclear plant four [Swedish] miles [40 kilometers] west of St. Petersburg. According to information from the Green Party in St. Petersburg, radioactivity has leaked out of the reactor. A cloud with

increased radiation has drifted toward Vyborg, where radiation 10 times higher than normal has been measured.

Ivan Blukov from the Green Party of St. Petersburg told this station that the information department at the nuclear plant refuses to give information on the amounts of radioactivity that have leaked into the atmosphere. [passage omitted]

Center Official Comments

LD2403104392 Helsinki Suomen Yleisradio Network in Finnish 0900 GMT 24 Mar 92

[Text] There was a nuclear incident in the early hours of the morning at the nuclear power station in Sosnovy Bor. During the accident some radioactive gas and iodine leaked into the air from the third reactor of the plant situated 100 km west of St. Petersburg. Our reporter spoke to Antti Vuorinen, head of the Radiation Protection Center:

[Begin recording] [Vuorinen] The international scale includes seven levels of seriousness. This incident has been classified as being on the third level. The three lowest levels are what are called incidents, more or less technical incidents, which do not have serious security consequences for people or the environment. The four higher levels are actual accidents.

[Reporter] But radioactivity has leaked out?

[Vuorinen] Radioactive substances have leaked out of the plant. The Russians say that this is within permissible levels, but they do not say whether there have been any emissions exceeding the norms.

[Reporter] How serious do you think this incident is?

[Vuorinen] Well, this is difficult to say. What has happened there is damage to a fuel channel. This is part of the difficulties of this plant. It is a very sad incident, but as long as it is only one fuel channel this plant will cope with it well technically. Protection measures have been scaled to the fact that no harm has been done from the point of view of the outside. [as heard]

[Reporter] Doesn't this endanger inhabitants near there?

[Vuorinen] It has been said that in the town of Sosnovy Bor, which is in the immediate vicinity, the situation is totally normal. Of course, there is a threatening situation there until the incident has passed, but the stopping of the reactor happened in a controlled manner and according to plans.

[Reporter] Is it still leaking?

[Vuorinen] I had telephone contact there and was told that as soon as the reactor cools down—it cannot be cooled suddenly—the leak will become smaller. It was reported that the initial leak was small.

[Reporter] But is it still leaking to some extent?

[Vuorinen] Yes.

[Reporter] Have there been increased radiation levels observed here in Finland?

[Vuorinen] No, that has not been observed.

[Reporter] Can we trust the information this time? Six years ago no radiation was observed either.

[Vuorinen] That is not true. Wait a minute, six years ago, what do you mean?

[Reporter] I mean Chernobyl.

[Vuorinen] Radiation was observed in Finland and reported right away, at least the Radiation Protection Center reported it right away. That sort of accusation in this connection is totally groundless.

[Reporter] So now the Finns have no reason to be worried?

[Vuorinen] No. They did not need to be worried six years ago either. Luckily there has been no need to be worried in Finland so far, if you believe our information.

[Reporter] General Manager Vuorinen, one more question: Could this lead to the final closure of this reactor?

[Vuorinen] That I do not know. We will learn later. I hope so. [end recording]

The most serious power plant leaks in Finland have been at level two. The Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant accident in 1986 was seven on the scale of seriousness of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The nuclear plant in Sosnovyy Bor, which now has a leak, is the same type as Chernobyl. The faulty reactor has been closed according to TASS news agency, but a representative of the Russian Nuclear Energy Ministry could not say whether the leak continues. According to him the level of radiation in Sosnovyy Bor is between 1,000 to 3,000 curies. The normal level of radiation is about 500 curies.

Reportage on Congress of Ethnic Germans

LD2303212492 Moscow TASS in English 1958 GMT 21 Mar 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Sergey Ryabinkin]

[Text] Moscow, March 21 TASS—The emerging identity of views on the solution of the problem of ethnic Germans on the part of the Russian leadership, Germany and the Interstate Council for the Rehabilitation of Germans from the Former USSR was a characteristic feature of the second day of the Congress of Ethnic Germans from Russia and other CIS Member States. Chairman of the State Committee for the Affairs of Nationalities of Russia Valeriy Tishkov, Secretary of State of the German Interior Ministry Horst Waffenschmidt and Chairman of the Interstate Council Heinrish Grout, who spoke at the forum today, pointed out that it is necessary to cooperate closely in working out solutions to the problems of ethnic Germans living on the territory of the former USSR.

The report of Horst Waffenschmidt, who is in charge of the problem of migrants in the German Government, was the highlight of today's session. He urged all Germans to take advantage of the opportunities opening now in Russia and other CIS republics for the life, work and preservation of original culture and traditions. The German leadership is going to render various kinds of assistance to Russian Germans and to all the population living together with them in the national regions and districts, as well as, in the future, to the autonomous entity of Germans in the Volga Region.

Waffenschmidt again assured Russian Germans that they may continue to emigrate to Germany. Last year Germany accepted 220,000 German settlers, of whom 150,000 were Russian Germans. About one million German settlers from eastern and south eastern Europe moved to Germany over the past three years. However, the possibilities even of countries like Germany are limited. This is why there will be no uncontrolled immigration of ethnic Germans to Germany by-passing the law, he stressed.

According to Heinrich Grout, the orientation towards emigration continues to be a priority for Russian Germans. In his opinion, the recognition of this fact both by the German and Russian authorities will make it possible to settle all problems, connected both with emigration and with the restoration of statehood and the implementation of local projects in the regions for Germans, who will remain in Russia. Cooperation of governments of the two countries with the representative organs elected by the congress will be an indispensable condition for the settlement of those problem, Grout believes.

Concluding Remarks Cited

LD2303220692 Moscow TASS in English 1710 GMT 22 Mar 92

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Sergey Ryabikin]

[Text] Moscow, March 22 TASS—Speeches of delegates to the forum showed the determination of ethnic Germans in Russia in the effort for rehabilitation and restoration of the Volga German Republic illegally eliminated by the Stalin regime. However, they have no illusions about prospects for their national future. This was noted by Heinrich Groth, chairman of the interstate council for the Rehabilitation of Germans of the Former USSR, in his concluding remarks at the Second Congress of Ethnic Germans in Russia.

Groth believes the German movement in Russia should be developing in three directions—the struggle for the rehabilitation, emigration and care for Germans in localities where German communities exist. He said emigration processes had become top priority processes and that the interstate council intended to work out jointly with leaders of Russia and the FRG a programme for the resettlement of ethnic Germans from Russia in Germany. The interstate council intends to ensure the implementation of the programme within three to five years.

Hugo Wormsbecher, leader of the opposition section in the German movement, said the congress had failed to analyse the objective situation and provide an action programme. The congress had not generated activity of people and had not indicated the line of constructive action.

The congress's resolution says that the ensurance of ethnic and physical survival of people is a strategic goal of the German national movement. The Ukrainian President's initiative in inviting ethnic Germans to Ukraine where as many Germans as in the Volga reaches resided before the Second World War has been given a positive appraisal. However, the resolution says that resettlement of Germans in Ukraine should not be regarded as an alternative to the autonomous formation on the Volga.

The next Congress of Germans of the Former USSR is planned for October, 1992.

Congress Ends

LD2403063292 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0900 GMT 23 Mar 92

[Text] The special congress of Germans of the former USSR ended in Moscow on 22 March. A resolution was adopted which contains a demand to the leadership of Russia and Germany to give immediate assistance to Soviet Germans in their departure for Germany.

U.S. Urged To Pay for Damage to CIS Submarine

PM2403113492 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 21 Mar 92 p 5

[Article by N. Mormul, former chief of the Northern Fleet Technical Directorate: "Don't Play the Fool, America! Why Should We Not Take the U.S. Navy to Court?"]

[Text] On 11 February 1992 the U.S. nuclear-powered strike submarine Baton Rouge and a CIS Joint Armed Forces nuclear-powered attack submarine collided near the entrance to Kola Bay in the Northern Fleet's combat training area. Of course, this was a sensation to many people but not to regular submariners. In 30 years' naval service I have repeatedly encountered, and then repaired, submarines returning from the increasingly "crowded" ocean with mangled conning towers or damaged bows. Such damage can be received only from a collision with submarines or surface ships.

In the seventies, in the Mediterranean, a nuclear-powered submarine of ours with cruise missiles on board collided, on surfacing, with a U.S. Navy surface ship.

In 1973, in the Caribbean, a nuclear-powered submarine of ours collided at a fair speed at a depth of over 120 meters with an uncharted reef. The blow was so powerful that the torpedo tubes, loaded with conventional and nuclear weapons, were "bent" 90 degrees. It was a miracle that the boat's machinery was not ripped from its foundations and that the emergency reactor protection was not triggered.

There have been several more underwater occurrences, leaving behind a considerable number of mysterious secrets. In the last decade there have been only two cases when there has been no doubt about the "authorship" of an incident: The latest, on 11 February 1992, and a similar situation in 1981, also in Kola Bay. The only difference is that in 1981 the U.S. submarine rammed the stern section of one of our latest strategic submarine missile cruisers.

On that occasion our boat surfaced and got back to base under its own steam. A naval commission, of which I was a member, discovered pieces of conning tower skin, Plexiglas, and countersunk bolts in the damaged tanks. It was established that they came from a U.S. Sturgeon-class submarine.

Some days later a U.S nuclear-powered submarine with a damaged conning tower surfaced in the area of the British Holy Loch naval base. We requested a further check. Yes, it was reported to us, it is a Sturgeon-class boat...

At that time such commissions' findings were naturally not published in the press. Only now can I talk about the main conclusion. By simulating the two submarines' maneuvering, the commission established that the U.S. submarine was **following**ours, staying in its acoustic shadow. When the USSR submarine changed course, the underwater "sleuth" did not have time to react and blindly sliced into the stern with its conning tower.

The February incident in Kola Bay was not followed by diplomatic incidents either from the Russian Federation or the United States. However, both sides admitted the fact that the submarines collided underwater, which could not have been even suggested in pre-perestroyka times. Another sign of democratization: The captain of our submarine was not punished. He was indeed not to blame. The author of the clumsy maneuver was the U.S. submarine captain. In that case why should the American side not pay the cost of repairing our damaged submarine? I believe that the CIS Navy should file a claim at the International Court and that the submarine should be repaired at the U.S. Navy's expense.

The United States is a country with deep-seated democratic traditions that respects and observes laws. When, for example, two seiners clash and the International Court recovers money from the guilty party, nobody doubts the legality of such actions. Why can we not bring a claim in the case of a collision between submarines?

After all, it is not only lawful but also economically necessary for us to file a claim against the U.S. Navy as the guilty party in the occurrence. Despite the mutual assurances about the insignificance of the damage, I think that the case is otherwise. The conning tower hit the hull from below. It was a powerful blow, since our boat actually caved in. Even nonspecialists realize what happens when two huge metal objects weighing 8,000 and 6,000 tonnes collide. The repair of our submarine requires considerable material expenditures.

Friendship is friendship, but if you are guilty you have to pay... If we keep silent now, if we do not act according to laws accepted in civilized society, we will simply not be understood—least of all abroad.

Vance Mission to Nagorno-Karabakh Noted

PM1903145992 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 Mar 92 Morning Edition p 4

[Vladimir Mikheyev report: "UN Secretary General's Representative Starts Peace Mission in Nagorno-Karabakh"]

[Text] Since the formation of sovereign republics amid the wreckage of the USSR, free to choose their foreign policy strategy and allies, states that historically gravitate toward different systems of values and political alliances, the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh has shown every sign of becoming a headache not only for the parties directly involved.

Since Armenia and Azerbaijan became members of the United Nations there has also been a legal basis for "internationalizing" fully and definitively the efforts to settle this undeclared war. The visit to this hot spot by Cyrus Vance, the UN secretary general's special envoy, that began on Tuesday 17 March] is confirmation of this.

C. Vance's talks with Azerbaijan's Acting President Yagub Mamedov and the republic's Prime Minister Gasan Gasanov took place in a businesslike atmosphere, but the details are still not known. C. Vance canceled the planned press conference, saying he had to gather more thorough information about the crisis situation before voicing his ideas. He will submit a report to the UN Security Council regarding the results of his trip. The details of C. Vance's route have been kept secret "for reasons of security." After Baku, meetings await him with Armenian leaders in Yerevan. The Azerbaijan outpost of Agdam beside Nagorno-Karabakh is being named among the "hotspots."

In the opinion of observers, the UN envoy is testing the ground regarding sending international peacekeeping forces to this contentious mountain enclave. Last month UN "blue helmets" were deployed in Yugoslavia and Cambodia. In this case the two sides will have to agree; however, Armenia intends to suggest at the 20 March conference in Kiev that CIS Armed Forces be sent there, while Azerbaijan has already rejected this option, saying that it is a matter of the republic's "internal affairs." "We are against any state's troops, including UN forces, being sent there," Ya. Mamedov said.

If C. Vance is expecting to act as a vigorous intermediary in the long term, he will inevitably have to seek arguments promoting a compromise between Yerevan's and Baku's two initial demands; the Armenians are insisting on "gestures of goodwill" and concessions from the Azerbaijanis before coming to the negotiating table, while the Azerbaijanis see the withdrawal of Armenian armed formations from Nagorno-Krabakh as an indispensable condition.

Since Yerevan wants to assume the role of a "secondary" party to the talks, giving representatives from Baku and Nagorno-Karabakh itself the fore, the peace missions will only be effective when all interested parties are involved in the dialogue, namely the official authorities, radical opposition movements, and field commanders that frequently operate at their own risk.

The cautious skepticism voiced by I. Gambarov, head of the People's Front parliamentary faction in Azerbaijan, is worth noting: "It would be naive to expect one man to be able to solve the problem simply by coming to the table and talking with each of the sides in turn." Obviously, one of the things that C. Vance will have observed is the considerable difference of opinions about what is going on—it is no coincidence that Azerbaijan Foreign Minister Guseynaga Sadykhov used the stay by the UN secretary general's envoy to send this warning to the opposing side. If C. Vance does not succeed at Baku's prompting in persuading the Armenians to lay down their weapons, Azerbaijan will ask the UN Security Council "to introduce sanctions against Armenia." This prompts the supposition that Yerevan and Baku will try to win over representatives of international peace missions to support their demands by playing the "UN card" or the "CSCE card" in their own interests.

Evidently, the UN secretary general can see this danger and has for that reason agreed to an ostentatious action: Dzh. Stefanidos, UN representative in Tehran, met Iranian Foreign Minister 'Ali Akbar Velayati to express UN approval for his country's peace efforts. Does the United Nations not want to "keep its distance" so as not to get involved in another difficult conflict? C. Vance stressed straightaway on arrival in Baku that the question of the United Nations taking a direct part in settling the conflict is still open.

UN's Butrus Ghali's Remarks on CIS Cited

LD2003214792 Moscow TASS in English 2157 GMT 19 Mar 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Yevgeniy Menkes]

[Text] United Nations, March 20—United Nations Secretary-General Butrus Butrus Ghali held on Thursday [19 March] at the United Nations headquarters his first news conference after assuming the post of the United Nations chief.

Asked by ITAR-TASS, he said he intends to seek the strengthening of relations between the U.N. and new independent states, former union republics. The United Nations intends to step up cooperation with former union republics, specifically in the technological and information areas.

Butrus Ghali said that under the United Nations Charter, the CIS and similar international organisations cannot be United Nations members but cooperation between the United Nations and regional organisations is possible and desirable.

Summing up the United Nations activity over the 79 days that he has been in office as secretary-general, Butrus Ghali mentioned such problems as the Yugoslav, Cambodian, Somalian, Iraqi, Libyan and others. Butrus Ghali welcomed the statement of Afghan President Najibollah about his readiness to resign. He said this would help the United Nations to convene a conference on the settlement in Afghanistan. It can be held in Geneva or Vienna late in April.

The U.N. secretary-general declared for democratisation of international relations. He said he means a more active participation of all the 175 U.N. member-countries in the solution of various problems. He said the first stage of the restructuring in the U.N. Secretariat had begun. It is aimed at ensuring greater efficiency of the Secretariat. The second stage will be embarked upon in a year.

Credit for Israel, Aid for CIS Link Eyed

PM2303164992 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Mar 92 Morning Edition p 4

[Aleksandr Shalnev report: "Influential Congressmen Link Financial Aid for CIS With Credits for Israel"]

[Text] Washington—Our hopes of the United States offering us massive aid will be thoroughly undermined if George Bush's administration does not reach agreement with Congress over the next two weeks on a question that one would have thought concerns us alone.

It is a question of U.S. state guarantees for credits of $10 billion that Israel would like to obtain for resettlement programs for Jews from the former Soviet Union. Washington is willing to give these guarantees, but only on condition that Israel totally abandons the construction of new Jewish settlements on all the occupied territories. Tel Aviv categorically opposes this linkage, considering it quite superfluous and insulting to the Israelis.

All this concerns us most directly now since those congressmen and senators who are insisting on unconditional, unfailing guarantees for Tel Aviv have told the administration: If there are no guarantees for Israel, there will be no money for aid programs for Russia and the other Commonwealth countries.

What is more, the administration, as I understand it, was also told that there can be no question of legislative ratification for the $12 billion that the United States promised to pay into the IMF by the end of last year. Without this $12 billion, as Michel Camdessus, executive director of the IMF, hinted fairly transparently on Wednesday [18 March], it is hard to believe that Russia and the other former union republics will get what they have long been expecting on joining the fund.

The situation in terms of guarantees for Israel is obviously deadlocked. The series of proposals made by Bush and Secretary of State James Baker late last week did not meet with enthusiasm from those people on Capitol Hill who uphold Israel's interests with even greater vigor than U.S. interests. Yet these proposals contain a fair amount of compromise. A statement on Wednesday by State Department spokesperson Margaret Tutwiler indicates that the administration has relaxed its previously fairly tough stance and will agree to Israel completing construction of settlements begun before 1 January this year.

The debates cannot go on ad infinitum. The foreign aid bill, one of whose key elements was guarantees for Israel, must be adopted—in one form or another—by 31 March. The same bill also discusses the problem of aid to the former Soviet Union. One has been made dependent on the other.

When M. Tutwiler was asked on Wednesday how the situation in terms of credits for Tel Aviv will affect aid to the CIS, she replied that "it is still hard to tell," but she admitted that there is a connection.

Let us, however, return to the IMF executive director, who spoke at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce on Wednesday. He said that, according to his estimates, the question of Russian and other CIS states' membership of the fund would be decided within the month and that the former Soviet republics would be able to start receiving IMF aid by the summer.

That is good news. On the other hand, Michel Camdessus' statements also aired the idea that Russia must not rely particularly on the stabilization fund, which, according to the Kremlin's plans, is designed to strengthen the ruble's position. I asked the executive director to clarify this point. According to Camdessus, "there are no magic solutions to the problem of stabilizing currencies, and it would be an illusion to think that this problem will be solved in Russia by setting up the fund." The fund will only be effective, the IMF executive director continued, if its formation is preceded by the introduction of a tough financial and monetary policy. Then, Camdessus stressed, the fund would be an element making this policy more creditworthy. If the fund is set up without "firm budgetary and monetary policy," the whole thing will dissolve, the executive director thinks, in three or five days.

What I heard from Camdessus does not, I think, entirely accord with the confident statements that appeared in the Moscow press following the latest round of behind-the-scenes talks with the IMF in Washington. It seemed then that the question of setting up the stabilization fund in cooperation with the international fund had already effectively been decided. I would remind you that if the $12 billion is not received from the United States, this idea will remain up in the air, even if the IMF itself agrees to it. There are as yet no guarantees that Washington will provide these $12 billion.

States Urged To Demonstrate CIS' 'Vitality'

PM2403105592 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Mar 92 p 2

[Observer Aleksandr Golts commentary under "Topic of the Week" rubric: "CIS Idea Still Hard To Comprehend, But the West Is Trying Nevertheless"]

[Text] At one time the Ottoman Empire was known as the "sick man of Europe." Sad though it is to admit, there is now every reason to give the same title to our Commonwealth, still struggling to get onto its feet. The question of how to coexist with this "sick man" within the confines of the same continent, land mass, or planet has become international problem number one for many states in both East and West.

Especially as our crisis is becoming an increasingly obvious threat to the security and well-being of our neighbors near and far. Armed nationalist formations are eager to gain access to Army and Navy arsenals. One can only guess what they will get their hands on: hail gun installations, anti-aircraft missiles, combat helicopters, or radioactive material. Incidentally, attempts are apparently already being made to sell radioactive material produced in our country on the Western "black market."

"Since the USSR ceased to exist as a single whole from the point of view of security strategy, the general staffs of many countries have worked out the most diverse scenarios for the possible development of the situation," LE QUOTIDIEN DE PARIS observes. "These include, in

particular, the possibility of the former Soviet Army's disintegrating into hostile groups, large-scale civil war breaking out, even involving the use of tactical weapons, and nuclear ammunition being seized by 'corrupt officers' and resold to Third World countries."

Before these nightmare scenarios become reality, our partners are urgently considering how best to respond to the development of the situation in the CIS. Several possible options for mutual relations have been made more or less public this week.

One such option was outlined in Brussels at a session of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. NATO created this body specially, to gradually build collaboration and coordinate efforts with the East European states and the crisis-racked USSR—and subsequently with the CIS countries. The working protocol adopted for 1992 gives a clear picture of how NATO would like to see this cooperation develop. Essentially, we are talking about consultations and exchanges of opinion on the entire range of security problems such as military strategy and planning, the structure of armed forces, arms control, relations between military and civilian authorities, the planning of defense budgets, conversion, and other matters.

By acting in this way, the West not only hopes to obtain reliable information on the CIS countries' views on defense problems, it also hopes to be able to influence these views. This "soft" approach counts on the controlled development of events in the CIS. The question is: Can this intention be realized? After all, the session devoted its main attention to the Karabakh conflict. The possibility of NATO's becoming directly involved in its settlement was discussed. In that case consultations are not going to be enough.

So it is not surprising that another option has been proposed in addition to the "therapeutic" method of dealing with CIS-related security problems demonstrated in Brussels. An extremely tough option. I am referring to the Pentagon's draft "Defense Directives," which have appeared in the press. We will not mention the blatantly imperial claims formulated in this document. They have rightly prompted strong protest in the United States itself and among its closest allies. If we single out the sections relevant to the former USSR, we see that the Pentagon's plans are as simple as a cudgel, and just as benevolent. The U.S. military department argues that, as the CIS's military potential is still considerable, it is necessary to keep nuclear missiles targeted on objectives that are "the most important in the opinion of present and future leaders of Russia and other possible enemies" (the word "enemies" says a great deal!). In other words, a straitjacket in the form of nuclear missiles is essentially being proposed for the CIS.

A memorandum from former U.S. President R. Nixon is an original response to this approach. He sharply criticizes the West—and the United States first and foremost—for dragging its feet over the question of giving massive economic aid for the reforms in the CIS, and Russia in particular. Nixon believes that the assistance being given at present is "pitiful and inadequate to the dangers which the crisis in the former USSR entails." In the former U.S. president's opinion, the fate of the reforms will decide "whether we win the last battle of the cold war." If Yeltsin is beaten, Nixon warns, a new despotism will be established, which will lead to fresh confrontation.

So, as we can see, plenty of methods of conducting affairs with the CIS have been suggested. But, so far, neither individual countries nor the West as a whole have come up with a final solution in this connection. Should the CIS countries simply sit by in this situation and wait to see what it is decided will be done with them? Of course not! In the final analysis, the world community's attitude to us and its choice will be decided by how mature the former Soviet republics show themselves to be.

It is time we finally realized that sovereignty does not consist in flags and emblems or in our own "individual" uniforms and letters on shoulder straps. It lies primarily in our ability to protect our citizens, guarantee human rights, and ensure calm on our borders. We can only do that together.

It sometimes seems that the CIS states are prepared to delegate their problems to the first international institution that comes along: NATO, the United Nations—it does not really matter, just so long as they do not have to deal with them themselves. But why, in fact, should Czechoslovakia, France, or Iran have a greater interest in ending the bloodshed in Karabakh than the Ukraine or Belarus? In the meantime, the CIS has not even begun to take any action to settle its conflicts. As the Commonwealth's members hold different viewpoints on the nature of the CIS, there are still no permanent consultative bodies which could work out a common approach to vitally important matters of state. Our states have proved themselves unable to work together. (Many avoid taking any action at all).

Right now the CIS idea certainly is hard to comprehend. Although, as we can see, the West is trying nevertheless. Perhaps the time has come to help it. It is time to demonstrate the Commonwealth's vitality and its ability to make collective decisions. Not just so that the West believes it. Mainly so that we believe it ourselves.

Forum Seeks Ways To Help CIS Scientists

PM2403094092 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Mar 92 Morning Edition p 6

[Mikhail Ilinskiy report: "Bruno Pontecorvo: Russia's Nuclear Physicists Not on the Market"]

[Text] Rome—The government of the region of Valle d'Aosta in northern Italy has organized an international meeting of physicists. One of the aims of the colloquium is to help scientists from Eastern Europe.

The forum's participants include the well-known physicist Bruno Pontecorvo. He emigrated to Stalin's Soviet Union in 1950. Eight months ago he returned to Italy and favors giving concrete aid to scientists from Eastern Europe, in particular his colleagues from Russia and other CIS states.

These scientists are not on the market, he told journalists. It would be a tremendous mistake to think that they can be bought for a few thousand dollars. You have to respect their pride. Scientists do not need charity, but equitable cooperation, they need to participate in and develop joint programs, and they need to obtain all the necessary equipment and materials for their work.

What outcome does Bruno Pontecorvo see, how does he regard the initiatives by Baker and Genscher, who are striving to prevent CIS scientists working on the problems of nuclear energy from ending up in Iraq or Libya?

I approach this question from a different angle, B. Pontecorvo said. The United States, Germany, and other Western countries should not base their calculations on increasing their superiority in the scientific sphere by obtaining the best minds from Eastern Europe. That is not the way to help the East and science as a whole. We must not allow progressive science with its unique minds to collapse once and for all with the collapse of the USSR. This problem is not solved by buying brains.

Bruno Pontecorvo himself supports the plan suggested by Nobel prizewinner Carlo Rubbia from Geneva. The aim of the plan is to create a special fund from which money would be drawn to fund the research activity of 5,000 leading scientists and specialists from Russia and other CIS states. In 10 years the fund should obtain $100 million per year. Some 50 percent of the capital would be provided by the countries of Western Europe and the same amount from the United States, Canada, and Japan. A noble mission for a noble purpose.

Turin's LA STAMPA writes that Carlo Rubbia spoke of this project in his message to French President F. Mitterrand and Italian Foreign Minster Gianni de Michelis. As yet only Paris has responded positively to this suggestion. Other Western politicians are, in Bruno Pontecorvo's opinion, only concerned with scientists who have knowledge of nuclear secrets.

CIS Summit

TASS Carries CIS Documents Adopted 20 Mar

Appeal to UN for Help in Chernobyl

LD2303173292 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1638 GMT 23 Mar 92

["Appeal from the Heads of State of Belarus, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine to the United Nations Organization for help in Overcoming the Consequences of the Chernobyl Disaster"]

[Text] [no dateline as received] The accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power station on 26 April 1986 can, in terms of scale and the damage caused, be classed as one of the very worst accidents in the history of mankind to result from technical failure. It ranks among global disasters from the point of view of radiation contamination of the biosphere.

The Chernobyl disaster affected the lives of millions of people in many countries of the world. It continues to have a negative impact on the lives and health of people, and particularly children, above all in the affected areas of Belarus, Ukraine, and Russia.

The extreme nature of the situation is made worse by the potential danger of the "sarcophagus" and the lack of world experience in overcoming the consequences of a disaster on this scale.

Thanks to UN efforts, particularly last year, when an international program for overcoming the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster was approved, a genuine wide-ranging international cooperation to overcome the consequencs of the catastrophe has been outlined.

However, the sharp deterioration in the situation in the former USSR and the cessation of its existence prevented the United Nations from beginning the implementation of this idea. The three most affected UN member states, which have appeared on the map of the world as a result of the disintegration of the USSR and have been recognized by the world, have in practice found themselves alone in facing the consequences of a global catastrophe which presents a threat to certain neighboring states as well.

Our great sense of responsibility to our peoples for the grave consequences of the accident, which will have an extremely negative effect on the lives and activities of people in the affected areas for a long time yet, prompts us on behalf of our peoples to appeal to the world community to give fresh impetus to the international program to overcome the aftermath of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power station.

We call on the United Nations Organization to mobilize the efforts of the world community to help our states in overcoming the aftermath of the Chernobyl disaster.

* * *

The appeal is signed by Vyacheslav Shushkevich, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Belarus; Boris Yeltsin, president of the Russian Federation; and Leonid Kravchuk, president of Ukraine.

Declaration on Rejecting Use of Force

LD2303190792 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1646 GMT 23 Mar 92

["Declaration on the Non-Use of Force or the Threat of Force in Relations between the CIS member states," issued by the CIS summit in Kiev on 20 March]

[Text] [no dateline as received] The Commonwealth member states:

Noting that rejection of using force or threatening its use, which is enshrined in the UN Charter and the CSCE final act, is an obligation which all states must observe,

Confirming their obligations to tackle all contentious problems by exclusively peaceful means, as was stated by the CIS heads of state in Alma-Ata on 21 December 1991 and in Minsk on 14 February 1992,

With the aim of ending bloodshed and localizing and averting tension,

And guided by the desire of the peoples of the Commonwealth for peace, security, and good-neighborliness,

declare as follows:

member states

1. Do not permit the use of force or the threat of its use.

2. Do not deliver arms to zones of conflict.

3. Prevent attacks on troop units aimed at seizing weapons.

4. Refrain from organizing or encouraging the organization of irregular forces or armed bands, including mercenaries.

5. Refrain from fanning tension in relations between the Commonwealth states.

6. In the event of disputes arising between them, they will apply their efforts conscientiously and in a spirit of cooperation to reach a fair decision based on international law, within a short period of time.

To these ends, they will use such means for the peaceful settlement of disputes as talks, investigation, mediation, reconciliation, arbitration, court examination, or other peaceful means of their own choosing, including any procedure for settlement that was agreed before the disputes occurred and to which they may have been party, and apply the principles, tenets and norms for the

peaceful settlement of disputes that have been developed within the framework of the UN Organization and the CSCE.

7. Encourage the use of various forms of people's diplomacy and public initiative with the aim of averting the threat of inter-state conflicts.

8. Support the efforts of the international community and its instruments to settle conflicts on the territory of the Commonwealth states.

Done in Kiev on 20 March 1992 in a single original copy. The original is kept in the archives of the government of Belarus, which will forward a certified copy of this convention to the signatory states.

* * *

The declaration was signed by representatives of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine.

USSR Assets, Liabilities Agreement

LD2303184492 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1650 GMT 23 Mar 92

["Agreement on Sharing out of Assets and Liabilities of Former USSR State Bank Among Central Banks of the CIS member states"]

[Text] [no dateline as received] The member states to the present agreement have agreed to the following:

Article 1

For the purpose of sharing out the assets and liabilities of the former USSR State Bank, the central (national) banks of the CIS member states will set up a joint commission within one month and in accordance with constitutional procedures. The Central Bank of Russia will furnish the commission with all necessary materials from the liquidating commission, including the USSR State Bank's consolidated balance as of 1 January 1992, for its cognizance and processing.

Article 2

The commission will within one month devise a mechanism for sharing out the assets and liabilities as at 1 January 1992 and will submit it for the consideration of the heads of state.

Article 3

The present agreement comes into force from the day it is signed. Done in the city of Kiev on 20 March 1992 in one original in Russian. The original is to be lodged in the archive of the government of the Republic of Belarus, which will send attested copies to signatory states of the present agreement.

* * *

The declaration was signed by representatives of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine.

Decision on Price Formation Issues

LD2303185592 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1655 GMT 23 Mar 92

["Protocol Decision on Item 1 of the Agenda for the Session of the Council of Heads of State of CIS member states"]

[Text] [no dateline as received] Having discussed the draft agreement on the principles of regulating prices for vital raw materials, fuel and energy resources, materials and foodstuffs, the heads of governments of the CIS member states have reached an accord on the following:

1. To set up a working group from authorized representatives of the member states of the Commonwealth to analyze the effect of price, financial-credit, and tax policy on the socio-economic development of the CIS member states and to draw up coordinated proposals.

2. To instruct the above-mentioned working group to draw up, within a month, a draft agreement envisaging a comprehensive settlement of matters of price formation for products of inter-state exchange, taking into consideration the possibilities of joint financing of the development of the fuel and energy complex of the CIS member states.

3. To examine the results of the working group's work at the next session of the Council of Heads of State of the CIS member states.

4. Prior to examination of the results of this group's work and the adoption of a decision on this matter by the Council of Heads of State, the parties will refrain from raising prices for products supplied on a reciprocal basis.

* * *

The declaration was signed by representatives of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, the Russian Federation (without point 4 if point 2 is not fulfilled), Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine.

Agreement on Peacekeeping Group

LD2303193092 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1657 GMT 23 Mar 92

["Agreement on Groups of Military Observers and Collective Peacekeeping Forces in the Commonwealth of Independent States" adopted at the summit of CIS member states in Kiev on 20 March]

[Text] [no dateline as received] The participating states in the present agreement;

Proceeding from the goal declared by them in the Alma-Ata agreement of building democratic, law-governed states and relations which will develop upon a basis of respect for state sovereignty, for the inalienable right to self determination, for the principles of equal rights and noninterference in internal affairs, the rejection of the use of force or the threat of force, the peaceful settlement of disputes and respect for human rights and freedoms, including the rights of ethnic minorities,

Confirming their adherence to the goals and principles of the UN Charter,

Recognizing their responsibility for the preservation of civil peace and interethnic concord and seeking to take without delay coordinated practical measures for the purpose of promoting the establishment of an atmosphere of peace, stability, concord, and trust within the framework of the Commonwealth,

Have agreed on the following:

Article 1

Groups of military observers and of collective peacekeeping forces of the CIS member states (henceforward called "the peacekeeping group") are being created for the purpose of providing each other with assistance, on the basis of mutual agreement, in settling and preventing conflicts on the territory of any member of the Commonwealth that may arise on interethnic, religious, and political grounds and that entail the violation of human rights.

Article 2

The peacekeeping group carries out the functions and tasks which are placed upon it by a decision of the CIS Council of Heads of State adopted by common consent. Such a decision is adopted only in the event of a request being made by all the conflicting sides and also on condition that agreement is reached between them on a cessation of fire and of other hostile actions before the peacekeeping group is sent.

Article 3

The peacekeeping group is being formed to carry out tasks such as separation of the parties to the conflict; observation of the fulfillment of accords on cease-fires or truces; monitoring compliance with accords on disarmament between opposing sides; creation of conditions for the peaceful settlement of disputes and conflicts that arise; assistance in guaranteeing human rights and freedoms; and the provision of humanitarian aid, including aid in the event of ecological catastrophes or natural disasters. The peacekeeping group may not be used for participation in combat actions.

Article 4

The peacekeeping group is formed on a voluntary basis by the states that are party to this agreement, with the exception of the conflicting parties, through the provision of contingents of servicemen, of military or civilian observers or other civilian personnel, and also of aid and the corresponding service facilities, including the right of passage. So that the peacekeeping group can function properly, a provisional joint command is formed from representatives of the states that are party to this agreement.

The commander of the peacekeeping group is appointed by decision of the Council of Heads of State, and reports to it.

Article 5

The states that are party to this agreement undertake to strictly observe the peacemaking, neutral, and impartial status of the peacekeeping group, and to prevent involvement of those serving in it in direct military clashes in the interests of any of the conflicting parties; they will refrain from encouraging or committing acts that might undermine or hamper the execution by personnel of the group of its functions, and undertake any measures necessary to guarantee safety and to protect against any violent encroachments on the lives and health of the personnel.

Article 6

The states that are party to this agreement, in accordance with their obligations under the UN Charter and other international agreements, and by mutual agreement with each other, may consent to the participation of the military and civilian personnel of the peacekeeping group in peacemaking efforts undertaken by CSCE bodies and structures and in UN actions to maintain peace decided on by the Security Council.

Article 7

The states participating in the present agreement will hold talks between each other and will sign supplementary protocols on all specific issues linked with the formation of the peacekeeping groups, with their structure, their material and technical support, the legal status of their personnel, and the financing of their activity.

Done in the city of Kiev on 20 March 1992 in one original document in Russian. The original document is kept in the archives of the Government of the Republic of Belarus, which will send to the states participating in the present agreement an attested copy of it.

* * *

The agreement was signed by representatives of Azerbaijan (with the addition of the words: "Comes into force following ratification by the parliament of the Republic"), Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine (with the amendment: "In each specific case, the decision on the participation of Ukraine is taken by the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine")

Karabakh Observers, Peacekeepers Decision

LD2303182992 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1727 GMT 23 Mar 92

["Decision of the Council of Heads of States"]

[Text] [no dateline as received] 1. Should a request be forthcoming from Azerbaijan and Armenia, and should an agreement be reached between them to cease fire and to cease other hostile actions in the zone of the Karabakh conflict, to send a group of observers and collective peacekeeping forces there.

2. To instruct the heads of governments to prepare and to submit for endorsement by the Council of the Heads of States proposals concerning the composition of the observer group and of the collective peacekeeping forces being sent to the zone of the Karabakh conflict, the conditions of their financing and material- technical provision, legal status, and specific time-frames for the introduction of observer groups and peacekeeping forces.

3. To provide information on the decisions adopted to the UN bodies and structures, the CSCE, and other international organizations and countries and, with their consent, to organize interaction with them.

Done in the city of Kiev on 20 March 1992 in one original copy in the Russian language. The true copy is to be kept in the archives of the Government of the Republic of Belarus which will send a certified copy of the same to the states which have signed this decision.

* * *

The decision was signed by the representatives of Azerbaijan (with the proviso: "Becomes effective once it has been ratified by the parliament"), Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine.

Protocol on Rail Transport Council

LD2303231192 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1730 GMT 23 Mar 92

["Protocol on the Establishment of a Statute on a Council for Rail Transport of the member states of the Commonwealth and a Statute on a Board of Directors of the Council for Rail Transport"]

[Text] [no dateline as received] In executing the agreement on the coordinating bodies of rail transport of the Commonwealth of Independent States of 14 February 1992, the governments of the Azerbaijani Republic, the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, the Republic of Moldova, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, the Republic of Uzbekistan, and Ukraine, bearing in mind that the distribution of the overall fleet of freight wagons and containers will be carried out before the end of 1992, have agreed the following:

1. To establish a statute on a Council for Rail Transport of the member states of the Commonwealth (attached). To establish that the statute is valid until 31 December 1992.

2. To establish a statute on a board of directors of the Council for Rail Transport of the member states of the Commonwealth (attached).

* * *

The protocol has been signed by the representatives of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine.

Baltic States' Borders Protocol

LD2303183692 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1734 GMT 23 Mar 92

["Protocol on Examining the Matter of Installations for the Newly Formed State Borders of the Member States of the Commonwealth of Independent States"]

[Text] [no dateline as received] For the purposes of ensuring the security of the member states of the Commonwealth, the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation have agreed to examine matters of installations and equipment for the newly formed state borders with the Baltic states, formerly republics of the USSR, on the basis of a bilateral agreement.

Done in the city of Kiev on 20 March 1992 in one original version in Russian. The original is kept at the archives of the government of Belarus, which will send the Russian Federation a certified copy.

* * *

The protocol was signed by representatives of Belarus and the Russian Federation.

Decision on Border Troops Joint Command

LD2303194792 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1739 GMT 23 Mar 92

["Decision on the Joint Command of the Border Troops"]

[Text] [no dateline as received] Proceeding from the need for the coordinated settlement of practical matters of protecting the state borders and maritime economic zones of the CIS member states and for coordination of the activity of the Border Troops of the Commonwealth and the states' own border troops, and taking account of the agreement on protecting the state borders and maritime economic zones of the CIS member states, the CIS member states have decided:

1. To create a joint command of Border Troops.

2. To approve the statute on the joint command of Border Troops (attached).

3. To instruct the commander in chief of the Border Troops to draw up proposals, in conjunction with the authorized representatives of the CIS member states, and to present them to the Council of Heads of State, regarding the legal status of the commander in chief of the Border Troops and of the inter-state Committee for the Protection of Borders.

Done in the city of Kiev on 20 March 1992 in one original copy in Russian. The original is kept at the archives of the government of the Republic of Belarus which will send the states which have signed this decision a certified copy.

The decision was signed by representatives of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.

General Purpose Forces Commander Decision

LD2303195592 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1743 GMT 23 Mar 92

["Decision on Appointment of Commander of Commonwealth Joint Armed Forces General Purpose Forces"]

[Text] [no dateline as received] For the purposes of ensuring control of the Commonwealth Joint Armed Forces, the CIS member states

Have decided to appoint

Colonel General Vladimir Magomedovich Semenov as commander of the General Purpose Forces of the Commonwealth Joint Armed Forces.

Done in the City of Kiev on 20 March 1992 in one original in Russian. The original is to be lodged in the archive of the government of the Republic of Belarus, which will deliver attested copies to signatory states of the present agreement.

* * *

The decision was signed by representatives of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.

Statute on Border Troops Joint Command

LD2303211192 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1747 GMT 23 Mar 92

["Statute on the Joint Command of Border Troops"]

[Text] [no dateline as received] **I. General Points**

1. The Joint Command of Border Troops is a permanent collegial body of the Border Troops of the Commonwealth and its states' own border troops, which effects the implementation of the decisions of the Council of Heads of State and the Council of Heads of Government of the Commonwealth on matters of the protection of the state borders and maritime economic zones of the CIS member states, and the coordination of the activity of the Border Troops.

In its activity, the Joint Command is guided by international legal acts, acts of the CIS, the legislation of the CIS member states, and the enforceable enactments of the former USSR that do not contradict it, and also by this statute.

2. The staff of the Joint Command of Border Troops comprises: The commander in chief of the Border Troops, the chief of General Staff of the Border Troops, the commanders of the states' own border troops, and authorized representatives of the CIS member states, but not exceeding a total of two persons from each member state. The commander in chief of the Border Troops, the chief of General Staff of the Border Troops, and each CIS member state possess one vote in the Joint Command.

The Joint Command invites specialists and experts, as required, to meetings of officials of the Border Troops.

Representatives of states, formerly republics of the USSR, which are not members of the Commonwealth can take part in the work of the Joint Command as observers.

II. Powers of the Joint Command of Border Troops

1. The Joint Command of Border Troops:

Coordinates the activity of the Border Troops of the Commonwealth and the states' own border troops;

Submits proposals to the Council of Heads of State and Council of Heads of Government and to the top bodies of state authority and administration of the CIS member states on matters of the protection of state borders and maritime economic zones, and on maintaining the activity of the Border Troops of the Commonwealth and the states' own border troops;

Works out general principles and proposals on developing the system for protecting state borders and maritime economic zones and allowing persons and means of transport across state borders;

Organizes and ensures the implementation of acts of the Commonwealth and the legislation of CIS member states by the Border Troops of the Commonwealth and by the states' own border troops;

Works out coordinated approaches on matters of manning, training of personnel, and maintaining combat readiness of the Border Troops of the Commonwealth and the states' own border troops.

The Joint Command can also examine other matters which relate to the protection of state borders and

maritime economic zones and to the activity of the Border Troops of the Commonwealth and of the states' own border troops.

2. Members of the Joint Command have the right;

To represent the Joint Command, at its instruction, in state and public organizations, including international, on matters within the competence of the Joint Command;

To receive the necessary information on the activity of the Border Troops through the governing bodies of the Border Troops.

III. The Organization of the Work of the Joint Command of Border Troops.

1. Conferences, which are held as required under the chairmanship of the commander in chief of the Border Troops, are the main form of work of the Joint Command. Conferences are convened on the decision of the commander in chief or on the proposal of the permanent members of the Joint Command.

2. Decisions of the Joint Command are passed on the basis of consensus and are announced by orders of the commander in chief of the Border Troops and the commanders of the states' own border troops.

When no consensus is reached, an issue is submitted to the Council of Heads of State or the Council of Heads of Governments.

3. Other matters of the Joint Command's work are determined by regulations worked out by this Command.

Agreement on Border Troops' Status

LD2303220392 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1800 GMT 23 Mar 92

["Agreement on the Status of the Border Troops of the Commonwealth of Independent States"]

[Text] [no dateline as received] The member states of the Commonwealth, fulfilling the agreement of the heads of the CIS member states on armed forces and border troops of 30 December 1991, have agreed on the following:

Article 1

The protection of the state borders and the maritime economic zones of the member states of the Commonwealth is carried out by the border troops of the Commonwealth or by the states' own border troops.

Until new normative documents regulating the activity of the border troops are adopted, they are guided by the documents of the Commonwealth, by the national legislation of the states, and by normative documents of the former USSR that do not contravene it.

The border troops of the Commonwealth are not involved in the fulfillment of other tasks, with the exception of the elimination of the consequences of natural calamities, accidents, and disasters.

Article 2

The border troops of the Commonwealth are formed from personnel on the basis of the principles defined by a separate agreement.

Article 3

The participating states in the present agreement recognize the necessity for the existing system for training and raising the qualifications of cadres for the border troops of the Commonwealth to be used and developed.

The training of cadres is carried out to orders from the commander in chief of the border troops and the commanders of the states' own border troops.

Article 4

The social and legal guarantees of servicemen in the border troops of the Commonwealth, of individuals discharged from military service, and of members of their families is regulated by the 14 February 1992 agreement between the CIS member states on the social and legal guarantees of servicemen, individuals discharged from military service, and members of their families, and by the national legislation of the member states of the Commonwealth.

Article 5

Controlling bodies of Commonwealth Border Troops undertake their activities in conjunction with appropriate state bodies, enterprises, and organizations of the Commonwealth member states.

Commonwealth Border Troops conclude contracts with enterprises and organizations of the Commonwealth member states to carry out work for developing and modernizing weaponry and military equipment and for other matters concerned with facilitating the activities of the Commonwealth Border Troops. Commonwealth member states assist in the conclusion of such contracts.

Movements of formations and units of Commonwealth Border Troops, and other actions undertaken outside their permanent station (base) areas, are carried out in accordance with decisions of the Border Troops Joint Command by arrangement with the government of the state where they are located or with bodies empowered by that government.

Article 6

The member states of this agreement, in the interests of protecting the state borders and maritime economic zones, provide for the military formations of the Border Troops of the Commonwealth the land, air, and sea

space and internal navigation routes necessary for this movement and assist in the movement of these formations.

The provision of air flights and of navigational and hydrographical supplies for ships of the Commonwealth's Border Troops, as well as the use of mooring and port facilities, airfields and airports, railways and roads and their construction on the territory of the member states of the Commonwealth, connected with the protection of the borders and maritime economic zones, is carried out gratis.

The member states of this agreement provide the Border Troops of the Commonwealth with plots of land for the siting of engineering and technical buildings and monitoring facilities along the border, for use without time limit and free of charge.

The construction of new roads, bridges, buildings and other facilities in the interests of protecting the borders on the territory of the member states of the Commonwealth is carried out with the consent of the competent bodies.

Article 7

The member states of this agreement take a proportional part in financing the Border Troops of the Commonwealth and providing them with material and technical supplies. The volume of expenditure for these purposes and the procedure for their financing is determined by separate agreements.

Article 8

The states participating in this agreement retain for the Commonwealth Border Troops the land which they had before this agreement was signed and also provide them with electric power and communal and other services. The procedure and conditions of use of the land plots that had been allocated (with the exception of cases provided for by Article 6 of this agreement) and of the provision for the Commonwealth Border Troops of all manner of services are determined in accordance with the laws of the host state and agreements on the mechanism of the activities of the Commonwealth Border Troops on the territories of the Commonwealth states.

The moveable property of the Commonwealth Border Troops is in their ownership and use. The procedure of what can be done with it is determined by the Council of CIS Heads of Government.

The motor transport resources of the Commonwealth Border Troops have registration numbers and distinguishing marks. The registration numbers and marks are established in agreement with the High Command of the Commonwealth Joint Armed Forces.

Article 9

In cases where laws have been violated by persons who are members of the Commonwealth Border Troops or members of their families, the laws in force on the territory of the Commonwealth member-state where these violations of the law occurred will apply.

Article 10

The Commonwealth Border Troops have a border flag, naval and air border flags and identification symbols, the description of which and the procedure for the use of which are approved by the Council of Heads of Government.

Article 11

The Commonwealth Border Troops servicemen wear the prescribed military uniforms and are allowed to keep and to carry standard issue firearms in accordance with the established procedure.

Article 12

The procedure for the stay and the status the Commonwealth Border Troops on the territories of states which are setting up border troops of their own and which are not members of the Commonwealth are determined by separate agreements.

Article 13

Each state signatory to this agreement has the right to withdraw from this agreement. A state intending to withdraw from the agreement notifies the depository state and all the other participant states in writing about its decision to do so. Such notification is given not less than six months in advance of the proposed date of withdrawal from this agreement. The border troops of the states which are not members of the Commonwealth could be incorporated in the Commonwealth Border Troops on the basis of a special agreement.

Article 14

The present agreement comes into force from the moment of its signing. Done in the City of Kiev on 20 March 1991 in one original copy in the Russian language. The original copy is to be kept in the archives of the Republic of Belarus, which will send the certified copies to the participant states signatory to this agreement.

* * *

This agreement is signed by representatives of Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russian Federation, and Tajikistan.

Agreement on Army Manpower Acquisition

LD2303211492 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1825 GMT 23 Mar 92

["Agreement on the Principles of Manpower Acquisition of the Joint Armed Forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States and on Military Service Therein"]

[Text] [no dateline as received] The member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States, subsequently referred to as "the Commonwealth member states,"

Proceeding from the necessity to have a joint command of the strategic forces and the general purpose forces,

Bearing in mind the real presence on the territory of the Commonwealth member states of groupings of troops and navy forces, set up earlier in consideration of operational-strategic necessity,

Taking into account the necessity of resolving issues concerning the procedure for manpower acquisition of the Commonwealth's Joint Armed Forces and for servicemen doing their military service,

Being of the opinion that the development of the military requires a high level of professional training of military personnel with a mastery of modern methods of armed warfare,

Being guided by the fact that the use and the development of the system of military education geared toward meeting the requirements for military personnel of the Commonwealth's Joint Armed Forces and the armed forces which belong to the Commonwealth's member states alike, a system which has taken shape on the territory of the Commonwealth's member states, is methodically justified and economically viable,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

The Commonwealth member states take upon themselves the obligation to strive to implement the agreed measures, aimed at ensuring during the period of transition a uniform procedure of conscription, manpower acquisition, and military service for the servicemen of the Joint Armed Forces of the Commonwealth. In this context the following principles will be observed:

1. The establishment of the age of conscription as being from 18 to 27 years;

2. The combination of the normal period of compulsory military service based on conscription with the military service of soldiers, sailors, sergeants and warrant officers serving on the contract basis;

3. The establishment of the duration of normal periods of compulsory military service on the basis of conscription of two years for sailors and petty officers serving on board warships and vessels and in the combat support units of the Navy, with additional benefits and compensation being introduced for an extended period of military service;

of one year for soldiers, sailors, sergeants and warrant officers who have higher education;

of one year and six months for the remaining soldiers, sailors, sergeants, and warrant officers;

4. Citizens to be called up to do a normal period of compulsory military service, to be sent to their units and to be discharged into their reserves twice a year—in April-June and in October-December;

5. The Joint Armed Forces are to acquire their manpower on the basis of combining territorial and the extraterritorial principles in accordance with the laws of the Commonwealth member states;

6. The existing system of the preconscription (the initial military) training of young people and training of specialists for the Commonwealth Joint Armed Forces is to be retained and provided for.

Article 2

Citizens of the Commonwealth member states are called up to do the normal period of compulsory military service in the Joint Armed Forces of the Commonwealth by the Commonwealth member states in accordance with the principles established by this agreement and by the laws of the Commonwealth member states within quotas annually established by the Council of Heads of Government by means of a separate protocol on the basis of a joint representation by a government of a Commonwealth member-state and the high command of the Commonwealth Joint Armed Forces.

Article 3

The Commonwealth member states do not prevent citizens from doing their military service in the Commonwealth's Joint Armed Forces and the armed forces of the Commonwealth's member states on a voluntary basis or on contract basis.

Article 4

The procedure for servicemen doing the military service in the Commonwealth's Joint Armed Forces is established by the Council of Heads of State on the basis of representations of the commander in chief of the Commonwealth's Joint Armed Forces, with account taken of the laws of the Commonwealth's member states.

Article 5

Commonwealth member states recognize the need to use and to develop existing systems of training of military cadres to meet the needs that the Joint Armed Forces of the Commonwealth and the Commonwealth member states have for them.

The organization of training of military cadres for the Commonwealth Joint Armed Forces and the procedures for distribution of graduates of military training establishments are established in a separate agreement.

The Commonwealth member states recognize the need to grant cadets and those attending courses the right to continue and complete their training, without charge, at military training establishments where they enrolled before the signing of this agreement.

Article 6

With their consent, servicemen may be transferred (posted) from the Commonwealth Joint Armed Forces to the armed forces of Commonwealth member states and vice versa to continue their military service, being removed from the lists of personnel by agreement between the competent bodies of the chief command of the Commonwealth Joint Armed Forces and of the Commonwealth member- states.

The procedures for transfer (posting) of servicemen in these cases are established by a separate protocol between the chief command and the Ministry of Defense of the Commonwealth member-state.

Article 7

The Commonwealth member states recognize the need to preserve the established military ranks within the Commonwealth Joint Armed Forces for servicemen up to army general or equivalent, including the existing procedures for conferring of military ranks, reduction from military ranks, deprivation of military ranks, and restoration of military ranks. Meanwhile the conferring of military ranks for the officer corps of the Commonwealth Joint Armed Forces is to be carried out:

For the first officer rank, military rank of colonel or equivalent, early promotion in military rank by one degree higher than the military rank provided for according to the service position occupied—by the commander in chief of the Commonwealth Joint Armed Forces;

Up to captain, inclusive—by the commanders of troops of military districts, commanders of groups of forces or commanders of fleets, or by commanders of arms of the forces or of strategic formations [obyedineniye];

Up to lieutenant colonel or equivalent, inclusive—by the chief of General Staff, by deputy commanders in chief, or by the commander of strategic forces and the commander of general-purpose troops of the Commonwealth Joint Armed Forces;

Up to Colonel or officers of equivalent rank serving in army units and establishments on CIS territory, according to a procedure determined by the commander in chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces by agreement with the ministries of defense (defense committees) and in accordance with the laws of the state concerned;

Dissenting view of the Republic of Uzbekistan concerning this paragraph: The conferring of military ranks on the territory of a Commonwealth member-state is done in accordance with the laws of that state;

Military ranks for the higher officer corps up to colonel general or equivalent, inclusive, are to be conferred by the heads of the Commonwealth member states on the basis of a joint representation of the commander in chief of the Joint Armed Forces and defense ministers (chairmen of defense committees) of the Commonwealth member states in accordance with a list of posts to which generals and admirals should be appointed;

The rank of army general and equivalent is to be conferred by the Council of the Heads of State according to a joint representation by the commander in chief of the Joint Armed Forces and the ministers of defense (chairmen of defense committees) of the Commonwealth member states.

Article 8

The appointment of members of the officer corps to command posts and their recall from the posts they occupy is done for:

Commanders of divisions, or equivalent and higher, commanders of testing ranges and military educational establishments—by decisions of the heads of host states on the basis of representation by the High Command of the Joint Armed Forces, with subsequent confirmation of these appointments (or recall decisions) by the orders of the commander in chief of the Commonwealth Joint Armed Forces;

Commanders of regiments and equivalent—by the High Command of the Joint Armed Forces in agreement with the relevant ministers of defense (defense committees) of the Commonwealth member states. The awarding of orders, medals for the servicemen of the Commonwealth Joint Armed Forces and the conferment of honorary titles established by the Commonwealth member states will, as a rule, be done on the basis of representations of the commander in chief of the Commonwealth Joint Armed Forces in agreement with the minister of defense (chairman of the defense committee) of the Commonwealth member-state in accordance with the laws of the Commonwealth member states. Until the Commonwealth member states establish the orders, medals, and honorary titles, the commander in chief of the Commonwealth Joint Armed Forces is temporarily authorized, as an exception, to award, on behalf of the Commonwealth heads of states, the order "For Personal Valor" to servicemen for courage and selfless actions in carrying out military duties.

Article 9

The agreement comes into force the moment it is signed. Done in the City of Kiev on 20 March 1992 in one original copy in the Russian language. The original copy is kept in the archives of the government of the Republic of Belarus, which will send a certified copy of the same to the states which have signed this agreement.

* * *

The agreement has been signed by the representatives of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.

Army Activities Legal Foundations Agreement

LD2303224392 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1850 GMT 23 Mar 92

["Agreement on the Legal Foundations of the Activities of the Joint Armed Forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States"]

[Text] [no dateline as received] Until the armed forces of the former USSR have been re-organized in accordance with the agreements adopted among the CIS member states, and in order to retain the legal foundations for the activities of these armed forces during the period of transition, including the issues of ensuring that their personnel have social and legal protection, the states participating in this agreement have agreed as follows:

Article 1

Until the questions envisaged in articles 2 and 5 of the agreement between the CIS member states on the Strategic Forces and in article 2 of the agreement of the Council of CIS Heads of State on the armed forces and border troops have been resolved, the organization and activities of the Joint Armed Forces of the Commonwealth and the social and legal protection for their personnel are regulated by agreements between the Commonwealth member states, by the decisions of its plenipotentiary bodies, and also by normative acts of the Commonwealth member states and the former USSR, if these acts do not run counter to the agreements and decision referred to above.

Article 2

The agreement comes into force the moment it is signed. Done in the City of Kiev on 20 March 1992 in one original copy in the Russian language. The origimal copy is kept in the archives of the Government of the Republic of Belarus, which will send a certified copy of the same to the states which signed this agreement.

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This agreement has been signed by the representatives of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.

Agreement on Defense Issues

LD2303232592 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1855 GMT 23 Mar 92

["Agreement on the Powers of the Highest Bodies of the Commonwealth of Independent States on Questions of Defense" adopted at the summit of CIS member states in Kiev on 20 March]

[Text] [no dateline as received] The member states of the Commonwealth, hereafter referred to as "the member states,"

Guided by the principles of the provisional agreement on a Council of Heads of State and a Council of Heads of Government of the Commonwealth of Independent States of 30 December 1991,

Recognizing the need to ensure the security of each member state,

Taking into consideration their interest in coordinating the activity of the member states of the Commonwealth in solving questions of strengthening defense capability,

Proceeding from the understanding that the Joint Armed Forces include the strategic forces and the armed forces of the member states of the Commonwealth—on the decision of these states—as well as special purpose forces (apart from the armed forces of states who are not part of the Joint Armed Forces),

Have agreed on the following:

Article 1

The Council of Heads of State is the highest body of the Commonwealth on questions of defense.

The Council of Heads of Government carries out the coordination of the military-economic activity of the Commonwealth.

Article 2

The Council of Heads of State:

Works out and implements the military policy of the Commonwealth;

Determines the concept of collective defense and the basic directions of military construction;

Adopts the military doctrine and nuclear strategy of the Commonwealth;

Establishes the procedure for adopting decisions for the use of nuclear weapons and the system of measures for excluding their unsanctioned use, and also the procedure for carrying out the unified control of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction;

Determines by referral to the heads of government of the Commonwealth the volume of the allocations and material-technical resources for defense and the upkeep of the Joint Armed Forces of the Commonwealth;

Establishes the composition and structure of the Joint Armed Forces of the Commonwealth, creates the Main Command of the Joint Armed Forces of the Commonwealth, and determines its powers;

Establishes the procedure for the performance of military service in the Joint Armed Forces of the Commonwealth;

Reviews the plan for the development of the Joint Armed Forces of the Commonwealth, the mobilization plan of the Joint Armed Forces of the Commonwealth, and the plan for their adaptation in wartime;

Appoints on recommendation to the Council of Ministers of Defense (chairmen of defense committees), which in the future will be the Council of Ministers of Defense, a commander in chief, chief of the General Staff, and deputy commanders in chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the Commonwealth, and also a commander of the Strategic Forces;

Confers the rank of Army General and its equivalent;

Adopts decisions:

On the introduction of martial law throughout the territory of the Commonwealth in the event of aggression or the threat of aggression against the Commonwealth, against several of its member states or one of them, on a declaration of war, on the conduct of military operations, on the lifting of martial law, on the cessation of the state of war and on the conclusion of a peace treaty;

On the procedure for bringing into force normative acts in wartime and of the termination of their validity;

On the use of contingents of the Joint Armed Forces of the Commonwealth through the necessity to fulfill international treaties and obligations;

And other decisions on the more important questions of defense.

The decisions of the Council of Heads of State are taken on the basis of a consensus.

Article 3

The Council of Heads of Government:

Submits to the Council of Heads of State the draft unified defense budget of the Commonwealth;

Works out, together with the High Command of the Joint Armed Forces of the Commonwealth, an agreed program for developing armaments and military hardware for the Joint Armed Forces of the Commonwealth for an appropriate period, the finances for this program within the limits of allocations for defense and the upkeep of the Joint Armed Forces of the Commonwealth, and the priorities in meeting orders for military goods;

Establishes the procedure for adopting (supplying, using) armaments, military hardware, and other military property for the Joint Armed Forces of the Commonwealth and the procedure for their material and technical provisioning;

Determines the procedure for conducting scientific research and developmental work in the defense field, and ensures via the appropriate bodies of the independent states that the Joint Armed Forces of the Commonwealth are equipped with armaments, military hardware, and other material requirements and that the Joint Armed Forces of the Commonwealth are provided with essential services;

Agrees on the annual contingent of citizens who are liable for conscription for military service in the Joint Armed Forces of the Commonwealth and the annual number of forces-trained specialists liable for training or re-training;

Draws up mobilization plans for the national economy and plans for accumulating material resources for the mobilization reserve;

Establishes tasks for preparing and handing over to the Joint Armed Forces of the Commonwealth means of transport and communications and other material and technical facilities when mobilization is declared as well as other mobilization tasks in war time;

Takes decisions on the creation (maintenance), development, and procedure for the use of defense facilities and lines of communication between the communications and transport networks on the territory of member states in the interests of collective defense, and the system of management within the Joint Armed Forces of the Commonwealth;

Takes decisions regarding social and legal guarantees and financial, material, housing, domestic, and pension provisions for servicemen of the Joint Armed Forces of the Commonwealth, people released from military service and their families, and the families of servicemen who have been killed (or died) in carrying out the obligations of their service.

Article 4

A Council of Ministers of Defense from the member states is formed to coordinate military construction. A High Command of the Joint Armed Forces of the Commonwealth is created to carry out the decisions taken by the highest bodies of the Commonwealth on defense matters. The provisions on the Council of Ministers of Defense and on the High Command of the Joint Armed Forces of the Commonwealth are endorsed by the Council of Heads of State.

Article 5

This agreement comes into force on signing and applies to the states signatory to it. Done in the City of Kiev on 20 March 1992, in one original copy in the Russian language. The original copy is to be kept in the government archives of the Republic of Belarus, which will send the certified copies to the states signatory to this agreement.

* * *

This agreement is signed by representatives of Armenia, Belarus (with the addition of the words: "With transitional period for the Republic of Belarus - years") [as received], Kazakhstan (with the addition of the words: "It is necessary that measures are taken for creating an effective technical measure for controlling and blocking

the use of nuclear missile systems within the shortest possible time"), Kyrgyzstan, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.

Agreement on Joint Armed Forces

LD2303205292 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1906 GMT 23 Mar 92

["Agreement on the Joint Armed Forces for the Transitional Period" adopted at the summit of CIS member states in Kiev on 20 March]

[Text] [no dateline as received] The member states of the Commonwealth, henceforth called "the member states,"

Proceeding from the need for the mutually acceptable and organized solution of the questions of reforming the Armed Forces of the former USSR,

Have agreed on the following:

Article 1

The CIS Joint Armed Forces are not directed against states which are not participants in this agreement. The Joint Armed Forces are being created for the transitional period with the aim of providing security for the member states, preserving the Army command, preventing conflicts, and coordinating the reform of the former USSR Armed Forces.

Article 2

The CIS Joint Armed Forces include the Strategic Forces of the Commonwealth created in accordance with the agreement reached by the CIS member states on the Strategic Armed Forces of 30 December 1991, and also the General Purpose Forces created in accordance with the 14 February 1992 agreement on the General Purpose Forces between the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and the Republic of Uzbekistan.

Article 3

The Strategic Forces of the Commonwealth are subordinated directly to the commander of the CIS Strategic Forces. The military formations and facilities of the General Purpose Forces, with the exception of the member states' own armed forces, are subordinated directly to the commander of the General Purpose Forces.

Article 4

The authority of the supreme bodies of the CIS and the high command is applied to the member states' own armed forces which have been transferred with their consent to operational subordination to the high command of the Joint Armed Forces, only in respect of questions of operational subordination.

Article 5

Each member-state has the right to withdraw from this agreement by notifying the other member states not less than six months in advance.

Done in the City of Kiev on 20 March 1992, as one original copy in the Russian language. The original copy is to be kept in the government archives of the Republic of Belarus, which will send its certified copy to the member states which are signatory to this Agreement.

* *

The Agreement was signed by representatives of Armenia, Belarus (with the addition of the words: "With the stipulation of a transitional period of two years for the Republic of Belarus"), Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.

Leaders' Statement on Moldova Issue

LD2303225592 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1907 GMT 23 Mar 92

["Statement by leaders of CIS member states on the Situation in the Regions on the Left Bank of the Republic of Moldova"]

[Text] [no dateline as received] Reaffirming undeviating adherence to the principles stated in relevant documents adopted by the leaders of the CIS member states in Minsk in December 1991, in Alma-Ata on 21 December 1991, and in Moscow on 16 January 1992;

Guided by the goals and principles of the UN charter and the Helsinki final act;

Drawing attention to the statement made by the president of the Republic of Moldova on 8 March 1992 and the appeal by the parliament of the Republic of Moldova to the Supreme Soviets of the Russian Federation and the Ukraine on 5 March 1992;

Taking into consideration the concern of the public opinion of the CIS countries about the dangerous development of the situation in that region and the desire of the leadership of the Republic of Moldova to solve the problem through political means,

The leaders of the CIS member states who gathered in Kiev on 20 March 1992 believe that it is necessary to declare the following:

CIS member states:

Consider the preservation of the territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova as the cornerstone of their policy in relations with this state, which is a UN member, and as one of the most important factors for stability in the Commonwealth and in the region;

Will take measures to prevent citizens of their countries from being drawn into the conflict in any manner, and

where this has already happened, to immediately return them to the areas of their permanent residency;

Will not allow the use of use their territory for transit of armed formations or weapons smuggling;

Will take additional steps to confiscate weapons, military equipment, and military communications equipment from civilians and illegal formations and to prevent any further access by them to army arsenals in CIS member states;

Will strive to prevent the media from conducting any propaganda that promotes the escalation of the conflict.

Done in the City of Kiev on 20 March in one original copy in the Russian language. The original is kept in the archives of the government of the Republic of Belarus, which will send a certified copy of it to the states which have had signed the present agreement.

The statement was signed by representatives from Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine.

Agreement on Guarding Borders

LD2403095192 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1909 GMT 23 Mar 92

["CIS Agreement on Guarding of Borders"]

[Text] [no dateline as received] **Agreement**

On the guarding of the state borders and maritime economic zones

of the member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States

The states that are party to this agreement, further called "the Commonwealth member states", in accordance with the agreement of the Council of Heads of State of the Commonwealth of Independent States on armed forces and border troops of 30 December 1991;

proceeding from the need to implement mutually acceptable decisions in the interests of guarding the state borders and maritime economic zones of the Commonwealth member states, and taking into account the system and the principles for insuring inviolability of those borders which have come into being, have agreed the following:

Article 1

In this agreement, the terms below mean:

1. "State borders of the member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States"—the sections of the state borders of independent Commonwealth member states with states that are not in the Commonwealth.

2. "Border troops"—formations of border troops of the Commonwealth and of states' own border troops.

3. "Own border troops"—formations of border troops belonging to a Commonwealth member state.

4. "Commonwealth border troops"—formations of border troops which are not own border troops.

Article 2

The guarding of the state borders and maritime economic zones of the Commonwealth member states is implemented by Commonwealth border troops or by states' own border troops.

Article 3

With the aim of ensuring their security, the Commonwealth member states pledge not to undertake actions on state borders and in maritime economic zones that are to the detriment of the political, economic or other interests of other Commonwealth member states. The establishment of state borders and changes to their system of operation are implemented by mutual accord with neighboring states and with regard for the interests of the Commonwealth member states.

Article 4

The Council of Heads of State is the supreme coordinating body of the Commonwealth of Independent States in the sphere of guarding of state borders and maritime economic zones of the Commonwealth member states. The Council of Heads of Government carries out the coordination of measures to insure the guarding of state borders and maritime economic zones.

Implementation of decisions of the Council of Heads of State and the Council of Heads of Government on matters of the guarding of state borders and of maritime economic zones of the Commonwealth member states is effected by the joint command of border troops, which coordinates the activities of border troops.

The regulations on the joint command are confirmed by the Council of Heads of State.

The leadership of the Commonwealth border troops is provided by a commander in chief for border troops appointed by the Council of Heads of State.

Article 5

Prior to the conclusion by Commonwealth member states of interstate agreements on borders and maritime economic zones and their system of operation, the organization and activities of border troops are regulated by Acts of the Commonwealth, national legislation of states, and by law-making Acts of the former USSR that do not contradict the latter.

Matters of manning, finance, and material-technical supply for Commonwealth border troops and of the social and legal status of those serving in them are regulated by special agreements of the Commonwealth member states.

Article 6

This agreement is open for states which are not member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States to subscribe to it, with the consent of all parties to it.

Done in the city of Kiev on 20 March 1992 in one original document in Russian. The original document is kept in the archives of the Government of the Republic of Belarus, which will send a certified copy to the states that have signed this agreement.

Article 1 (Ukraine's wording)

The state borders of the Commonwealth member states are of identical status for the whole of their length, then as given.

Article 4 (Wording of the Azerbaijan Republic and Ukraine)

The implementation of decisions of the Council of Heads of State and the Council of Heads of Government on matters of the guarding of the state border and of maritime economic zones is effected by the competent bodies of the Commonwealth member states.

Collaboration by the Commonwealth border troops and Commonwealth member states' own border troops is implemented on the basis of separate agreements.

* * *

The agreement was signed by representatives of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.

The representative of Moldova made a note: "Issues of the guarding of the state borders of the republic of Moldova are resolved on the basis of bilateral agreements with the main command of the CIS border troops".

Article 1 (in Ukraine's wording) and Article 4 (in the wording of the Azerbaijan Republic and Ukraine) quoted above were signed by the representative of Ukraine.

Decision on Top Military Appointments

LD2303214992 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1920 GMT 23 Mar 92

["Decision on Appointment of Chief of General Staff and Commander of Strategic Forces of the Joint Armed Forces of the Commonwealth"]

[Text] [no dateline as received] In order to ensure the command of the Joint Armed Forces of the Commonwealth, the CIS member states

Have decided to appoint:

1. Colonel General Viktor Nikolayevich Samsonov as chief of the General Staff of the Joint Armed Forces.

2. Army General Yuriy Pavlovich Maksimov as commander of the Strategic Forces of the Joint Armed Forces.

Done in the City of Kiev on 20 March 1992 in one copy in the Russian language. The original is kept in the archives of the government of the Republic of Belarus, which will send a certified copy of it to the states that signed the present decision.

The decision was signed by representatives from Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.

Marshal Shaposhnikov Holds News Conference

Comments on Summit

LD2303174792 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1540 GMT 23 Mar 92

[Report with recorded "excerpts" from news conference by Marshal of Aviation Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, commander in chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, in Moscow on 23 March; from the "Panorama" program]

[Text] As has already been reported Marshal Shaposhnikov, commander in chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, gave a news conference in Moscow today. During the remaining 20 minutes of the Mayak Panorama program I suggest that you listen to excerpts from this news conference. However, it will take the usual Mayak form. You will hear short excerpts and then his replies to questions. So, here is Marshal Shaposhnikov:

[Begin Shaposhnikov recording] The Kiev meeting of the heads of state has dispersed. I mean, there were assertions that it was going to be the last meeting and that, I mean, the CIS would cease to exist, etc. This is gratifying to note, since the heads of states have adopted a sufficiently responsible and, when all is said and done, an even-handed approach both to the very fact of the existence of the Commonwealth and to the issues remaining to be resolved. Naturally, it can be said that not all issues are resolved just like that and unfortunately no mechanism has yet been worked out to implement the decisions adopted earlier. All in all, it is a tortuous, but natural process, because the Commonwealth is only a few months old and you cannot foresee everything immediately, nor can you resolve everything immediately either.

I wish to note with satisfaction that, all in all, the military issues submitted for the examination of the Council of Commonwealth Heads of States have been resolved without any serious, major, and acute debate of the kind that occurred at previous meetings. This testifies, first and foremost, to the fact that we have gained some experience. A Council of Commonwealth Defense Ministers has been formed. Even earlier, and according to the instructions we received about two weeks before, we finalized at this council all the documents we have

sent to the presidents and governments, and in this way they familiarized themselves with these documents in good time.

Thus, the last Kiev meeting saw the following agreements being signed: The agreement on the powers of the highest bodies of the CIS concerning defense issues. This document in fact sets out the duties of the highest Commonwealth bodies—the Council of Heads of State, the Council of Heads of Government. The decision concerning the High Command and the General Staff was confirmed.

Also signed was a decision on the High Command of the CIS Joint Armed Forces and on the provision on the High Command. The agreement on the legal principles governing the activities of the Joint Armed Forces, a very serious document, was also signed. The agreement on the principles of the formation of the Joint Armed Forces and on service in them was also signed. The spring call-up is only around the corner and, naturally, without this document we can no longer exist. The agreement on the status of the conventional forces of the Joint Armed Forces during the transitional period and the resolution on the appointment of the chief of general staff, the commander of the strategic forces, and the commander of the conventional forces was also adopted. Thus, Colonel General Samsonov is chief of general staff of the CIS Joint Armed Forces; Army General Maksimov is commander of the strategic forces, and Colonel General Semenov has been appointed commander of conventional forces.

Apart from that, an agreement was adopted to set up Joint Armed Forces of the Commonwealth. Apart from this, a very serious document was finalized: the agreement on the principles of providing arms, military equipment, and other material resources to the Commonwealth Armed Forces, on the organization of scientific, research, experimental, and design work. So this, then, is the package of documents that were examined. [end recording]

[Announcer] Let me remind you that winding up our Panorama slot, we make it possible for our listeners to discover what Marshal Shaposhnikov, commander in chief of the Joint Armed Forces, had to say today at a news conference on the results of the Kiev meeting of heads of state. Here is an excerpt in which he replies to questions on relations with the Cossack formations and on the contract system in the army.

[Begin Shaposhnikov recording] I wish directly, specifically, and precisely to express my thoughts concerning the Cossack formations: I oppose the Cossack formations. Judge for yourselves what is taking place in this country; I mean the army—the Joint Armed Forces—exists; I mean strategic forces exist as part of them; there are the general purpose forces; armed forces exist which belong to states which do not form a part of the Joint Armed Forces; republican guards exist—all we are short of is the Cossack formations, as it were. I myself hail from the Don area, I mean Rostov-on-the-Don and I am familiar with all that and the customs, the ways of doing things, the beautiful songs, and so on; and there are things I have retained vividly in my memory since my childhood years and I welcome it and it needs to be revived—I mean, efforts must be made to facilitate this. But, with respect to the Cossacks, when matters reach a stage of armed formations, this will not work.

The point is that currently each CIS state is adopting laws so that its young people, its citizens, should serve on its territory. Thus the process of military service, call-up and manpower acquisition, and so on is being made more complicated. That is why we have now examined and sent to the units the regulations concerning contract service. These will point out that people wishing to do their service on the contract basis will be able to serve anywhere in the CIS. I mean, this is one of the ways to resolve this problem. The second thing: There is agreement that young people also can serve in the strategic forces, in fact, where they are needed, rather than on any sort of ethnic basis. Well, it is in these two ways that we are trying to resolve this problem, although it remains to be resolved completely. [end recording]

Property Division, Finance Discussed

LD2303235492 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya Ostankino Television First Program Network in Russian 1800 GMT 23 Mar 92

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] One of the main themes of the Kiev meeting, as has already been said, was the question of the armed forces, and Boris Yeltsin has stated that he is content that the provisions on the armed forces have been set out in legal form. Out of the just over 10 documents of a military nature under consideration at the meeting, concrete decisions were made on four of them. We wanted to get an assessment of the situation by the military at first hand, from the high command, and we succeeded. [video shows Shaposhnikov news conference]

Despite the breakthrough in the military sphere, a number of problems remain. One of them concerns the division of property, military hardware, and armaments. That individual states should lay claim to them is natural, but not rightful, as all the republics made their contribution to securing the country's defense capacity, the marshal noted.

Another problem concerns the military budget deficit. Until recently all expenditure was borne by Russia and Ukraine. Only Moldova and Belarus have expressed a readiness to make their contribution. Russia undertakes to finance those units on the territory of other states which are being deprived of subsidies from the national budgets. The question of Russia's financing the Black Sea Fleet is also under consideration, but not through the Ukrainian State Bank.

The dispute between Russia and Ukraine as to who will receive funds from Germany to build housing for servicemen after their withdrawal remains unresolved. Ukraine is giving the size of its armed forces as 200,000. There are already 400,000 troops on its territory, and evidently half of them will be relocated to Russia.

[Begin Shaposhnikov recording] And so, we currently take the view that all the remaining money which has not been used for building on Ukrainian territory should be used here on Russian territory. [end recording]

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Interviews Shaposhnikov

PM2303212592 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Mar 92 p 1

[Interview with Marshal of Aviation Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, commander in chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, by Captain Second Rank O. Odnokolenko; place, date not given: "The Concept of the Unified Armed Forces Has Grown Obsolete, But the CIS Joint Armed Forces Could in Future Become the Basis of the Defensive Alliance of Independent States: Results of the Kiev Meeting Are Commented on by Marshal of Aviation Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, Commander in Chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces"]

[Text] [Odnokolenko] Comrade Marshal of Aviation, what, in your view, is the main result of the meeting of the heads of Commonwealth states in Kiev?

[Shaposhnikov] It is no secret that some people thought that this meeting would be the CIS' last. I would like to say the following on this score: The hopes of those counting on such an outcome were not realized.

There were difficulties in resolving the first two issues, which concerned the property of the former Union, but we were able to get round them. We then got on to discussing military issues. I would observe here that the more we work on these problems, the more constructively we are able to tackle them. I was pleased that there were no protracted debates on this occasion and that all the delegations displayed sufficient wisdom, restraint, and responsibility. Military issues were examined pretty vigorously. They went through virtually without amendments.

[Odnokolenko] Was the question of setting up a CIS Security Council raised at the conference? If leaks are to be believed, the Russian delegation was ready to make such a proposal.

[Shaposhnikov] No, that question was not raised. On the other hand, it is clearly determined and laid down now what the Council of Heads of State and the Council of Heads of Government are responsible for in defense questions, and it has also been indicated that a coordinating organ—the Council of Defense Ministers and the CIS Joint Armed Forces High Command—has been set up.

[Odnokolenko] What, then, is the extent of the subordination of the General-Purpose Forces to the CIS Joint Armed Forces Glavkomat [High Command]?

[Shaposhnikov] It varies. Everything depends on whether a specific state has made the decision to set up its own armed forces or not. For example, Uzbekistan has made the decision, therefore a milder form of command—of an operational type—will be exercised in respect of Uzbek units. While Kazakhstan, say, which is not creating its own armed forces, delegates to the central leadership decisions on questions of combat training, manpower acquisition, and even—to a certain extent—the implementation of cadre policy.

[Odnokolenko] Where, then, did the special position adopted by Ukraine manifest itself?

[Shaposhnikov] It should be noted that Ukraine's position was special from the very outset. The Ukrainian parliament produced and adopted an extensive package of documents on its own armed forces and laid down that they are not part of the Joint Armed Forces and are not subordinate to the High Command. Only the Strategic Forces stationed on Ukrainian territory will, as resolved in Kiev, be subordinate to the High Command.

[Odnokolenko] But how, Yevgeniy Ivanovich, was the news of the creation of the Russian Defense Ministry received at the conference?

[Shaposhnikov] It was very well received. It was also well received by the leadership of the Joint Armed Forces High Command, because previously questions of finance, social and living conditions, and so forth were the responsibility of the High Command. Now, however, as Boris Yeltsin has said, they will be looked after in the foreseeable future by the Russian Defense Ministry.

[Odnokolenko] Given that a decision to create the Russian Defense Ministry has been made, the following question is clearly inevitable: Has a decision been made to create a Russian Army proper?

[Shaposhnikov] For the time being the president has issued an instruction to prepare proposals regarding the Russian Federation Armed Forces.

[Odnokolenko] And yet was the appearance of the Russian Defense Ministry not to some extent a surprise to the CIS Joint Armed Forces High Command?

[Shaposhnikov] No, we have known about this for a long time and have long been prepared. And I regard it as no bad thing that the Russian president should appoint himself to discharge temporarily the duties of defense minister, because there have already been so many nominations for the post and such a contest had developed over it...

[Odnokolenko] And how was the dispute which recently flared up between Russia and the Ukraine over nuclear weapons resolved?

[Shaposhnikov] That question is closed, because Ukraine has confirmed its intention to remove nuclear weapons. But with verification! And therefore a document is now being prepared regulating the procedure for relocating nuclear weapons and also the verification of their relocation and destruction.

[Odnokolenko] Who will carry out the verification—Ukraine itself?

[Shaposhnikov] The CIS countries. But Russia will assume the greatest responsibility.

[Odnokolenko] How many countries have joined the Joint Armed Forces, then?

[Shaposhnikov] Eight countries, excluding Ukraine, Moldova, and Azerbaijan. The Georgian delegation attended the talks as observers. But Azerbaijan, incidentally, has not still initialed at Supreme Soviet level the treaty on joining the CIS. The status of troops on Azerbaijani territory therefore still needs to be defined. I am in favor of this happening somewhat more quickly. And the 4th Army, if it is needed there, should switch to Russian jurisdiction on the basis of bilateral agreements between Russia and Azerbaijan. If, however, there is no treaty, the army must be withdrawn.

[Odnokolenko] And what is to be done with the 7th Army stationed in Armenia?

[Shaposhnikov] We have not for the time being touched the 7th Army. The point is that Armenia makes no claim on it and has agreed that the 7th Army should be part of the Joint Armed Forces and even become, by accord, the Russian Army on Armenian territory. Incidentally, the question of Armenia's creating its own armed forces depends on the position adopted by Azerbaijan. If they start creating their own armed force there, Armenia will do likewise.

[Odnokolenko] Do you not think, Yevgeniy Ivanovich, that the CIS Joint Armed Forces is a temporary formation—for the period until final breakup—so to speak?

[Shaposhnikov] I do not think so. It may be that this formation will in the future develop into some kind of new defensive alliance. And another thing I would wish to stress here is that, in analyzing the course of events, I have revised my own standpoint on the concept of the unified armed forces. You have to be a realist, you have to realize that there is no going back, history cannot be put into reverse. This concept has already become conclusively obsolete.

[Odnokolenko] You will know that there are increasingly strong rumors in journalist circles that a decree transferring the Transcaucasus Military District to Russian jurisdiction is on the Russian president's desk...

[Shaposhnikov] That decree has been signed. Under it the Transcaucasus Military District and the Caspian Naval Flotilla are temporarily transferred to Russian jurisdiction.

[Odnokolenko] There is also the viewpoint that all troops, except those on Ukrainian territory, should be taken under Russian jurisdiction. States which so desire could then create their own armies based on their own potential. How do you regard such an option?

[Shaposhnikov] This is no longer an option, the train has already left the station, as it were. I think it would be better if the Council of Heads of State made the decision not to create separate armies in those states which are embroiled in military conflicts. But the heads of state have not, unfortunately, done so to date.

Incidentally, another very important question was discussed at the meeting. The president of Kazakhstan proposed the creation of a group of military observers and special peacekeeping armed forces in so-called trouble spots. This proposal was supported as a whole by everyone.

[Odnokolenko] Wherein resides the main disagreement over the Black Sea Fleet? The issue was deferred, but nonetheless...

[Shaposhnikov] The main divergence is over numbers. The majority of the states and the CIS Joint Armed Forces High Command insist that the Black Sea Fleet is the property of the CIS and should form part of the CIS Strategic Forces. Ukraine insists that it is otherwise.

[Odnokolenko] What on the whole, Yevgeniy Iavnovich, was your impression of the meeting in Kiev?

[Shaposhnikov] There were no serious disagreements, and I am grateful to the presidents, who treated our problems with understanding. I also regard as substantive the fact that a mechanism was found for tackling the problem of Karabakh. Now, if Armenia and Azerbaijan ask for help in this issue, the CIS will be able to help them.

International Affairs

Ambassador to U.S. Vladimir Lukin Profiled

LD2003151392 Moscow TASS in English 1454 GMT 20 Mar 92

[Text] Moscow, March 20 TASS—President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin has appointed Vladimir Lukin ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of Russia in the United States of America. Viktor Komplektov, who held this post before him, has been releassed and given a new job.

Vladimir Lukin, doctor of historical sciences, was born in 1937. He graduated from the Moscow State Pedagogical Institute in 1959. Lukin knows English and Spanish. His diplomatic rank is ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary.

From 1965 to 1969 Lukin was on the staff of the magazine "PROBLEMS OF PEACE AND SOCIALISM" in Prague, and from 1968 to 1987—on the staff of the Institute of USA and Canada of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

In the period from 1987 to 1989 Lukin was assistant chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry's Department for the Pacific Ocean and South-East Asia, in 1989 he was appointed assistant chief of the ministry's Department for Assessments and Planning.

In the period form 1989 to 1990 Lukin headed the team for analyses and forecasting under the secretariat of the USSR Supreme Soviet. From 1990 to 1992 he was chairman of the Committee for International Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations of the Russian Supreme Soviet.

Linkage of Russian, U.S. Interests Criticized

PM2003145992 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 19 Mar 92 p 3

[Article by observer A. Vasilyev: "We Will Make People Respect Us If We Learn To Distinguish Russian Interests From U.S. Interests"]

[Text] Obviously, the main aim of Russian foreign policy should be the improvement of our citizens' living standards, that is, its economic aspect comes to the fore. But in Russia's case economics are most intimately bound up with politics. Indeed, it is difficult to name anything we do not want to obtain from outside, given the shortage of everything in the country. Things can be bought from various countries, and if the prices and quality are more or less the same, then political considerations come into play: Whom do we buy from and how do we pay?

Clearly, of late Russia has been forced not only to hand over money, oil, and timber for computers and tights, but also to relinquish political and military influence. In the end this results in economic losses, since all things in the world are interrelated. That is why it is that how full Russian stomachs are is directly dependent on how nimble our politicians and diplomats representing Russia are in the international arena.

There is no point getting embroiled in philosophical arguments about whom Russia belongs to, whether East or West, concluding the academic inquiry with the shamanic invocation "the mind is unable to fathom Russia," indicating the need to follow a third path. Let us leave philosophy to the philosophers...and let us actually follow the third path, since this is dictated by purely pragmatic considerations.

Russia urgently needs to learn the tactics used by the Third World countries in relations with the Soviet Union and the United States—the tactics of balance. The two superpowers struggled for influence all over the world, while the developing countries—those that were lucky enough to have smart politicians—obtained money, machine tools, and weapons both from the Americans and from the Russians.

We are in a similar situation now. The West is struggling with the East for hegemony, and it would be foolish not to take advantage of this. After all, primarily they will be jockeying—and, indeed, are already jockeying—for position in "Upper Volta with missiles." In the first place, there is a vast market here; in the second place, there is much raw material; third, thank goodness, we are still feared (the missiles have come in very handy).

Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev has lately been setting a shining example worthy of imitation. Recently he visited India and Pakistan—states with very complex mutual relations—and contrived to strike up friendships in Delhi and in Islamabad. There can be no doubt that the citizens of Kazakhstan will very soon feel the beneficial effects of advantageous economic links with both countries.

It is as if Nazarbayev is saying to the West: Even though I am a Muslim, I am in principle not averse to the ideals of Western civilization, it is just that you have to fight to get me. And indeed they are fighting! In January and February Kazakhstan was visited by a dozen or so delegations from both West and East. Such is the significance of a large territory, a wealth of natural resources, a stable domestic political situation, and a "special position" on the issue of nuclear armaments.

You have to play not only on the global contradictions between Christians and Muslims, but also on the smaller differences of opinion between the developed industrial countries. In the first half of the eighties Moscow was already trying to drive a wedge between the United States and Europe, but this attempt was bound to fail because, being in awe of the "Red peril," the United States-West Europe bloc was as strong as granite. It is not so today, because times have changed. Europe is much more concerned about what is happening in Russia, for the simple reason that it is nearer to us than is the United States. Who exactly could be of use to us, who might be more interested than anyone else in having special

relations with Russia? We hardly need Germany as a political ally. Its gratitude for the removal of the Berlin Wall is clearly almost exhausted, and it is looking more and more intently in the direction of Russia's most likely rival—Ukraine. In my view, it makes sense to pay special attention to France, which since German unification has faced the anguish of losing its former role in the world and which could embark on a special relationship with Russia to preserve its standing.

I deliberately use the expression special, rather than allied, relations. It would be a big mistake to sign up as an ally of anyone, since, in the first place, given the current internal situation in Russia, it could instantly become a political vassal, and, in the second place, an allied relationship with any state would deprive Moscow of a freedom to maneuver which could bring considerable dividends if things are handled competently.

The fundamental mistake of the Gorbachev-Shevardnadze team's foreign policy course was that the Kremlin was seeking nonconfrontational relations with the West at any price. The Moscow leadership became so complaisant that it not only created artificial problems between the USSR and the industrial world but also made itself forget about many real problems it should not have forgotten about.

But, according to the laws of dialectics, serious differences of opinion will arise between NATO allies, since reaching a consensus in Brussels is one thing, but being accountable to one's own voters is quite another. Again let us take France as an example. Government subsidies for French farmers—without which the farmers would be ruined because they would not be able to compete with their class brothers in the United States—have been a touchy subject in Franco-American relations for many years. For their part, U.S. farmers are demanding that Washington officials combat protectionism and open up the European market to their products. In both countries these people know how to work and how to fight for their own economic interests. In France you get these big guys driving their tractors into Paris, dumping manure on the Champs Elysees, and burning an effigy of the president. That is why Francois Mitterrand declared: "France does not intend to concede to American demands or defer to another country's interests, and it will not give in to pressure."

Sooner or later this conflict will be resolved: Washington will make concessions, Paris will make concessions. But the lesson here for Russia is that confrontation is useful, since it provides an opportunity for bargaining. Our country has a certain item that attracts the whole world's attention to our foreign policy brokers; nuclear weapons. It is not a matter of trying to frighten the world. It was remarked a long time ago that USSR and U.S. ICBM's [Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles] will cease to have political significance only in the event of their being launched. There will be no one left on earth to benefit from this. As long as the missiles are in their silos it is impossible to overestimate their significance. People in the West and in the East realize this. Do the people in the Kremlin realize it?

Take China, for example. Judging by the West's criteria, China should get a far lower rating than Russia: The communists are in power there, dissidents are languishing in jails, ethnic minorities are being oppressed, and Beijing is selling ballistic missiles to enemies of the United States. But the strange thing is that the PRC's economic links with the United States and other Western countries are developing much more vigorously (the results are on the store shelves), while Beijing's interests are defended in Congress by none other than President Bush. But why? Because Beijing is still in control of the situation in a country of 1 billion people and nuclear missiles. China is constantly demonstrating that it is prepared for both peaceful and military confrontation with the West, and it is respected for that. But what about us?

Incensed by my article about Russo-American relations (see KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 22 January 1992), one senior official at the Foreign Ministry sent me a letter, headed "From the 'law of the jungle' to general human values." For objectivity's sake I will relate the content of this four-and-one-half page missive. The official, as he promised at the start of the letter, did not confine himself to "parading the shameless misrepresentations and garbled facts on which the author constructs his 'argument'." I was accused, in the first place, of being emotional and, in the second place, of being a populist. I was called a savage and a barbarian, while "A. Vasilyev and others of that ilk" (what lip-smacking style!) were all lumped together as fascists.

I was curious to learn on what the mentality of the unemotional defenders of human values in the Russian Foreign Ministry is based, and what the esteemed official and "others of that ilk" are guided by in their work. And I found it. Let me cite the letter: "In the preface to the White House report on U.S. national security strategy (August 1991) President Bush noted: 'The new world order is not a fact but a goal and an opportunity. We have been given an unprecedented opportunity, of the kind few generations have had: to create a new international system in accordance with our own values and ideals, while all around the old stereotypes and fixed ideas are crumbling.' But what about Russia? Will it remain imprisoned by these stereotypes, or will it, together with the most civilized part of mankind, build a more democratic, safer, and more prosperous world?"

It is amazing: The U.S. President talks frankly of America's wish to redraw the world using its own template, while a senior Russian diplomat is unable to conceal his delight and emotion. As if a U.S. submarine had not violated Russian territorial waters, as if the aggressive, anti-Russian Pentagon document had not been published in the papers, as if Council of Europe Secretary General Catherine Lalumiere had not called the Russian-speaking minority in Estonia "foreigners" and

"occupiers," expressing doubt about their being given Estonian citizenship. Yet these are events of the past two months. Actually, the Council of Europe is supposed to safeguard human rights in European countries in accordance with the "values and ideals" that our esteemed official finds so moving as interpreted by George Bush. Why, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker is already mediating between the CIS countries. So is it worth having on Smolensk Square diplomats who see no difference between Russian and U.S. interests? Is it not simpler to hire Americans? They will be better at implementing "our values and ideals," or at any rate they will be more honest about it.

EBRD President Attali Examines Eurasian Role

PM2403100392 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Mar 92 Morning Edition p 6

[Article written specially for IZVESTIYA by Jacques Attali, president of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development: "Europe From London To Vladivostok"—first two paragraphs are editorial introduction]

[Text] Doctor Jacques Attali, president of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) arrives in Moscow 19 March on a private plane accompanied by a team of experts. This is the EBRD president's first visit to the Russian Federation following the bank's creation in April and the collapse of the USSR last December.

The bank was set up by 40 developed countries of West and East (with an incorporation capital of $12 billion) to promote reforms in the USSR and the countries of East Europe. Attali is expecting to meet with B.N. Yeltsin and later to travel to Sverdlovsk in the Urals (conversion problems). Today we publish an article written by the EBRD president specially for IZVESTIYA on the eve of his visit.

Legacy of the Past

The totalitarian system, which is incapable of adapting to change and immune to criticism, has left behind a burdensome legacy of cynicism and distrust in the wake of long years of stagnation, corrosion, and physical and moral difficulties. The desire for truth was at least no less important in destroying the system than was the desire for material well-being. But the system also led to a situation in which the concepts of responsibility and risk and the foundations of enterprise and democratic forms of social organization were alien to entire generations of people.

Many Europeans, despite their open rejection of Marxist-Leninist ideology, have nonetheless profoundly embraced a faith in a certain kind of equality, in the wrongness of unemployment, and in the secondary role of money. As Prof. Janos Kornai noted: "People should change their ideas. Getting rich has for too long been seen as something indecent. People became imbued with the false idea that if someone earned more it was only because someone else was earning less; that it is shameful that the rich do not share with others; and that if they are unwilling to do so voluntarily their wealth should be taken from them by force."

One reason for these ideas was the lack of faith in the market economy. People must realize that the ethical principles of the market economy are based on trust maintained by legislation. The West has a special obligation to demonstrate this.

The peoples of Central and East Europe, having chosen the path of democracy and the market economy, have been forced at the same time to resolve interrelated political, economic, and social problems. We should not underestimate the complexity of the transition to democracy and the market.

Economic change starts with a flood of tears that can be disastrous and almost unbearable for democratic politicians. What should take priority—political or economic liberalization? In any event, democracy is in danger when it is tempted by the alternative of either a populist or more or less moderate military regime. When the military have such an important position as they had in the former Soviet Union and suddenly discover they they have been left without a center and without jobs, when 30,000 nuclear warheads are in the hands of the independent republics, when you recall that the military industry produced 20 percent of the USSR's GNP in 1990 and that it consumed 75 percent of appropriations—including 40 percent of total appropriations for machine building—then you realize that this is indeed a major problem.

Conversion is an exceptionally difficult process, but it is one of the most important elements for world stability. The difficulty of conversion lies not only in the need to seek out civil production which could be implemented with the help of military technology and find a market, but also in the unemployment, retraining, wage cuts, changing specialization of whole regions of the country, and financial complications which inevitably accompany this process. Not to mention the possibility of professionals working in the defense sphere being lured abroad. It is also very important to utilize these people's exceptionally high standards.

The lack of a structure of market-economy institutions, which have evolved over decades in the West, is the main problem facing the eastern half of Europe.

Other reforms such as the creation of ownership rights, price liberalization, macroeconomic stabilization, and privatization also have to be started from scratch. The resolve with which they are implemented determines to a significant degree how quickly the market mechanism will work. However, the need to settle the social and psychological problems which arise requires a more gradual approach which will help cushion the blow. Therefore it is important to stick to a course aimed at creating not something directly opposed to the previous

system but a model that is more regulated and closer to the demands of the transitional phase.

How the World Should React

There is no particular need to dwell on the reasons why the European states have no choice but to set up a Eurasian zone covering the entire continent, or to explain why they have a vested interest in its success. The vacuum that has emerged with the end of the Warsaw Pact, the lack of alternate structures, and the situation with conventional armed forces and nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union—a situation exacerbated by growing nationalism and regional conflicts—are sufficient grounds for viewing them in conjunction with the security of the continent. Economic difficulties comparable with the Great Depression, the shaky political situation, and, as a result, the threat of mass emigration cannot leave us unmoved. Many people are now calling into question the decisive role which the West can and should play in channeling events toward strengthening stability.

Given the importance of seeking ways to solve the problems of the former Soviet economy, we need to take account of the role which could be played by currency stabilization. Naturally, we need balanced finances. But a certain caution is also necessary—this will help to control all manifestations of inflationary pressure. Therefore, and also because stocks of foreign exchange among the successors to the Soviet Union have been seriously depleted, a stabilization fund would by its very existence help to create confidence in the ruble and thereby prevent wild fluctuations in its value. Courageous measures have been taken to implement economic reform, and it is important that the world community and international institutions work together to make the transition successful.

Foreign investment is important too. Not only because it provides an influx of capital, but also because it can provide technology transfer, managerial experience, and vocational training for the workers.

Gift Aid Leads Only to Dependence

Spending one's own money sensibly is twice as effective as using foreign investments. Therefore we should not underestimate the importance of creating financial institutions, viable capital markets, and a private sector.

The trade question is central to the international community's reaction to the needs of East and Central Europe. Gift aid leads to dependence, not autonomy. Freer trade lets neighboring regions increase their income and investment, and save more. Shipments of output from the European countries should be paid for as far as possible with export revenues rather than credits which have to be repaid in the future—something that could also prove problematical.

Capital inflows would also be promoted by lower trade barriers if certain sectors of the economy were made more profitable and attractive to foreign investors. Increased export revenues would lead to higher exchange rates for the states of Central and East Europe. This would increase real incomes and reduce the incentive to emigrate. I recently proposed the creation of a "continental common market" based on these principles and on free trade.

What we are seeing in Europe is the beginning of the creation of a new continental political and economic architecture. Europe has a chance to become one of the new centers of power and prosperity. This Europe will stretch from London to Vladivostok. What is really needed is greater integration, and free movements of goods, services, finances, and people. Success will depend on Europe's ability to accept this challenge. The triumph of democracy and the market economy lies in the fact that they represent a way of life that is free from extremes and leads people to peaceful relationships, while finances serve the common good. Many people have tried to divide the world into individualistic societies or communes. In fact, both these tendencies exist in any society. But when taken to extremes their positive points become a caricature of themselves. It is interesting that both these trends require a utopia in order to justify themselves. Utopia is not dead, but history has given us a chance to be realists. I can only hope that we have all the necessary resources to grasp this opportunity now and to comprehend the eternal values which alone can safeguard mankind's future.

Attali on Amount of Aid

LD2103210792 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1100 GMT 20 Mar 92

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] Russia will receive three-quarters of the entire volume of financial aid intended for the USSR. This was stated by Jacques Attali, president of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development [EBRD], who arrived in Russia yesterday. He also said that the bank does not intend to set up a fund to stabilize the ruble in the near future.

Today he arrived in Yekaterinburg where he will visit enterprises that are to undergo conversion. Attali stated to representatives of the press that the European Bank will render financial aid for the development of agriculture and the modernization of oil extracting enterprises.

Views Defense Conversion

OW2103165292 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1546 GMT 21 Mar 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) intends to set up a fund for conversion together with the Russian government, the

bank's president Jacques Attali told newsmen in Ekaterinburg on Friday 21 March]. The problem of conversion and privatisation issues will be given top priority at the first annual session to be held by the bank's founders in Budapest on April 13-14, he said.

During his one-day visit to Ekaterinburg, the biggest industrial center in the Urals, J. Attali conferred with municipal officials and with representatives of private enterprise. He also visited the research-and-production association "Vektor". J. Attali said he hopes that the city and the adjoining areas 30 percent of whose population are employed by defence plants will become partners to his bank and Russia's government in the framework of the fund for conversion. An agreement was reached that Ekaterinburg's authorities and local businessmen will send concrete cooperation proposals to his bank in the near future. J. Attali made it clear that projects yielding enough hard currency will have the greatest chances to succeed.

Burbulis Departs Moscow for Kazakhstan Meeting

LD2303060492 Moscow TASS in English
0557 GMT 23 Mar 92

[By unidentified ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Moscow, March 23 TASS—Gennadiy Burbulis, state secretary and first deputy head of Russia's Government, left here by air for Uralsk, north-western Kazakhstan, at 08.00 today. He is heading a Russian delegation who are to meet with representatives of the Government of Kazakhstan later in the day.

The holding of such an inter-governmental meeting was recommended by Russia's President Boris Yeltsin and Nursultan cnazarbayev of Kazakhstan during their working meeting here on Saturday [21 March].

Urgent tasks related to cooperation in the political and military spheres, the maintenance and expansion of economic contacts between the two states are to be discussed in Uralsk.

Summarizes Agreements

LD2403104192 Moscow TASS in English
1007 GMT 24 Mar 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Ivan Ivanov and Gennadiy Talalayev]

[Text] Moscow, March 24 TASS— The joint meeting of the Russian and Kazakh governments in Uralsk, held on Monday [23 March], is necessiated by "an acute need for interaction in the ongoing economic and military-political reforms" and also by the "situation developing in the CIS", first Vice-Premier of the Russian Government Gennadiy Burbulis told a joint meeting of the Presidium of the Russian Supreme Soviet and the collegium of the Russian Government in the Kremlin today.

According to Burbulis, the meeting was not "a ritual or festive affair". Its main result is that the Kazakh Government has confirmed its consent to accept the Russian Government's memorandum on economic policy, forwarded a few weeks ago to the International Monetary Fund as the Russian programme of reforms. Burbulis noted that "Kazakhstan is ready to join this programme as a fully-fledged partner".

The Russian vice-premier said that several documents were signed in Uralsk between the governments of Russia and Kazakhstan, including agreements on a joint policy in the sphere of price formation, on the internal debt, on banking, to combat corruption, etc.

Burbulis said the parties to the meeting got in contact from Uralsk with Belorussian Prime Minister Vyacheslav Kebich, who assured them that the Belarus Government "supports all the fundamental decisions of this meeting and will join them".

"We also deemed it our duty to inform Ukrainian Prime Minister Vitold Fokin," Burbulis said.

EC Ambassadors Briefed on Kiev CIS Meeting

LD2403114292 Moscow TASS in English
1116 GMT 24 Mar 92

[By unidentified ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Moscow, March 24 TASS—First Deputy Russian Foreign Minister Fyodor Shelov-Kovedyaev on Monday [23 March] met European Community ambassadors to Moscow and informed them about the results of the CIS summit held in Kiev on March 20.

The Russian Foreign Ministry provided information on the main issues of the Kiev summit and a number of important agreements which were signed as a result of the discussion.

Status of Russian-German Relations Examined

PM1903164592 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
19 Mar 92 Morning Edition p 5

[Article by Doctor of Historical Sciences Nikolay Pavlov, head of sector at Russian Foreign Ministry Diplomatic Academy: "Forgotten Germany. Most Important European Partner Relegated to Backburner in Russia's Policy"]

[Text] Toward the end of February, I spoke to Celeste Vallander, an associate of Harvard University. The first thing that I heard her say plunged me into some confusion: "What has happened to the German area of Russian foreign policy, why the stagnation in Russian-German relations? Is this a temporary or fairly long-term phenomenon?"

It is symbolic that these words were uttered at the time when the scientific and practical conference entitled "Transformed Russia in the New World" was being held

in Moscow under the auspices of the Foreign Ministry. Many people there spoke upliftingly about the priorities of Russian foreign policy and relations with the states of the CIS, East and West Europe, and Asia; there was particular talk about China, Japan, the United States, and even France. But the fact that virtually nothing was said about Germany or about Russia's "German policy" is unpleasantly symptomatic of the fact that all is indeed not well in Russian-German relations.

Bonn Lags Behind After Putsch

To paraphrase what E.A. Shevardnadze said, one can say that Russia's relations with Germany "are a central, special issue" in its history. Thus, the German aspect has proved to be a long-standing, extremely strong presence in the Russian people's national memory, in their perception of the surrounding world, their notions of the challenges of the time, and their mentality. The reference here being to the historical collaboration between the two peoples' cultures, their rich experience of economic cooperation, and the sad memories of two world wars, the last of which cost the peoples of the Soviet Union 27 million lives and caused the German nation to be divided for years with all the ensuing consequences. However, normal human memory is such that bad memories are erased from it. The descendants of peoples who once fought among themselves are striving to take a new look at the history of their fathers and grandfathers and want to develop human contacts and mutually beneficial cooperation.

The eighties went down in world politics as a time to analyze the baggage that mankind is taking into the third millennium. Here history has assigned to Europe, the continent through which the line of military-bloc confrontation passed, an autonomous and constructive role in ridding mankind of the threat of world war. During this period USSR-FRG relations began to play a crucial role in the system of East-West relations on the European continent. Without constructive dialogue between the two countries there would have been no progress at the Stockholm conference on confidence-building measures, security, and disarmament, the Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles and the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe would not have appeared, the Paris Charter for the new Europe would not have been signed, and German unification would not have occurred.

You would have thought that the end of 1990 or beginning of 1991 marked the peak of Soviet-German relations. Contacts between the USSR and the FRG have probably never been so intensive, broad, and amicable. You would not have thought that there was a force capable of disorganizing the ongoing development of bilateral cooperation. But then the putsch erupted...

The August putsch and its defeat had far-reaching consequences for Soviet (Russian)-German relations. At a time when H. Kohl was continuing his intimate telephone dialogue with Gorbachev on the latter's return from the Crimea and was only starting to try the key to the Russian president, the strategic situation in one-sixth of the globe changed drastically. Some Western politicians realized the inevitability of the once powerful empire's breaking up and hastily began to play the "Russian card."

It is no coincidence that the first foreign guests on the makeshift rostrum outside Moscow's White House at the 22 August rally marking the Russian democrats' victory over the putschists, despite Mitterrand's well-known sluggishness on the first day of the putsch, were French parliamentarians who quite successfully drew parallels between the "French" and "Russian" revolutions, citing by way of an example the similarity between the colors of the Russian and French national flags. In the new geopolitical situation France rushed to secure itself a reliable ally in Europe in the face of such a dread, powerful rival as a united Germany's emerging. The Germans lost momentum in the struggle for Russia, losing the initiative (the effective "diarchy" in the USSR and the FRG's immutable gamble on Gorbachev played a fatal role at this time). The result being that in February 1992 the Russian president came back from Paris with a treaty and a promise to give Russia most-favored-nation status with credits of Fr [franc] 3.5 billion and France's pledge to release barter credits of Fr2 billion. The results of B.N. Yeltsin's visit to Bonn at the end of November 1991 were far more modest. Apart from the Joint Statement, in which you can single out an intention to provide a positive solution to the question of the Volga Germans and consent to use existing USSR-FRG treaties "in line with the new constitutional authorities" of the Russian Federation "in the interests of and as relations develop between Russia and Germany," and apart from the protocol on consultations between the Russian and FRG foreign-policy departments, there was nothing for the negotiating partners to brag about.

Subjective factors that had an adverse impact on the development of Russian (Soviet)-German ties must include the fact that the "German" area of Union foreign policy was virtually deprived of a leader following the anticonstitutional putsch in the USSR at a time when its Russian component had not yet stood on its own two feet. Well-known Soviet Germanists were forced to quit the political arena—previous USSR Ambassadors Plenipotentiary to the FRG V. Falin, head of the CPSU Central Committee International Department, and Yu. Kvitsinskiy, USSR first deputy foreign minister at the time. As far as I can tell, the Russian Foreign Ministry lacks new diplomatic cadres who could act as trailblazers and authoritative specialists in the German area of policy. It will take more than a day or a year for them to develop. Furthermore, the professional interests of the Russian foreign policy department's incumbent leadership are far from the mainstream of Russian (Soviet)-German relations. Foreign policy, like policy in general, is made by people who have their own predilections and weaknesses and it is impossible to abstract oneself from them entirely.

The Russian leadership's hit-and-miss activities in resolving the problem of restoring a German autonomous formation in the Volga area also had an adverse effect on the state of Russian-German relations, something that Ukrainian President Kravchuk did not fail to take advantage of by inviting hundreds of thousands of "Soviet" Germans to settle in the Crimea and southern parts of Ukraine in the hope of capturing some of the German money (totaling DM [Deutsche mark] 200 million) allocated by the FRG Government to settle the "German question" in the former USSR. As of 15 February the Ukrainian authorities abolished all formalities for FRG citizens' visiting Ukraine. Now all you have to do is receive a visa right on the border. I cannot say that the Russian president's decree on restoring the German settlements in Saratov and Volgograd Oblasts has entirely rectified the situation in Russian-German relations.

Against this backdrop the visits to Germany by A. Kozyrev and A. Shokhin this January and J. Moellemann's one-day trip to Moscow in February are no more than meager attempts to just keep Russian-German cooperation afloat.

Yet We Are Strategic Partners

However, from the geostrategic and economic viewpoint, Germany's central position in the European continent objectively makes it Russia's top-priority political partner among West European (and maybe even Western) countries. In terms of human potential (80 million people) it outstrips everyone in West Europe. In terms of territory (357,000 square kilometers) it is only inferior to France and Spain. Its total social product in 1991 totaled DM2.8 trillion, which is almost double that of its main partner and rival—France. Moreover, France and Britain cannot even roughly compare with the FRG in any economic indicator. This gap will widen constantly in the future. These states' political role will accordingly decline and Germany's role will increase.

A similar Franco-British scenario lies in store for the United States also. The U.S. military presence in Europe is being considerably reduced. Nuclear guarantees for its West European partners are also slackening off due to the disappearance of the "enemy image" in the person of the USSR's rightful successors and the general warming of relations with America. Economically one should expect an increase in clashes within the strong-arm triangle—United States-Japan-West Europe—where America's main opponent and competitor in the near future will be Germany, the main driving force behind West European integration.

Russia and the FRG are not rivals in any area of international activity. What is more, they complement one another and have an acute need of one another. The years-long cooperation between the USSR and the GDR and the USSR and the FRG favors this approach. It is easy to imagine a unified Germany being extremely interested in having a permanent partner with an extremely large market and steady foreign investment requirements. Germany is giving the Russians, as well as all citizens of the former USSR, extremely palpable support. German aid for the Soviet Union and its rightful successors (aid already given and planned aid) is estimated at DM75 billion, not counting the free humanitarian shipments in winter 1990-1991 and 1991-1992 worth many million German marks. The FRG accounts for 57.45 percent (the United States—11.95 percent) of all foreign investments in the CIS countries' economies.

Some people concerned with the purity of the Russian great-power idea shrug their shoulders and say that the Germans have done this out of gratitude for unification. They would be insultingly wrong in saying this because all human actions must not and cannot be assessed in monetary terms. The aid from the German people in this situation represents a noble impulse, the result of a breakthrough in relations between our two great peoples and the return—I very much hope—to the roots of the long-standing friendly relations between our two great powers—Russia and Germany. Typically, Bismarck pointed out that if "Russia's might is considerably shaken for a long time, that will not be in our interests." "It is not sentiment," he wrote, "but political calculation that tells us that Russia is the kind of power ('whose good disposition we value and consider essential'—N.P.) that could be of considerable assistance to us and whose friendship we need."

Many people rightly believe that Germany, in view of its geostrategic situation in the center of Europe, as well as its tremendous economic potential and political clout, should act as a link between the East and West of the continent and should help overcome the split in Europe. In this historic scenario Russia is assigned an equally important role—as a bridge between Europe and Asia. All this taken together indicates that Russia and Germany are objectively strategic partners in developing a single area of security, peace, and cooperation from the Atlantic to the Pacific.

(Footnote) (Nikolay Valentinovich Pavlov, 41 years old, is a doctor of historical sciences and head of a sector at the Russian Foreign Ministry Diplomatic Academy. He is the author of the monograph "FRG Foreign Policy" and other books).

Geostrategic Threats to Russia Viewed

PM2403110192 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Mar 92 p 3

[Article by Colonel S. Pechorov, candidate of military sciences, under "Viewpoint" rubric: "The Geostrategic Threats to Russia: Real or Imaginary?"]

[Text] The end of the cold war and the rejection of the policy of confrontation have led to a significant reorientation of foreign policy, and they dictate a pressing need to elaborate a new concept of national security for each of the states of the Commonwealth, including Russia.

Numerous arguments that Russia is threatened by no one and from nowhere can hardly be taken seriously.

It is no secret that the United States of America, which is playing the role of the last remaining "superpower" not without self-admiration, still remains the one state in the world possessing the physical military ability to destroy the Russian Federation (and the CIS besides). This, despite the fact that at the present time there is a marked tendency for the United States to lose dominant positions in the world economy, together with a growth in the might (including military-political) of the West European states and Japan. As is apparent from the "Defense Directives for Fiscal Years 1994-1998," Washington is manifestly seeking "to prevent the emergence on the territory of the former Soviet Union of... a new rival posing a threat analogous to that which stemmed from the USSR." With this aim in mind, a number of measures are proposed: from administration policy aimed, as THE NEW YORK TIMES acknowledges, at "reducing the Russian space and military industries to such a low level that they are unable ever again in the future to pose a threat to the United States"; to attempts, sometimes exceeding the bounds of decorum (let us recall the incident involving submarines in the Barents Sea), to exert tight control over the activity of our armed forces, and to impose rules for the disarmament process acceptable primarily to the Americans.

All other external threats, real or only on the horizon, can arise only along the perimeter of Russia's borders. Let us take the European sector. Despite the appreciable rapprochement of Russia and NATO, the question of the former's integration into Western economic, political, and military structures—especially the latter—will scarcely be placed in the field of practical realization in the immediate future. There are both objective and subjective reasons for this. Consequently, the theoretical prerequisite for a clash of interests between Russia and the states of West Europe remains. Indeed, within NATO's leading circles people are manifestly continuing to live by the rules and views acquired during the cold war. By way of example it is sufficient to mention NATO's attempts to include the Baltic states within the bloc's sphere of activity.

On the North Atlantic alliance's northern flank a special role belongs to Norway, which has a land border of about 200 km with Russia, and possesses, as a NATO member and with its support, wide possibilities for monitoring Russian shipping in polar waters. Which capability, incidentally, the bloc does not intend to give up. A revival cannot be ruled out of the traditional historic aspirations "toward the East" of a Germany increasing in might, and the extension of its influence (initially economic, later also political-military) over East Europe, and likely subsequent claims to former "German" territories (after the final withdrawal of the Western Group of Forces to Russia) and East Prussia.

The leaderships of the former countries of the "socialist community" and also of the Baltic, and certain circles close to the Government of Finland, which is gradually moving away from its traditional neutrality vis-a-vis Russia, are, let us say, in an extremely restrained mood, showing no special sympathies. Perhaps they have their own reasons for this. It is only the fact that they are tied to the former Soviet market and depend on deliveries of energy sources, the continuing presence (in Poland and the Baltic countries) of Russia's groups of forces, and Russia's still-impressive military potential that restrain some of them from making open claims—territorial claims included—against Russia and other states of the CIS.

In the southwestern sector Turkey is demonstrating increased interest in regions which are either a part of or border on Russia. The extension of Turkey's economic, and then, as a consequence, its political-military influence over these regions may have negative consequences for Russia's geostrategic positions—the neutralization of its naval presence in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean and the disruption of maritime communications in the southern waters.

Along with Turkey, Iran and, to a lesser extent, Afghanistan and Pakistan are also seeking to include the states of Transcaucasia and Central Asia within their spheres of interest. This will, first, lead inevitably to a weakening of the traditionally strong Russian positions in this region, and second, will intensify centripetal tendencies among the Muslim peoples of Russia itself, creating a threat to the maintenance of its territorial integrity. Belated attempts to balance the situation here may only lead to a confrontation between Russia and the Islamic world, that is to say, to Russia's being drawn into a confrontation along its north-south axis, or even to the transformation of Russia into a buffer separating the "flourishing West" from the "seething East." In this context the increased activity of U.S. diplomacy which has recently been discernible in the regions of Transcaucasia, Central Asia, and Kazakhstan is also worthy of attention. It looks as if, along with Washington's desire to prevent the spread of Iranian-style Islamic fundamentalism into these regions of the former Soviet Union, the U.S. leadership nurtures the hope of replacing Russian regional influence with its own.

The proliferation of nuclear missile weaponry to the countries of the Near and Middle East and South Asia carries an undoubted potential threat to Russia in the southern sector, as does, in the long term, the potential formation of a bloc of these states to counterbalance the "nuclear" North, or confrontation among these states themselves (India-Pakistan, Israel-Islamic world). This is dangerous not only in connection with the possible deterioration (even to the point of armed conflict) of relations between Russia and any of the new members of the "nuclear club," or accidental and nonsanctioned launches of nuclear-equipped missiles, but also because of potential ecological disasters in these regions.

The border between Russia and China extends for thousands of kilometers. At the present time relations

between the two states are shaping positively. (The recently completed visit to Beijing by Russian Foreign Minister A. Kozyrev is proof of this.) However, for this process to develop in the future as well, everything necessary must be done right now to achieve complete harmony on border questions. As for our other eastern neighbors, it is impossible to deny the definite danger stemming from the still-smoldering conflict between Pyongyang and Seoul.

Japan, one of the new rising world "centers of power," whose aspirations in the Asia-Pacific region have traditionally been opposed to Russia's interests, currently exerts substantial influence on the situation on Russia's eastern borders. At the present time this clash of interests is being intensified by territorial claims against Russia from the Japanese side, which factor is creating real prerequisites for confrontation.

Opponents may object that in the foreseeable future the most deadly threat for Russia may be a conglomeration of genuine threats on an internal plane—the continuing collapse of the economy, imminent ecological catastrophe, the acceleration of disintegrational processes, separatism, nationalism, and the increasing degradation of society's system of cultural and ethical norms. But let us not forget that everything in this world is interdependent. In particular, there exists, obviously enough, a direct link between internal circumstances and the external political situation around Russia. Consequently, in order to avoid national bankruptcy and to transfer threats from the category of real to imaginary, clearly we must uncover them in good time and promptly seek ways and means of neutralizing them.

Screening of KAL-007 Documentary Noted

PM2003192592 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Mar 92 Morning Edition p 8

[Report by Andrey Illesh: "The Russian Secret of the Korean Boeing 747"]

[Text] "The Russian Secret of the Korean Boeing 747" is the title of a full-length documentary made on the basis of an investigation by journalists from our paper. The movie, shot with the help of "Hiroshima TV" (Japan), will be shown on the first television program on Saturday 21 March at 1950 hours.

More than 60 reports published by the paper now constitute the materials of an investigation of the tragic story of a Soviet fighter's destruction in the early hours of 1 September 1983 of a giant South Korean passenger aircraft, flight KAL-007 from New York to Seoul, which had strayed from its flight path (Romeo-20) into Soviet airspace. The aircraft, with 269 people on board, fell from a height of around 10,000 meters into the water near Sakhalin (north of the island of Moneron).

Two missiles launched by the SU-15 fighter had cut short flight KAL-007. There was a massive international scandal. Emotions ran high in the United Nations and sanctions were imposed on the USSR—many airlines halted flights to us, there were legal proceedings and international investigations of the incident... Only in our country did they stick to one, official version: The aircraft was a spy and it had to be shot down.

Now, following the investigation by IZVESTIYA, it is absolutely clear that the official version was a lie—those actually involved in the events have told journalists, now (for the first time in eight years!) on television too, how it all happened. Only the top military authorities still refuse to see it.

The so-called black boxes—electronic instruments recording all the flight parameters and pilots' conversations in the cabin—are the key element in the terrible tragedy. The publication of the deciphered record of the black boxes will slot many pieces into place in this affair, which is still full of mysteries. But, I repeat, governments changed in the USSR, ministers too—Ustinov, Sokolov... Yazov is now in jail... He has been replaced by the smiling Shaposhnikov, the USSR itself has gone too, while the military remain silent, whatever the regime, whatever the authorities. Kryuchkov and Yazov deceived Mikhail Gorbachev—when he was president. When he asked about the fate of the black boxes they shrugged their shoulders. Then Boris Yeltsin (currently the acting Russian defense minister) last year promised live on CNN to investigate the affair. We will see...

I quote from IZVESTIYA's letter to Marshal of Aviation Ye. Shaposhnikov: "Please give instructions to the relevant services to show journalists the deciphered records of the black boxes. The world public would regard this as a manifestation of the new, humane policy of the CIS military leadership. The impact made by the IZVESTIYA investigation enables one to hope that the disclosure of the secrets of the KAL-007 black boxes will be widely commented on all over the world." Here is the reply to the editorial office (for some reason signed by V. Samsonov, whom we had not addressed): "...The CIS Armed Forces High Command has not carried out any independent research and does not have any new material."

In fact, it does not need to carry out any new research, all it has to do is look in its own archives! We are not the only ones who think that; the former KGB leadership does too. Vadim Bakatin categorically told us: "The black boxes are at the Defense Ministry."

Actually, where the boxes are, how many people died and how they died, and who gave the order to destroy the Boeing is in our movie. It was shot in Murmansk and Sevastopol, in Sakhalin and Khabarovsk, in Korea and the United States. And, finally, in a special underwater expedition, during which it was possible for the first time to film on the seabed what was once a giant aircraft.

Swedish Experts To Aid Budget, Tax Policy

LD2003220392 Moscow TASS in English 0847 GMT 20 Mar 92

[By ITAR-TASS Correspondent Dmitriy Gorokhov]

[Text] Stockholm, March 20 TASS—Swedish Government experts will consult Russia's Ministry of the Economy and Finance on matters of budget and tax policy.

According to the Swedish Foreign Ministry, the cabinet decided on Thursday [19 March] to allocate four million crowns for the project.

Along with consultations on state financial problems, the Swedish side will also give expert advise on military conversion. The new project is implemented in keeping with the wishes of the Russian Government.

According to the Foreign Ministry, two senior Swedish experts will work at the Russian Finance Ministry. Besides, Swedish experts will come to Russia on brief business trips to familiarise Russian specialists with the Swedish expertise in the field of the economy.

Komi Agreement With French Oil Firm Approved

PM2403122092 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Mar 92 Morning Edition p 2

[Aleksandr Solovyev report: "Ukhta Reaches Rapid Agreement With French"]

[Text] Syktyvkar—A contract between the French oil company Total and the "Ukhtaneftegazgeologiya" Association has come into force.

An agreement on business cooperation between this firm, which is one of the 10 largest oil companies in the world, and the northern association was signed back in December 1990. A year was spent drawing up its technical and economic foundations, following which the Komi Government signed a 25-30-year contract but the Russian Government appointed an expert commission before approving it.

"It proved easier to reach agreement with the French than with the Russian Government," Yaroslav Salo, deputy general director of the "Ukhtaneftegazgeologiya" Association, stated. "The agreement procedure was very protracted—causing considerable losses for both us and the French. After all, we had already started building an oil pipeline... But things finally became clearer in March—the contract has been approved."

According to Yaroslav Salo, the deal is undoubtedly advantageous for the Komi Republic.

"Wage questions have not been finally settled yet," Ya. Salo said, "but I think that we will be able to settle them without the government's help."

Russia To Supply Georgia With Oil, Gasoline

LD2003144892 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya Ostankino Television First Program Network in Russian 1200 GMT 19 Mar 92

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] In March, the government of Russia will supply Georgia with 100,000 tonnes of oil and 100,000 tonnes of gasoline and other petroleum products. An accord on this was reached during the recent trip to Moscow by Prime Minister Tengiz Sigua.

Tariffs to Baltics Abolished Until 30 Jun

LD2303210192 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 1830 GMT 23 Mar 92

[Summary] From today until 30 June, Russia is abolishing export tariffs on raw materials sent to the Baltic states.

Czech Firm To Build Houses for Servicemen

LD1903052992 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0600 GMT 18 Mar 92

[Text] RIA agency reports that a Czech firm has began building houses for servicemen around Moscow. The firm offers clients 50 "key in hand" models of wooden houses. The Czech firm is capable of building up to 100,000 houses per year in Russia. This year it will already build 10,000 houses.

Federation Affairs

'Mutual Understanding' Achieved Through Treaty

LD2303110792 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya Ostankino Television First Program Network in Russian 1200 GMT 23 Mar 92

[Correspondent V. Perfilyev report from Moscow; from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] Historians and sociologists talking about our time will perhaps recall the syndrome of the disintegration of the fatherland being experienced by many people. But here is an example of how, also by the efforts of many people, Russia will nevertheless probably remain whole. [video shows Khasbulatov, others signing a document]

Today, in Moscow's White House, the initialling took place of the treaty on the demarcation of subjects of jurisdiction and powers between the federal bodies of state power and the bodies of power in the autonomous oblasts and autonomous okrugs within the Russian Federation.

[Begin Khasbulatov recording] [video shows interview and clips of signatories, document with signatures] Do you know what percentage of the population lives in the territory of our okrugs? Seven percent, let's say, whereas

these okrugs actually make up 66 percent of Russian Federation territory today, with their boundless reserves and minerals. So what we have accomplished today is no less important that the signing, the ratification and initialling and so on, of the treaties with the republics and oblasts. The treaty was no less difficult than that with the republics; it was no less difficult than removing the contradictions with the oblasts and krays, I assure you. Therefore we really can justifiably say today that we have achieved mutual understanding to resolve a very major state problem.

Yeltsin Decree Establishes Technology Academy

PM2303152192 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 21 Mar 92 First Edition p 1

[Unattributed "News" column report: "Academy of New Technology"]

[Text] As became known at a general meeting of the Russian Academy of Technical Sciences, Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin has signed a decree "On the Academy of Technological Sciences." The document lays down that "the ATN [Academy of Technological Sciences] is a Russia-wide self-managing independent scientific organization" and acknowledges the importance of ATN activity as one of the fundamental "factors for accelerating the development of the Russian national economy on the basis of new science-intensive technologies."

Rutskoy Encourages 'Stable' State Farms

LD2003231192 Moscow POSTFACTUM in English 1640 GMT 20 Mar 92

[From the "Politics" section]

[Text] Tomsk—The Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoy demanded on March 19 that Tomsk regional administration chief Viktor Kress take on personal responsibility for ensuring the normal operation of collective and state farms. In a telegram addressed to Kress, Rutskoy said the general results of the agricultural year would largely hinge on the stable and effective operation of profitable collective and state farms. It is these farms that can accomplish the overriding task of the year—to ensure Russia's population with the sufficient amount of farm products, agricultural raw material and seed stock , Rutskoy said. Rutskoy thinks the transition to private farming in the countryside has nothing in common with a campaign to demolish the organized production of farm output in collective and state farms.

Party Chairman Says Tatarstan Wants Secession

LD2303211592 Moscow TASS in English 1528 GMT 23 Mar 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Yuriy Dovin]

[Text] Moscow March 23 TASS—The Russian Democratic Party regards the results of a republican-wide referendum in Tatarstan as a vote for secession from Russia, Deputy Party Chairman Ilya Roitman told reporters today. Roitman led a group of party observers during the ballot.

The social and political situation in Tatarstan will deteriorate after the referendum, he predicted.

The vote's results in several cases are difficult to believe, according to party member Aleksandr Lukin, who is a member of the Moscow City Council. For instance, returns from rural constituencies were delivered to the commission before those from city constituencies, which is against the logic, he said.

During the two days in Tatarstan the car with Democratic Party observers was twice detained by local law-enforcement bodies. Arbitrary accusations were put against the observers, he said.

In some cases, they were barred from visiting polling places, he said.

Federation Citizens Assembly Appeal Launched

PM2303142192 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 21 Mar 92 First Edition p 1

["Appeal to Russian Federation Political, Professional, Social, and National Organizations, Russian Business Circles, and the Russian Public at Large" published under the headline "Citizens, to the Assembly!"]

[Text] The Russian Federation is experiencing difficult times. The economic situation is deteriorating. Legal chaos continues. The boycott of reforms in progress by forces dreaming of a return to the past is growing. The number of malcontents ready to go out into the streets and ready to demand the immediate resignation of the government and the nationally elected Russian Federation president is increasing. Centrifugal forces are growing, and not only in the former autonomous entities but in krays and oblasts too. Does it need to be said that the implementation of radical transformations, not to mention the very existence of the Russian Federation, depends to a large extent at this moment on a solution to the question of Russia's national-state structure, on the strengthening of Russian statehood.

The resolution of this, the most important task of the day, would be promoted by the signing of the Federation Treaty, which demarcates powers between the constituents of the federation, and the adoption of the new Russian Constitition. Moreover the new Constitution could be adopted as early as by the extraordinary Sixth Congress of Russian People's Deputies to be held in April 1992.

The acceleration of the implementation of economic reforms, the consolidation of forces supporting radical transformations, and the adoption of the new Russian Constitution could be promoted by an Assembly of Russian Federation Citizens, which it would be worth

holding on the eve of the upcoming Congress of Russian People's Deputies. Such an important event should be held with the direct participation of the Russian Federation president and should involve representatives of the most diverse political, professional, social, and national organizations, the business world, and the broadest strata of the public. The assembly's main objective would be to unite supporters of radical economic transformations, carry out a public expert assessment of the draft new Russian Federation Constitution, and approve the main question on the agenda for the Sixth Congress of Russian Federation deputies.

The Assembly of Russian Federation Citizens could be an important milestone on the path of strengthening Russian statehood. A possible date for it would be 4 April 1992—shortly before the congress. We appeal to political, professional, social, and national organizations and representatives of business circles and the public to participate in preparing and holding the Assembly of Russian Federation Citizens.

Rashit Rakipovich Akhmetov, coordinator of the congress of democratic forces of the constituent republics of the Russian Federation; Lev Iosifovich Vaynberg, chairman of the Union of Joint Enterprises; Vasiliy Fedorovich Vershinin, vice president of the Association of Peasant Farms and Cooperatives of Russia (AKKOR); Irina Viktorovna Vinogradova, deputy chairman of the Board of the People's Party of Free Russia, Russian Federation people's deputy, and coordinator of the "Free Russia" faction in the Russian parliament; Aleksandr Pavlovich Vladislavlev of the Enterprise Council under the Russian Federation president; Vyacheslav Vasilyevich Volkov, Russian Federation people's deputy and coordinator of the bloc of democratic factions in the Russian parliament; Arkadiy Ivanovich Volskiy, president of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs; Ivan Kharlamovich Kiviridi, director of the Foreign Economic Cooperation concern; Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Kotenev of the Union of Afghanistan Veterans; Vera Grigoryevna Lashch of the Russian Union of Labor Collectives; Vladimir Nikolayevich Lysenko, cochairman of the Republican Party of the Russian Federation and Russian Federation people's deputy; M.V. Massarskiy, president of the International Association of Enterprise Leaders; Yuriy Aleksandrovich Milyukov, cochairman of the Russian Stock Exchange Union; Vasiliy Mokhov, cochairman of Sotsprof [Association of Socialist Trade Unions]; Andrey Aleksandrovich Nuykin of MOSKOVSKAYA TRIBUNA; Russian Federation People's Deputy Lev Aleksandrovich Ponomarev of the Committee of Support for Reforms; Eduard Mikhaylovich Sagalayev, chairman of the Confederation of Journalists' Unions; Vladimir Sergevevich Smirnov, chairman of the Coordinating Council of the "Military for Democracy" movement; Vladimir Aleksandrovich Tikhonov, president of the League of Cooperatives and Entrepreneurs of Russia; Konstantin Mikhaylovich Troivtsev of "Living Ring"; Davlat Khudonazarov, chairman of the Confederation of Cinematographers' Unions; Yuriy Dmitriyevich Chernichenko, chairman of the Russian Peasants Party; Aleksandr Nikolayevich Yakovlev, cochairman of the Movement for Democratic Reforms; and Russian Federation People's Deputy Gleb Pavlovich Yakunin of the "Democratic Russia" movement.

Aims Outlined

MK2103132192 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 21 Mar 92 p 2

[Feature comprising reports by Yelena Tregubova and Yevgeniy Krasnikov and postscript by T.I. under the "Democrats" rubric and the general headline: "Citizens of Russia Forum Will Meet. But This Is a Gathering of Advocates of Reform, not a Constituent Assembly"]

[Text] [Tregubova report] At a news conference held by the organizing committee of the "Assembly of Russian Federation Citizens," the "assembly's" main purpose was described as being to "unite advocates of economic transformations."

Asked whether the Congress of Russian People's Deputies would regard the organizing of an "assembly" as an attempt to exert pressure, Vladimir Lysenko, cochairman of the Republican Party of the Russian Federation, answered that he saw nothing bad in this: "If the people express their opinion, this may of course be regarded as pressure on the deputies, but it is entirely legitimate." In this connection Vladimir Lysenko said that the article in NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA had given a distorted picture of the "assembly." "It is not true," he stated, "that the government itself is founding the 'assembly' in order to break up parliament and the Congress. All people's deputies have been invited to the 'assembly.' Boris Yeltsin too will probably take part in the 'assembly,' but merely as a citizen."

The founders—the League of Cooperative Members and Entrepreneurs of Russia, "Moscow Tribune," the Republican Party of the Russian Federation, and others—stated that the "assembly," which is scheduled for 4 April, could become a basis for a structure uniting advocates of democratic transformations.

Constitutional Commission Member Viktor Sheynis stated that opponents of the adoption of a new constitution are less concerned to criticize it constructively than they are to criticize the political movements defending its adoption. Regarding the "Sobchak group," which is formulating an alternative draft constitution, Viktor Sheynis said that, in his view, this group's chances of getting their draft accepted are nil, but there is probably a chance that the group will be able to delay the adoption of the fundamental law for a long time. According to him, the matter has less to do with fundamental differences and more to do with the personal ambitions of St. Petersburg's mayor, since Sobchak did not respond to Rumyantsev's invitation to work together.

The organizers are convinced that a new constitution needs to be adopted at this Congress and believe that the

"assembly" will be able to bring the necessary constructive pressure to bear on the body of deputies.

[Krasnikov report] During a discussion of technical questions relating to the "assembly" at the organizing committee session 18 March, it was stated that the "Assembly of Russian Federation Citizens" would cost 1 million rubles (for, among other things, hiring the Kremlin Palace of Congresses and expenses). At the news conference, the organizers stated that this money would be allocated from social funds and the resources of the parties and unions participating in the organizing committee. Nonetheless, according to information received by NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA from participants at the 18 March organizing committee session, during the discussion of expenditure on the upcoming event it was implied that the government would pick up the tab. And Arkadiy Volskiy joked: "The main thing is to keep this secret from the journalists on NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA."

At the news conference, Vladimir Lysenko noted in passing: "Our only error was to hold the first organizing committee meeting on Staraya Square. Henceforth we will meet only in the Russian Sociopolitical Center (formerly the Committee of Youth Organizations)."

And so it is perfectly clear that the "assembly" organizers' plans certainly do not include supplanting the legislative branch. This event is merely intended to show deputies that in some situations a more constructive and disciplined alternative to the legislative branch can be found.

It cannot be ruled out that variables which the "assembly" initiators have not foreseen might come into play in this process, and then, regardless of their wishes, it could become a kind of "business game" simulating an alternative legislative branch. However, if it is convened over and over again, then, having undergone certain contextual metamorphoses, it will be rechristened under a different name.

[T.I. postscript] Contrary to expectation, "Democratic Russia" will take part in the "Assembly of Russian Federation Citizens" with its "distinctive voice." The movement's Coordinating Council, clearly attempting to refute rumors of the "imminent demise of 'Democratic Russia,'" has recalled its candidates for the organizing committee Ponomarev, Yakunin, and Kharichev (the latter, incidentally, promised the "assembly" off his own bat that "Democratic Russia" would take part, without being authorized to do so) and replaced them with the more "mainstream" Bokser, Zaslavskiy, and Smirnov.

Authorities Support Movement

LD2003224992 Moscow TASS in English 1527 GMT 20 Mar 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Lyudmila Aleksandrova]

[Text] Moscow March 20 TASS—"The main purpose of the 'Assembly of Citizens of the Russian Federation', scheduled for April 4, is to rally all pro-reform forces on the eve of the Congress of People's Deputies of Russia," members of the assembly's organisational committee told a news conference here today.

The assembly, initiated by the Republican Party of the Russian Federation, was conceived as an alliance of all the forces that are ready to support Russia's president at the forthcoming congress, where an acute struggle over the draft Russian Constitution is expected. Judging by everything, the assembly idea enjoys complete support of the Russian authorities.

According to co-chairman of the Republican Party of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Lysenko, President Yeltsin has accepted the invitation to attend the forum or, possibly, even to address it. Invitations will be forwarded also to the leaders and deputies of the Russian parliament, presidents and parliament speakers of all the constituent republics of the Russian Federation. The importance attached to the assembly is borne out by the fact that it will most likely be held in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses.

The agenda of the forum will include such items as the "preservation of Russian statehood by democratic means", the strategy of Russian reforms, and the Constitution of the Russian Federation. The assembly does not plan to adopt any documents or decisions. The purpose of its organisers is to rally the deputies on the eve of the congress, because the opposition is getting ready to vehemently attack the president and his supporters.

According to Lysenko, the need for the forum is explained by the fact that the Democratic Movement is now divided and in a critical situation, whereas the opposition, that is the national-patriotic and post-communist forces—are rallying together quite successfully.

The idea of the assembly was supported by several organisations of businessmen, many trade unions and servicemen. The organisational committee includes, for instance, representatives of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Businessmen, the League of Businessmen and Cooperators, Russia's second largest "Sotsprof" trade union centre, and the "Servicemen for Democracy" movement. The political forces that plan to take part in the assembly include representatives of the "Democratic Russia" movement, weakened by the latest split, and the Movement for Democratic Reforms.

However, apart from the Republican Party of the Russian Federation, no other political party has supported the assembly idea, although they have all signed a "protocol of intensions" during the previous Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Federation, outlining the mechanism of their cooperation with the president in the effort to carry out the reforms.

The Democratic Party of Russia has bluntly objected to the assembly, while the "Free Russia" People's Party, led by Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoy, which recently joined forces in one bloc with the former, has simply ignored the initiative. As to Constitutional Democrats and Christian Democrats, they have joined the "patriotic opposition" and are, apparently, lost to the democratic movement.

Pamyat 'Liberation Corps' To March on Moscow

LD2003175992 Moscow POSTFACTUM in English 1348 GMT 20 Mar 92

[Text] Moscow—On March 19 the Russian Popular Patriotic Front Pamyat (Memory) appealed for forming a people's volunteer corps. At a news conference on March 19 Front leader Dmitriy Vasiliyev read out an appeal that says: On the basis of the people's volunteer corps a Russian liberation corps will be formed, the core of our future national army. At H-hour on D-day people's volunteer regiments will start a march to Moscow and, with God's help, take the cause of [the] motherland's salvation into their own hands. We shall be guided by the example of our great predecessors, knight Dmitriy Pozharskiy and citizen Kuzma Minin. It is impossible to remain idle while the motherland is going through such a heavy crisis, Vasiliyev argued.

Threatens Orthodox Church

LD2103222592 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya Ostankino Television First Program Network in Russian 1200 GMT 20 Mar 92

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] We need civil peace and consensus today as much as we need air, but the processes of schism and disintegration are spreading like an infectious disease. Our correspondent recounts a schism within the Church. The leaders of the Pamyat Society are evidently trying to frighten the patriarchate as well.

[A. Sturua] The Russian Orthodox Church abroad, which is not officially recognized in our country, has once again stated its property claims on Russian territory. A news conference in Moscow was devoted to this. Those taking part place responsibility for the fact that their demands are not always met by secular authorities at the local level with the Moscow Patriarchate, blaming it for all its problems.

Dmitriy Vasilyev, leader of the Pamyat Society, has meanwhile evidently turned away from the Russian Orthodox Church and threatened to begin a holy war against it. [video shows prelates addressing audience, icon on rostrum, black-shirted Pamyat members in audience, Vasilyev speaking]

Mandate for Salvation of Russia Adopted

PM2403113992 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 21 Mar 92 p 1

["Mandate of the Nationwide Veche," dated Moscow, 17 March]

[Text] We, the people of Moscow and all Russia [Rus], have gathered at our veche [historically, the name given to town meetings in medieval Russia] at a tragic time for the motherland. For the first time in several centuries the Russian [Rossiyskiy] State has been brought to the brink of collapse by an adventurist antipeople policy, and society is threatened with extinction. The country is essentially being turned into a colony and a raw materials appendage of the major Western powers, and the people are being transformed into colonial slaves. This cannot be tolerated any longer!

In naming its candidate for head of state today, the veche gives him and all the people's elected representatives the following mandate:

—to halt the growth in prices. To bring down the real prices of the basic types of consumer goods to the 1985 level;

—to place all stocks of food and consumer goods and the entire trade and distribution network under the control of labor collectives, military subunits, and law-enforcement organs;

—to end the financial and administrative stifling of state and collective farms, which is leading to the wrecking of the spring sowing campaign and to hunger this year already;

—to stop the selling and issuing of shares for land property, which threatens to cost Russia its sovereignty over its own national territory. To confirm the unshakability of the Decree on Land adopted 26 October 1917;

—to restrict or end altogether the export abroad of consumer goods that are in demand in the country, strategic resources, inventions, unique works of art, and historical valuables; to restrict the importation of luxury articles;

—to nationalize the whole banking network without delay by creating a single All-Russian State Bank; to implement a radical monetary reform confirming the value of the earned ruble and undermining the positions of the speculative ruble;

—to repeal the anticonstitutional privatization (private appropriation) of means of production belonging to the people, enterprises in the services sphere, cultural establishments, and housing, and to annul such deals with foreigners;

—to begin drawing up a five-year plan to raise working people's living standards and to restore a national economy devastated by "perestroyka."

With reliance on the patriotic public, constitutional order must be urgently restored in the country, and the undermining of the system of education, science, and culture must be ended. A resolute rebuff must be dealt to liars from the mass media, to slanderers of Russia, and to corrupters of the rising generations. Russia will be reborn, regaining reason, magnanimity, and strength. The people's cause is a just cause. Victory will be ours.

Adopted at the Nationwide Veche.

Moscow, 17 March 1992

Deputy Chairman for Nationality Policy Named

LD2303185292 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1235 GMT 23 Mar 92

[Text] Moscow, 23 Mar (ITAR-TASS)—A directive from the Russian Government has appointed Valeriy Shamshurov as deputy chairman of the State Committee of the Russian Federation for Nationality Policy.

Representative to Nuclear Center Appointed

PM2303152792 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 21 Mar 92 First Edition p 1

[Unattributed report under the "Appointments" rubric]

[Text] Russian Federation Science, Higher Education, and Technical Policy Minister B.G. Saltykov has been appointed plenipotentiary representative of the Russian Government to the international organization the Joint Nuclear Research Institute.

'Utopian' State-Legal Administration Viewed

PM2403095592 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 23 Mar 92 First Edition p 3

[Article by Candidate of Juridical Sciences V. Mazayev, member of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet: "Farewell to Montesquieu..."]

[Text] Since the "August" revolution qualitatively new problems have arisen. In Russia what has started to take shape is not an opposition with the formal attributes of power but power itself. And in that sense the stance to "overcome the absence of power in Russia" did not give rise to any doubts and was in need of support. But the gamble on strengthening power, especially executive power, is a very delicate matter requiring a sense of moderation. History has confirmed the sacred norms for the separation of powers (Montesquieu was one of the originators of this principle) and the mechanisms of restraints and counterweights in the state organs' system of activity.

Unfortunately, the present day confirms the desire of some young rulers to fill executive power with unconstitutional content. This desire did not develop in a day. Thus, in October Sergey Shakhray stated that "with a view to ending confrontation for the period of the implementation of the economic reform, the prerogative in introducing economic draft laws should be handed over to the president."

The point of this sentence became clear a little later. By the president's 12 December 1991 decree state adviser Shakhray was appointed deputy chairman of the Russian Government. He was assigned the running of state security, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Justice, and the State Committee for Nationalities Policy. In accordance with the 27 December 1991 decree the president's State-Legal Administration was created and he became its chief. And despite the legal ban on combining a deputy's seat and a ministerial portfolio, the vice premier has remained a people's deputy, acquiring the opportunity to finally ensure the "unity" of the legal system. Here I write and approve laws, there I adopt them. It is convenient and, most importantly, justified by expediency, by the requirements of a "complex" time.

On 27 December the provision on the State-Legal Administration was approved; it was initially intended to provide legal backup for the preparation of the president's decisions. But that is only formally. In actual fact an attempt was made to resurrect a different form of the CPSU Central Committee administrative department for the full volume of political and legal decisions.

It must be said that the provision on the State-Legal Administration was compiled with the utmost precision and caution. The text was diluted by numerous democratic words—"coordination" and "interaction"... But what lies behind them?

According to the logic of the separation of powers, the administration, which is the structure of executive power, should be "restrained" by parliament. But the provision places on the State-Legal Administration duties in ensuring the formation of legislative work programs and organizing the preparation of draft laws of the Russian Federation. The administration has also taken on the function of coordinating the activity of various departments with the Russian Supreme Soviet.

All these unconstitutional functions, with their punctilious execution, will inevitably lead to contradictions between legislative and executive power. That is what always happens when one unconstitutional organ "takes away the bread" from another, entirely constitutional, organ and also lays claim to the monitoring of its activity. In this context a phrase from Shakhray's article "What is the State-Legal Administration" (IZVESTIYA 6 February 1992, No. 31) about how "sometimes even the duplication of functions is expedient: In a competitive struggle it is the more dynamic and competent institution that survives" acquires a sinister meaning. There is the Constitution and there are normative acts founding the state's institutions and restricting the competence of state organs precisely to ensure that there is no competition between them. The state organs are not businessmen competing with each other.

The desire to "keep a finger on the pulse" is so great that it transcends all borders. The leadership of the administration intends to submit draft laws to the president, depriving all the other government and department leaders of this right. The fact that the competence of the State-Legal Administration is unbounded also puts us on our guard. This fear can be justified traditionally: "Perhaps it will be better for the cause." But the idea of the State-Legal Administration in the form in which it has been implemented is Utopian. A gigantic formation seeking to control everything and to keep track of everything and to have time to bestow awards, issue ranks and titles, punish and pardon, and decide questions of citizenship is doomed to work inefficiently. Essentially the idea of an inexpensive, small, structurally simple government which the president once announced in his program has been compromised.

The State-Legal Administration is duplicating the activity of numerous organs. But why should an "expert analysis" administration engage in addition to everything else in civil defense, customs, and state reserves? Or why did the State-Legal Administration need to duplicate the powers of the control Administration, the Committee for interethnic relations, and in part the Foreign Ministry and the Defense Committee and so forth?

The most dangerous thing is that the president becomes the hostage of the State-Legal Administration: Its decisions on all important questions of political-legal life become the decisions of the president. The president receives information on these problems exclusively in that department's interpretation. Yet it is obvious (even if S. Shakhray acts only from the best motives) that even he can make mistakes in assessing a particular legislative act.

The State-Legal Administration has become a kind of supergovernment capable only of delaying the process of adopting and implementing decisions, acting as a "partition" between ministries, departments, and the local authorities on the one hand and the government and the president on the other. In addition the administration erects a barrier between nongovernment—legislative, oversight, and court— institutions and the president and his cabinet.

According to the decree and the provision, the State-Legal Administration chief himself is beyond the jurisdiction of the government and its first vice premier and individually becomes a representative of the president with extraconstitutional powers. Only the State-Legal Administration approves the texts of the laws which are adopted before they are signed and it alone determines how the president will use his deferring [otlagatelnoye] veto. Essentially it implements the president's legislative initiative.

The State-Legal Administration lays claim to the implementation of functions encompassing legal policy as a whole, legal and court reforms, and even the legislative process.

The "coordination" of the activity of the state security and internal affairs organs could successfully replace the failed plan to create the Ministry of Security and Internal Affairs. Control over the uniformity of court practice essentially cancels out an important avenue of the activity of the Supreme Court. We already know how the first experience of "collaboration" with the Constitutional Court (point five of the provision on the State-Legal Administration) ended! Nor can we fail to mention the administration's arrogation of the material and technical and cadres backup for the work of the investigation organs and courts of various levels. There's the independence of the court for you!

There are also other elements. Understandably, the president cannot take part in all sessions of the Congress of People's Deputies, the Supreme Soviet, and its organs. But once again the right to represent his interests in these legislative structures is handed over to the State-Legal Administration leadership.

Finally, the State-Legal Administration leadership has the right "to issue, on instructions from the president, explanations of decisions taken by the president and government..." This is one more type of interpretation of juridical norms, previously unknown to jurisprudence, which is, I fear, being created to justify the saying "the law can be twisted..."

Recent events in the legal sphere put us on our guard. For instance, take the acts of the customs service, legalizing customs control's appropriation of part of the contraband it seizes. That is no better than the "feeding" of provincial leaders in Russia before Peter I! Who generated this looting by the customs? It was the State-Legal Administration again—back in its infancy when it was called the service of the state adviser for legal policy.

In actual fact what is taking place is not simply a dispute between different juridical organs which involves no commitments, not a selfish struggle for a place in the sun, but confrontation between two lines in legal policy. It is a case of a historical choice: Either Russia will gamble on creating power structures like the State-Legal Administration or our state will gradually advance toward a truly rule-of-law ideal. Forcing people by force to "switch" from totalitarianism to democracy is impossible: The trouble is that in that case they will still have a totalitarian legal culture. And you cannot build a rule-of-law state with it.

In conclusion I want to note that the negative reaction from the viewpoint of the law generated by a whole series of actions of the State-Legal Administration and by the very fact of its emergence, to judge by the press recently, is shared by many people. In my view the time has come for the Constitutional Court to express itself on the matter. After all, the provision on the State-Legal Administration, approved by the Russian president,

violates article 125 of the Russian Federation Constitution and article 13 of the declaration on the state sovereignty of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic.

Trends in Military Conversion Examined

PM2303153592 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 19 Mar 92 p 1

[Artivle by S. Razin: "Market Beyond the Barbed Wire. Conversion in Military Industrial Complex Is Having Its First Results"]

[Text] What is now happening behind the military industrial complex's armor plate? Nothing good, it would seem. Gaydar has acted in a decisive but rash manner, and hundreds of military plants have come to the brink of bankruptcy—their debts with the bank are already running into millions. It looks as if unemployment will burst out into the open, and this also means millions—only this time they are enraged and exhausted people....

The defense industry, however, if you look harder at it, is turning itself around quickly. If anywhere there have appeared the beginnings of radical reform, it is here behind the barbed wire fences. As confirmation of these very bold conclusions, I can give an actual address: the "Istok" association in the city of Fryazino near Moscow, which is one of the most secret facilities of the former USSR Ministry of the Electronics Industry.

Fryazino is a typical one-facility city. Of its 40,000 inhabitants, every third person is tied body and soul to "Istok." If it is reduced in size, then you might as well go hang yourselves. You will not find decent work anywhere in the district. A vast housing program has up till now been a millstone around "Istok"s' neck. Just consider, half the city was built at the military's expense. It is high time that this heavy burden was cast off onto the municipal self-governing body. But can you cast it off when the local treasury is completely empty? Last year the military industrial complex's flagship plowed about 50 million rubles [R] into cultural and consumer services, almost all its profits. But where can the money be obtained this year?

Experts maintain that aiming and guidance systems built in this country can hit the very bull's eye from any altitude just as well as can the American ones. In the area of microwave technology, Soviet scientists are steadily maintaining their world-class standing, and in several fields they have even shot ahead. It was here in Fryazino itself that the "eyes and ears" of "Buran" were created, and of all which flies above the land and plows the ocean. They did not grudge us the money to develop space communications, the newest navigation and radar systems, and superaccurate sights. Thank God!

At "Istok" I was shown an extensive list of goods which can be dumped on the consumer market in the coming year. Industrial microwave chambers, which are capable of saving a harvest from losses, processing timber, and firing bricks and reinforced concrete; hearing aids, laser and microwave equipment for medicine; a unique electric spark machine; and a device for special communications. As well as a thousand minor items like—pressure gauges, antiradar devices [antiradary] for automobiles, speedometers, and so on and so forth....

And so only the smallest thing is necessary—the first payment which would set conversion in motion and turn the military industrial complex away from the generals' needs to those of ordinary people—to your needs and mine.

Where can such money be obtained? "Istok" would for a start like to have R50-60 million but this firm has also been "blacklisted" in the bank although it kept out of debt for longer than the others. Alas, the stream of refusals to buy special products is really affecting the whole of the defense industry.

It seems to be the right time to shake up the exchange structures: money plus technologies is an obvious formula for success. However, the chief engineer Vitaliy Batygin explained me outspokenly where he would tell these speculators to go, if they poked their noses in his business again. Batygin has been at the firm 40 years now, and has plowed his furrow till his heart ached, but should he now have to surrender himself up to some "Alices" who have captivated everybody with their dogs [reference to Alisa Exchange using a logo which features an attractive dog named Alisa]?

There is plenty of evidence of such antagonism. The moneybags from the exchanges are demanding a goodly slice of the "militaristic" property in exchange for startup capital. However the merging of two so dissimilar sectors of the economy in the future is extremely likely. Stereotypes in our turbulent times change quickly.

But in the meantime the "dinosaurs" of the military industrial complex have fixed their gazes on the West. How well everything would be set up if they succeeded in pushing their output for currency! The euphoria on this account has, however, clearly subsided. The advantageous places on the world market have been taken up long ago. "Istok," for example, for all its good reputation, only managed to sell its high technology to China and North Korea. And consider yet another example. "Istok" was going to produce hearing aids together with the Italian firm "Mayko" [as transliterated]. They were already on the point of striking a deal: Fryazino's excellent development plus imported flow lines. But where had those Italians gotten to? They had hesitated over the contract.

Evidently, this is a general trend: Dependable capital is in no hurry to move to Russia for the moment—it thinks long and hard, then waits for our stormy life to conform to the rules of simple decorum. Yet for the time being you have to agree to such contracts of which you cannot be proud. At one secret shop the director intends to rivet some sort of handles for American yachts, and at another it was to be automobile lights made with German

machinery. It is convenient for the foreign partners to dump such "trifling" things on us—consider, labor here costs nothing. But is our cosseted military industrial complex really looking for currency earnings there?

However, I would not begin to dismiss a priori the tactics of General Director Aleksandr Korolev, who is attempting to attract Western partners to his firm at any cost. Unprestigious orders are, he considers, a temporary phenomenon. The most important thing just now is to survive, and to get the ball rolling as far as conversion is concerned.

There is yet one more cause for reflection and guarded optimism:

"Istok" is taking the plunge into parallel structures.

Almost a year ago the small enterprise "Magratep," created in parallel with "Istok," began to mark out a new era. At one time superlight magnets were created by order of the military and superhigh frequency generators, magnetrons, were based on them. However, the peaceful profession of making the new magnetrons turned out to be even more unique and profitable. "Magratep" adapted the new development for peaceful uses and increased production of it threefold. The major plants of Novosibirsk, Moscow, Tselinograd, Dnepropetrovsk, and other regions jumped at this technology, and will receive the "know how" which has been brought to their attention, like seedlings in pots. I am talking about those self same microwave chambers which will be useful in all areas: from storage of seed grain to the safe destruction of nuclear waste.

This is how money should be made: A second and third harvest may be reaped from any military technology. And you see there are only 35 people employed at "Magratep." What is more, all the administrative apparatus is represented in the person of Oleg Morozov, one of the former chiefs of the shop.

Of course "Magratep" alone cannot set a trend, but it has set many minds thinking. And "Istok," like an orange being shared out, is being divided into separate firms capable of making their own way into the market together with their products. At the Fryazino flagship several mighty scientific and production complexes have been created which maintain the "highest standards" in various areas: lasers, microwave technology, alloys, transistors etc. There everything is near at hand: from computers to unique machine tools.

"Unemployment is not a threat to us," Sergey Kantyuk, chief of Science and Produduction Complex-8 says putting forward his arguments. He made a proposal to his colleagues a couple of months ago that they club together, "each giving what he could," and set up the "Bezon" joint-stock company from voluntary contributions. It has attracted company capital of 350,000 rubles [R], and practically all the permanent members of staff have put themselves forward as shareholders, even pensioners whose numbers on their books they were going to reduce any moment now. A young engineer was elected president as "Bezon"s' president.

"Bezon" has gone even further than this. This is a pure kind of parallel structure. Each Science and Production Complex-8 staffer leads a double life: as a state employee and as a shareholder, fulfilling at one and the same time the usual planned orders and independent ones at their places of work. With time the deficit has disappeared insofar as the state order in this science and production complex has been cut by R20 million and now they have to find work for themselves. "Bezon" of course pays "Istok" in full for the lease, electric power, materials, and wear and tear of the equipment, but the shareholders have total control over the remaining profit: part of it will go on payments, part on development.

"We should determine our fate on our own. But nevertheless we should avoid acting in a decisive but rash manner," Kantyuk considers. He would like at first to remain within the association. Why? If only because the parade of sovereignties has destroyed our economy. It is necessary to build our new life in an intelligent manner, by creating new structures and squeezing out the old. Many leaders of "Istok"s' subdivisions agree with this strategy. The board of directors, however, are, strange as it may seem, putting forward a more radical plan for the regrouping of forces.

"We are prepared to give everyone a free hand!" General Director Aleksandr Korolev says who is also prepared to create joint-stock companies on the basis of the science and production complex, which are, however, completely autonomous. Why hide under "Istok"s' warm protection? True, Korolev considers that 50 percent of the company capital should remain in the state sector, that is in the hands of the board of directors. But how else could it be? It is wrong to squander the military industrial complex just any old how, and best of all go over to economic levers. Right now.

It is easy to see purely personal interests in the director's maneuvering: Who on earth would give away his own power so readily? But I do not wish to draw such conclusions. Korolev is very appealing to me, just as his opponents are. Everyone together elected him director. He looks at the military industrial complex with the eyes of an entrepreneur. His model has its advantages: Commercial freedom is coupled with state regulation. Nevertheless new superproducts will be required some time, a new defense doctrine will sooner or later appear, but only the major firms will be up to such orders... But at the moment about 200 joint-stock companies, parallel structures of their kind, have been registered at "Istok." The pressure from below is immense, and I think it is already impossible to stop it.

Drawbacks of 'Wholesale' Defense Shifts Eyed

PM2303151092 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Mar 92 p 2

[Report by Colonel O. Falichev: "'Wholesale' Conversion Could Rebound on the Production of Consumer Goods"]

[Text] Virtually our whole life today has been reduced to the basic question: How much does it cost? Each day workers, plant directors, housewives, and pensioners ask themselves this question...Time and again state officials in the government are having to calculate what to cut out of the budget and what to add to ensure that at least some of the political leaders' election promises are kept.

Several months ago the chief economists' gaze fell on defense enterprises. A simple and effective method suggested itself....

Here is an extract from a telegram sent to the Main Rocket and Artillery Directorate [GRAU]: "At present the plant is in a most difficult situation. It has a stock of 50,000 unsold items whose production required considerable material resources. People have not been paid any wages for two months and around 1,000 highly qualified specialists have been warned about dismissal. The plant has been asking for and demanding an immediate and final decision on the question of continuing or ending the production of military output...

"[Signed] Yu. Royetskiy, acting director of the 'Avtozapchast' plant."

There have been many telegrams like that sent to the GRAU, the CIS Joint Armed Forces, and the Russian Government. Plant directors, councils of enterprises, and whole labor collectives have been sounding the alarm, asking for help, and declaring that the situation is hopeless. I could name dozens of so-called "mailboxes" in Orsk, Volgograd, Novosibirsk, and other cities which are now on the verge of stopping work or financial collapse. Why is all this happening?

There is no need to explain that for decades our economy developed in a one-sided way. Hundreds of enterprises were geared to the production of military orders. There were even whole cities created to work for the defense industry. It, in turn, received steady supplies of resources and equipment....

"But this year we have not concluded a single contract with the plants," Major General V. Skorokhodov, deputy chief of the GRAU, said. "The government has not resolved questions of the financing of orders and there have been no explanations on this score to date. There is no money to pay for output worth 252 million rubles [R] that has alread ybeen produced for us even though it is needed...."

When a patient finds it hard to breathe they give him oxygen. But on this occasion that seems to be precisely what they are cutting off: This year finance for the defense sectors has been sharply reduced. That would seem the right thing to do. But how can you explain to people who have spent many years ensuring the country's strategic parity, whom the state needed, and who were always the focus of the central leadership's attention, that they are suddenly surplus to requirements? Does this mean that they have to find their own place in the sun now? Judging by the way events are developing in our country that is what it all boils down to. Recently one leader of Russian industry bluntly stated that the "social justice game is over."

Do the drowning have to save themselves now? How many of them are there now sinking to the bottom in full view of the whole country? No less than 12 million—the best engineers, scientists, and workers. It is a historical fact that in the Vietnam war the Yankees used to drop their much vaunted M-16 and at the first opportunity grab an AKM. Or take "Oka" and "Tor," the world's best operational-tactical and surface-to-air missile systems, the SS-20 mobile missile launchers...Dozens of types of military hardware and weaponry have won world renown and incorporated the best achievements of the country's science and know-how. Does it make sense now to turn skilled specialists, who have created all this by their talent, intellect, and sometimes incredible effort, into the dregs of society?

However, such an approach may seem narrowly departmental to some people. Say what you like but the military-industrial complex was and remains in the minds of many people a monster gobbling up the people's resources. But do you know something interesting?

This "monster" controls only around 15 percent of the capital in the whole national economic complex. In addition to everything else it keeps us shod and clothed and produces millions of those scarce refrigerators, washing machines, television sets, tape recorders and even... cosmetics. Here are figures from just one department, the Department of Munitions and Specialized Chemicals of the Russian Federation Ministry of Industry (one of the successors to the former USSR Ministry of the Defense Industry). The volume of civilian output there in 1989 was 40 percent of the total production volume. By 1992 that figure had risen to 85 percent. In other words, 85 percent of the output not destined for military purposes. This is a result which cannot be ignored.

Where is the problem? Until now there has been no Russian state conversion program or centralized fund for it. Even though work is going on in this sphere. As I was told at the Defense Industry Department of the Russian Federation Ministry of Industry, a decision has been made to channel 1.5 percent of defense enterprises' profit into financing research and development into the creation and assimilation of civilian output and consumer goods. For meeting the costs of conversion a fund will be formed using deductions from the profits of those same converted enterprises at a rate of 3 percent of the value of output and services produced. A decision is also

being implemented on reducing the defense industry's public budget finance by a factor of 7.5 and reducing purchases of arms and equipment by a factor of 8 and military building by a factor of 25. Drastic, isn't it?

Many enterprises have already found themselves "up to their ears in debt.". Ties built up over many years have been severed and top-class specialists and workers are losing their skills and are leaving. As a result the pace of the reorganization and modernization of production units—the very ones where it is planned to produce civilian output—is declining. This could be a considerable blow to our ailing ruble if you bear in mind that last year almost all the increase in consumer goods production was due to enterprises in the defense complex.

"Unfortunately, the danger of a decline in the production of civilian output is real," Yu. Starodub, general director of the the Russian Federation Ministry of Industry Department of Munitions and Special Chemicals, said. "Whereas before the government's decision to reduce financing we planned to produce output worth R35 billion in 1992, now production will fall by approximately 50 percent."

But it is not just a matter of consumer goods. It is also to do with the normal functioning of the economy as a whole. What in particular? The viability of such essential sectors as coal mining and the prospecting and development of oil and gas fields and ore are inconceivable without industrial explosives. Thus, to treat the defense industry as the poor relation will inevitably rebound on all sectors of the national economic complex. Such predictions are also confirmed at the Defense Industry Department of the Russian Federation Ministry of Industry where defense output now constitutes only 27 percent. "Wholesale" conversion and the tightening of the "financial screws" are bringing almost 200 enterprises to their knees now.

"It is ridiculous and wrong to use all our production and scientific potential to produce nothing but saucepans," General Director G. Yanpolskiy believes. "We want Russia to become a world producer of competitive output. But if we destroy the scientific base and production facilities, that will mean ruin."

Do those "at the top," in the Russian Government and the parliament, hear these pleas for help? Do they know that Hamlet's question of "to be or not to be?" is, sadly, real for many plants and millions of specialists? People with whom I spoke told me that they have sent reports on the existing situation to the very highest levels. Marshal of Aviation Ye. Shaposhnikov, commander in chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, has done likewise. At the end of January 1992 he sent a letter to President B. Yeltsin in which he bluntly stated that the further reduction of production, in particular of munitions, will begin irreversible processes and entail the disintegration of this very important sector and cause considerable damage to chemical, metallurgical, and machine building sectors.

Alas, the economic noose continues to tighten at enterprises. The process has started, as it were. Although the experience of those states which have already gone through this shows that not a single civilized country has carried out conversion this way .

"The Americans consider that conversion, that is to say, the reduction of military production, should be no more than 5-10 percent per annum," said V. Lazarev, chief of the conversion section of the Russian Federation Ministry of Industry Defense Industry Department. "If it is more, however, over there they compensate plants for the damage suffered."

But let's try to put ourselves in the place of, say, our vice premier, Ye. Gaydar. The country's budget is not elastic. You can, of course, print money, but that only whips up inflation and produces a new leap in prices and in dissatisfaction in society. At the last parliamentary session First Deputy Finance Minister V. Barchuk stated that the expected budget deficit will be 10 percent of GNP. Russian Government experts are recommending that state expenditure policy, above all military expenditure, be tightened up even more. True, the conversion of defense sectors, it was announced, could be an exception. But the conversion program has not yet been drawn up. Is there no solution?

About a year ago the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) recorded a surprising and considerable reduction in the export of Soviet weapons—a reduction of almost half. And this at a time when the United States and other countries are opening up new markets for arms sales with increasing assurance. In the last five years arms sales by America, according to SIPRI experts, have come to more than $50 billion. Weapons are sold for billions each year by France, Britain, China...Why, then, should we, producing mountains of armaments that are competitive and in demand, store them in warehouses or send them to be melted down? At a news conference in Moscow on 9 March Russian Federation Industry Minister A. Titkin said that we have lost some arms markets and neglected others. He cited the following as an example: At the recent Asian Air Show in Singapore Russia displayed only two civil aircraft. Meanwhile the United States offered for sale all the equipment which had done service in Kuwait, while the French were even selling at the show a salvo-fire system which had nothing to do with aviation. Our competitors, as we can see, have no fear of appearing to be militarists. You would think that, given our empty purse, it is God's will that we sell off our mountains of stockpiled weapons—T-72's, MiG-29's, "Tor" and "Osa" surface-to-air missile systems, small arms, night-vision aids, munitions, systems for the active, dynamic protection of tanks... There are customers for all these. So is it sensible now, at this most difficult time for our country, drastically to cut the production and export of them? Clearly it is necessary to be bolder in setting up joint ventures to manufacture, say, dual-purpose products.

But the main thing is to create the necessary legislative base and draw up a Russian program of conversion. In

the United States, for example, a law on conversion has been drafted which incorporates social guarantees for working people. It turns out that there they think about the future of redundant workers and employees, while we simply tell our people "the social justice game is at an end," and it is every man for himself. I think that our law on conversion should stipulate without fail not only how to implement it, the timetable, and what payments should go into its investment fund, but also the social guarantees for working people.

Finally we need a blueprint for the Russian defense industry, the elaboration of the defense sufficiency doctrine, and a well-argued validation of essential mobilization capacities. Nor are there on this score any legislative acts or statutes laying down the arrangements for taxing mothballed equipment and for stockpiling mobilization reserves of raw and semifinished materials and components. The adoption of a law on the mobilization preparation of Russian industry would also be a solution to this problem.

But for the time being you get the impression that we are groping our way, as it were, toward the target we have set. Moreover, many departments are seeking to grab as much as they can from the conversion of defense enterprises. They could not care less what happens after that. No one knows how this will end. That is perhaps why no one takes the responsibility to tell the whole country: "Everyone should bury the hatchet, we will never fight against anyone again."

How many times since 1917 has history taught us to treat what has been created with care and not to raze everything to the ground, and then later... Let us remember how battleships and planes were axed and how Khrushchev declared artillery to be neanderthal technology. And how in our time we heedlessly dispensed with the world's best operational-tactical missile system—the "Oka"—squandering billions of rubles of the people's money. Are we not repeating such mistakes today under the slogan of fighting to improve people's prosperity?

First Quarter Deficit of R84 Billion Projected

PM2403111392 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Mar 92 Morning Edition pp 1-2

[Article by Irina Demchenko: "Large Deficit in 'Balanced Budget' Expected"]

[Text] The Russian Federation Finance Ministry has sent its government a note informing it of the failure of virtually all the budget measures planned by the government for the first quarter of this year. According to the Russian Federation Finance Ministry's forecast, the budget deficit will amount to 84 billion rubles [R] in the first quarter. Last year Russian Federation Finance Minister B. Fedorov resigned when he considered it impossible to run the republic's annual—not quarterly—budget at a deficit of R70 billion.

As has been reported in the press, the first-quarter budget was not ratified, but merely adopted for consideration by a skeptical parliament. The Russian Government, however, was allowed to spend R420.5 billion in the first quarter provided that an equal amount of revenue was received. In its note the Finance Ministry states that budget revenue as of 1 April will amount to around R190 billion—R230.5 billion less than planned. In no area has the government's fiscal policy provided funds in the amounts expected, despite the fact that most tax is collected in advance.

According to the Finance Ministry's assessment, value-added tax [VAT] revenue shortfalls will amount to R44 billion—approximately one-third of the sum provided for in the budget. The main reasons for the shortfall are: a greater than planned drop in production volumes (13.5 percent in January-February, according to figures from the Russian Federation State Committee for Statistics [Goskomstat]) and a fall in consumer demand; enterprise and organization insolvency caused by price rises (according to Deputy Finance Minister S. Ignatyev, total payment defaults had reached several hundred billion rubles by mid-March); and the Supreme Soviet decision to cut VAT rates for a number of foodstuffs from 28 to 15 percent (the loss from this decision is R5 billion, or 11 percent of the total revenue shortfall).

According to the Russian Federation Finance Ministry forecast, cash receipts from the enterprise profits tax are running ahead of the sum provided for in the budget owing to the fact that they are levied in advance in the first quarter on the basis of last year's levels. But even this has failed to help: A number of regions have decided not to pay these taxes into the republic (central) budget. As independent experts predicted, the very same budget warfare is under way within Russia as was seen between the center and the republics in 1991. After, by analogy with the Pavlov government, the Russian Government on the spur of the moment transferred responsibility for maintaining the population's living standards to local authorities, the territories considered themselves relieved of any obligation to pay the tax collected to Moscow. Checheno-Ingushetia has paid just 2 percent of the profits tax to the republic budget, Bashkortostan has paid less than 10 percent, Tatarstan has paid 15.5 percent, while Magadan and Novosibirsk Oblasts and Krasnodar and Maritime Krays have paid less than 45 percent. On the other hand, higher than expected amounts of income tax, which remains wholly with local budgets, have been collected from individuals. This, incidentally, is thanks to the "reform government," which has more than tripled wages for miners, health care workers, law-enforcement workers, and so forth.

According to the note, income from foreign economic activity, which the Russian Government had expected to cover the VAT shortfall (at any rate, that was what economic adviser A. Ulyukayev explained in January) amounts to no more than R9 billion, as opposed to a planned R228 billion. The Russian Finance Ministry is drawing its government's attention to the fact that this is

linked not only to the catastrophic drop in exports, but also to the fact that exporters have no funds in their accounts from which export duty can be recovered. The oil refining industry has been completely ruined. Moreover, the budget has suffered a R120-billion shortfall in connection with the government's decisions to exempt shipments abroad of 9.4 million tonnes of oil, 9.2 million tonnes of petroleum products, and 6 billion cubic meters of gas from export duty.

It is expected that privatization proceeds in the first quarter will be no more than R300 million (R3 billion had been anticipated in the first quarter and R92 billion over the course of the year). According to figures from the Russian Federation Goskomstat, private individuals privatized 18 studios and workshops, 58 public catering enterprises, and 153 stores and trading stalls throughout the entire republic in January-February. In total, individual citizens now own 0.1 percent of trading and public catering enterprises and 0.05 percent of consumer service enterprises. Even when it comes to apartments only 17,500 were privatized in January—and 11,400 of these were done so free of charge. This slow "take-up rate" is clearly due above all to citizens' insolvency and lack of confidence in the reliability of the Russian leadership's domestic policy. Foreign investors have not been participating in privatization in Russia in 1992, exceptional cases apart. Currently 96 percent of industrial output is produced by state-owned enterprises. Only 1 percent of Russia's industrial enterprises have had share flotations.

The note states that serious complications in the implementation of budgetary policy are being caused by the position of the Central Bank of Russia, which has just started reforming the system for "recording the implementation of the republic budget and territories' budgets." This, in the Finance Ministry's opinion, is resulting in disruption to revenue. Moreover, speaking at a recent conference of experts, Deputy Finance Minister Sergey Ignatyev stated that the Central Bank of Russia, which has been declared to be the successor to the USSR State Bank, is not carrying out central bank functions. Correspondent accounts opened with the bank by the central banks of the former Union republics are purely pro forma [nosyat chisto informativnyy kharakter] and do not make it possible to run financial and credit policy in the ruble area. The balance of trade between Russia and the other CIS republics is in the black. This fact, remarkable in a normal economy, means in the context of inflation that goods are being exported from the republic and that the Russian Federation Central Bank is receiving "thin air" in credit payments.

The Finance Ministry draws the government's attention to the fact that, in connection with the large revenue shortfall, it has been necessary to sharply reduce state spending—which is already strictly regulated. Funds have been saved above all in areas such as appropriations for capital construction, science, the acquisition of equipment, and major overhauls.

According to the Finance Ministry forecast, the unratified Russian Federation state budget deficit in the first quarter will be R84 billion. As usual, it is planned to finance it by attracting additional banking resources.

Wisdom of IMF-Backed Economic Steps Pondered

PM2303120492 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 18 Mar 92 First Edition p 3

[Article by Candidate of Economic Sciences Vladimir Kosenko under the rubric "Prognosis": "Madness of the Brave, or Bravery of the Mad?"]

[Text] The good thing about democracy, the system under which we live, is the fact that it makes the government's intentions clear and comprehensible.

By the 17 February resolution "On Urgent Measures To Normalize the Situation in the Republic Oil and Gas Industry," the Russian Government permitted 40 percent of oil, gas, and the products processed from them to be sold at free prices. Ten days later the full program of government action for 1992 was announced. Among the most important measures are the further liberalization of prices, including prices for bread, milk, and energy sources, the introduction of internal convertibility of the ruble on the basis of a fixed ruble exchange rate, and the acceleration of the liberalization of foreign economic activity, including the abolition of quotas and licenses.

All the measures listed above comply with the recommendations of the IMF, loans from which (if we receive them) we intend to use to support the internal convertibility of the ruble by creating (after Poland's example) our own foreign currency stabilization fund.

It is, of course, not only a question of IMF recommendations. Releasing oil and gas prices will, the government expects, stimulate the interest of producers in increasing the extraction of energy sources, which provide about one-half of all the republic budget's income. Meanwhile Russia's oil men produced 11 percent less oil in 1991 than in 1990, resulting in a shortfall of over 10 billion foreign currency rubles. In the first two months of this year the curve of the downturn in oil production has taken on a still more threatening character.

In the context of this depressing picture such decisive and prompt measures can only be welcomed. However, all is not so simple as it appears at first glance.

First, the substantial price rises on energy sources (from 350 rubles [R] to R2,000-2,500 per tonne for oil) could create not incentives, but rather disincentives to produce more oil. That is what happened when prices were liberated in other sectors.

Second, there is a whole range of reasons for the fall in oil production. The first of these is the fact that the equipment is extremely worn out and obsolete and technology and organization are archaic, and this is to blame for the fact that no more than one-fourth of the oil contained in

deposits is successfully extracted from them. The exodus of skilled Ukrainian and Azerbaijani oil cadres has also taken its toll. Thus it will scarcely be possible to increase production through liberalization alone. At the same time the catastrophic consequences of this measure are quite plain to see.

Our economy possesses a unique quality which perhaps has no analogy in any other country of the world. It can be formulated as an aphorism: Our wealth is the cause of our poverty. Everyone understands that for a long time now we have been able to make ends meet only thanks to the sale of our natural resources. But this understanding is rather theoretical in nature, whereas it should be the cornerstone of the strategy of economic transformations. What specifically do I have in mind?

We have entered a very tricky phase of integration into the world economic system. And it has at once become apparent that there is a substantial difference between the extractive and processing sectors of our industry. The essence of this difference lies in the fact that the more of our own labor we apply to natural materials, the less competitive the products of our labor become on the world market. A highly developed economy (say, the German economy) transforms primary materials into the sort of end products whose sale ensures not only the prosperity of the German economy, but significantly greater benefits for the countries (for example Russia) whose raw materials the Germans process compared to the option whereby we process our raw materials ourselves. Given the existing technical and technological level of our processing industry (and the quality of the work force) it is more profitable for us not to process the extracted raw materials into finished articles ourselves, but to sell them wholesale on the foreign market. (Let me remark that the competitiveness of the output of our extractive sectors is not to the credit of the employees of these sectors, but is due to the peculiar nature of their subject of labor).

We did not notice this before, because we were living in the kingdom of "crooked mirrors"—the old system of pricing was designed to serve a fundamentally distorted economy. Its most important characteristic was artificially low prices, in comparison with world levels, for raw material resources, food products, and manpower. As a result, the situation arose whereby almost the whole of our processing industry existed quite successfully by "spreading thinly" the national income generated in the extractive sectors.

What conclusions follow from this with regard to our economic practice today?

The IMF recommendations, which the Russian Government is following, are indisputable from the standpoint of production efficiency. Our processing industry is indeed, by the standards of developed countries, capable only of unprofitably shifting natural resources. In its present form it is simply no use. But then this thought should be pursued to the end: About one-half of the population of Russia also become "no use, superfluous," because they earn their crust from this processing industry. But what else can they do?

If prices are released on all types of output, the convertibility of the national currency is introduced (a fixed ruble exchange rate on all forms of transaction), and full-scale liberalization of foreign economic activity is carried out, then naturally, by the laws of the free market, all the resources will head where their use will be most beneficial—in other words, abroad.

The government intends to increase the already established oil export quota of 60 million tonnes by a further 30-35 million tonnes through a reduction in internal consumption of energy resources following the liberalization of prices of energy sources. I believe this increase could be two or three times greater, since a direct result of the liberalization of prices of oil and gas and products processed from them will be paralysis—the total shutdown of at least one-third of processing industry enterprises, as they will be unable to sell their output and, consequently, their production lines will not require energy resources either.

The State Committee for Pricing estimates that as a result of liberalization, in comparison with March, fuel prices will rise more than fourfold; prices for ferrous metals will more than double; nonferrous metals will go up 130 percent; machine building output prices will nearly double; prices for light industry products will more than double; and prices for food industry products will go up 60 percent. Who will be able to afford to purchase, for example, a "Zhiguli" car at a cost of R500,000-600,000? Even to replace a single tire will cost R20,000-25,000. And how would you like a "Don" combine harvester at R17 million? So the abundance we have been aspiring to for so long is now just around the corner. True, at the same time more than 20-30 million people will find themselves out of work, and for them the purchase of a single loaf of bread at R10 and a package of milk at the same price will be an impossible dream.

Many calls have been heard in recent times not to aggravate an atmosphere which is already at fever pitch. I agree. But it is still more irresponsible to bury one's head in the sand. I am sure that the option involving the liberalization of prices for bread, milk, and energy sources is not viable—in the sense that it would be the last major action of the present government. The people would not agree to die off without a murmur.

Therefore it remains to be hoped that the government will substantially amend its tactics, taking cognizance of the incontrovertible fact that revolutions are futile in economics, and in real life it is impossible to jump from one qualitative state to another in one fell swoop. What should these amendments be? First, the planned liberalization of prices for energy sources, bread, and milk should be unequivocally rejected. Of course, in the long term we should draw nearer to the level of world oil and

gas prices, but this should be done sensibly, through eliminating disproportions and retooling our industry.

A second factor must be noted. We have released prices, and think that we have taken a major step toward the market economy. A profound error. Surely it is not the market when producers in the state and nonstate sectors of the economy alike are granted equal rights in pricing? Commercial enterprises really control their own property, whereas the collectives and administration of state enterprises, controlling state property as their own, do not bear economic responsibility for the results of their activity. They risk nothing, and cannot become bankrupt.

Prices for the output of nonstate enterprises undoubtedly can and should be released. As for the state sector, here some degree of price regulation is needed (profitability ceilings, progressive taxation). But the main thing is that prices for the output of state enterprises should be released only after monetary reform modeled on the reform once carried out by L. Erhard.

However, the government stubbornly ignores the repeated proposals for monetary reform. Why? Weren't you ready? Then get ready; by this time ration cards should have been introduced, exchangeable for goods at least on the level of prison rations. Surely the state of affairs is not natural from the point of view of logic and common sense when food which cannot be sold because of "mad" prices, despite its general scarcity, perishes and has to be destroyed? Is the present situation not a mirror image of the bad memory of the early thirties?

The country's leadership has frightened itself to such an extent with the bugbear of "the administrative-command system" that it considers it sufficient to issue decrees and adopt laws (even good ones) in the hope that later the market itself will arrange everything properly. It won't! We will not have a self-tuning, self-regulating market like this, perhaps, for 100 years. A huge amount of organizational work is needed to create and provide state support for private farms, to purchase top quality, uninfected seeds and highly productive breeds of livestock from abroad, to convert military-industrial complex enterprises to the production of small-scale agricultural equipment, to privatize these enterprises, and much else.

I consider the course of introducing internal convertibility of the ruble equally mistaken and premature in the current conditions. A certain parallel can be drawn between this course and the liberalization of prices. Whereas liberalization eliminates the distinction between state and commercial prices, the convertibility of the ruble leads to leveling.

By the standard of world prices, R100 per kilogram of meat is a giveaway, "dumping" price given an exchange rate of R100 to the dollar, since in the United States, for example, 1 kg of fillet of beef costs $5-8. At the same time, naturally, we lose sight of the fact that the average monthly income of a hired worker in the States is $3,000. As a result the upper limit of our internal prices extends, in effect, to infinity.

In order to support the internal convertibility of the ruble, the Polish idea of forming our own currency stabilization fund has been uncritically accepted. To my mind, this idea is profoundly mistaken, since its point is to artificially (and temporarily—until we have eaten our way through the fund) endow the national currency with the properties of a convertible currency, at a time when the economy is in no state to support such lofty aspirations. Only the nouveaux riches will benefit from this venture, by exchanging sackfuls of easy worthless rubles for hard currency at a lower exchange rate.

The problem of converting the national currency into a freely convertible currency is not a financial problem; it is a problem of the cardinal restructuring and recovery of the whole national economy, and the road toward a solution of the problem is long and hard.

It has long been known that the introduction of foreign currency into internal circulation devalues the weaker currency quicker than emission. If the population has $3 billion, for instance, this is equivalent to an additional emission to the tune of R330 billion. What sort of financial improvement can there be in these conditions? This is why an essential prerequisite for stabilizing the purchasing power of the ruble is an immediate ban on the use of foreign currency in internal circulation.

But this is not enough. It is necessary to return to differentiated currency coefficients until better times. There should be one exchange rate for foreign tourists, a preferential rate for investors, and a third rate for domestic producers purchasing raw materials abroad. Of course, this measure requires a state monopoly of all exchange transactions involving foreign currency. And only after we have overcome the lowest point in the downturn and feel that the upturn has begun, only then is a smooth convergence of ruble exchange rates possible, which will ensure a modest (relatively, of course) victory over our disproportions and the incorporation of the national economy in the structure of the world economy.

Functions of New Prices Watchdog Defined

PM2403090992 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 19 Mar 92 First Edition p 3

[Unattributed report under "The Government Has Resolved" rubric: "Everyone Will Know About Prices Here"]

[Text] The Russian Government has defined the functions of the Prices Committee set up under the Russian Federation Ministry of Economics. The committee is charged with ensuring the elaboration and implementation of a unified state prices policy in the republic. Its specialists will analyze the processes of price formation and prepare proposals to change the level of regulated prices and tariffs for output, goods, and services, as well as in reciprocal deliveries between Russia and other CIS members. One of

the committee's tasks is to regulate prices for the output of monopoly enterprises. The committee will monitor the prices discipline of enterprises and organizations on the republic's territory regardless of departmental affiliation or form of ownership.

Supreme Soviet

Khasbulatov Remarks Further on Additional Powers

PM2403085792 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Mar 92 Morning Edition p 2

[Report by Sergey Chugayev: "R. Khasbulatov Believes Russian President and Government Unable To Use Additional Powers"]

[Text] The 19 March session of the Russian parliament began with a report from the Supreme Soviet chairman on the work on the draft new constitution. In R. Khasbulatov's opinion—expressed repeatedly in the course of his report—the Congress of People's Deputies should demonstrate that it is a creative force and adopt the draft constitution on first reading. At the same time, a law should be adopted submitting amendments to the current Constitution, which will remain in force until a new one is finally adopted. Everything is in place for the congress to adopt the draft constitution, R. Khasbulatov believes. The main prerequisite is the reaching of agreement with the republics making up Russia and with the Russian krays and oblasts on the question of the Federation Treaty. Clearly, such agreement will be reached in the very near future with the national okrugs too.

It could be discerned from the speaker's words that the main differences still relate to the issue of the balance between the executive and the legislature. An original solution to this should be sought, since the relevant international experience is hardly applicable to Russian conditions, R. Khasbulatov believes.

Highly assessing the work of the Constitutional Commission on the whole, R. Khasbulatov stated that preparatory work on the draft constitution continues. Another session of the Constitutional Commission with the Russian president in the chair is to be held 24 March to sum up the preliminary results of the work. The speaker of parliament expressed the conviction that ultimately the congress could take just an hour to adopt the draft constitution on first reading, devoting the rest of the time to a discussion on economic and organizational problems.

The main problem, as is well known, should be to clarify relations between the government and the parliament. And, indeed, this was reaffirmed by R. Khasbulatov in proposing that an assessment of the intentions of a number of Russian Government members to convene a constituent meeting be submitted for examination by the congress. He stated that, in his opinion, the leader of a government which has promoted and supported the idea of transferring power to another structure should not remain in his position. It would be more expedient for the parliament to use the time left until the congress to adopt a package of laws on social protection for the population, R. Khasbulatov stated.

In the opinion of a number of parliamentarians, even such popular actions might not win public support for the attempts to change the government. On the other hand, the conservative section of the congress is entirely capable of "obstructing" the draft constitution. Thus, it is quite possible that the parliament could find itself caught between two stools.

We can unambiguously conclude from R. Khasbulatov's speech that he believes that civic consensus in society can only be achieved in the event of the president and government "rejecting unnecessary powers which they cannot utilize" before the congress opens.

R. Khasbulatov stated that he had far more faith in the I. Silayev government, whose "vapid ministers" would appear before parliament with reports on their work at the drop of a hat. Returning to parliament the right to confirm cabinet members also strengthens the president's positions, since it partially removes from him the burden of responsibility for the government's actions, R. Khasbulatov believes.

During his speech the speaker of parliament accused a number of the mass media (without naming names) of waging a war against the Supreme Soviet. And he did not rule out the possibility that this war could be conducted on the government's orders. In R. Khasbulatov's opinion, this press position is in conflict with the Law on the Press. In this regard he suggested that parliamentarians listen to the Russian minister of the press and information as well as to certain chief editors of publications and journalists about how they interpret the relationship between their actions and the Law on the Press.

Filatov To Attend Siberian Congress

LD2303191592 Moscow POSTFACTUM in English 1635 GMT 23 Mar 92

[From the "Politics" section]

[Text] Krasnoyarsk—Deputy Chairman of the Russian parliament Vladimir Shumeyko will represent the parliament at a congress of Siberian Councils, which will open in Krasnoyarsk on March 27.

Vladimir Shumeyko told PF [POSTFACTUM] on March 23 that he would attend the congress on the decision of the leadership of the Russian parliament, in order to see if the forum is constitutional and to hear what they are going to discuss there. According to Shumeyko, the issues to be discussed at the congress will show whether it is constitutional or not.

First Deputy Chairman of the Russian parliament Sergey Filatov said at a session of the Presidium of the

Parliament that, according to the information of the parliament, the Forum of People's Deputies of all levels in Krasnoyarsk intends to discuss the progress of the economic reform in Russia. According to Filatov, there are forces, which can turn the discussion towards the creation of some sort of a republic. This is why one should regard seriously the congress of March 27, Filatov said.

Law Adopted To Form Ingush Republic

LD2003200992 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1600 GMT 20 Mar 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Ivan Novikov]

[Text] Moscow, 20 Mar (ITAR-TASS)—The Russian parliament, having examined the legislative proposal from the Russian President Boris Yeltsin, today adopted in its first reading the draft law "On Forming an Ingush Republic Within the Make-Up of the Russian Federation."

In a resolution adopted in this regard, the Supreme Soviet instructed the government to confirm the authority and composition of a state commission on the Chechen-Ingush Republic, and to send representatives of the republic to participate in the preparation of legal and organizational measures on national and territorial demarcations, and the election of representative bodies of authority.

Deputies Warn of 'Law Breaking' Violations

LD2303222092 Moscow POSTFACTUM in English 1942 GMT 23 Mar 92

[From the "Politics" section]

[Text] Moscow—According to some sources, at a closed meeting with Russian parliament Deputy Chairman Sergey Filatov Russian People's Deputies discussed violations of Russian legislature by Aleksandr Rutskoy, Gavriil Popov and Anatoliy Sobchak.

Unofficial sources informed PF [POSTFACTUM] that at the meeting of Russian Supreme Soviet's leaders with the Deputies one of the items of discussion concerned concurrent holding of several positions in political organizations and federal institutions by Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoy, Moscow Mayor Gavriil Popov and St. Petersburg Mayor Anatoliy Sobchak, which was considered unacceptable.

Sergey Filatov told the Deputies that Russian Prosecutor General Valentin Stepankov assured him of the soon solution of the problem. According to unofficial information, prosecutor general has already drafted a resolution warning Rutskoy, Popov and Sobchak of law breaking.

Political Parties Bill Returned for Amendment

LD2303234192 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 2100 GMT 23 Mar 92

[Text] The Presidium of the Russian parliament has considered a bill on political parties, sending it back to parliamentary committees and commissions for further amendment. The proposed legislation, designed to set up a legal framework for the operation of political parties, takes into account the appropriate laws of other countries, in particular those which shifted from totalitarian rule to democracy.

Chernobyl Victims' Compensation Law Amended

LD2403000692 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1500 GMT 23 Mar 92

[Text] Amendments are to be made to the law on social protection of citizens suffering from the effects of radiation following the catastrophe at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, according to a decision adopted today by the Presidium of the Russian Supreme Soviet. Adjustments have been made to the legal enactments relating to citizens' labor rights and pension provisions, which have been subjected to censure. An examination will be made of the draft law in accordance with which compensation and benefits to victims will be extended to persons suffering from radiation sickness or who have been disabled following radiation accidents at other nuclear installations, both military and civilian.

Bankrupt Fund Threatens Pensions

LD2303222692 Moscow POSTFACTUM in English 1635 GMT 23 Mar 92

[From the "Domestic Market" section]

[Text] Moscow [dateline as received]. The RF [Russian Federation] Supreme Soviet Commission on Labor Policy's Chairman Mikhail Zakharov: Pensions will not be paid in full in April.

Catastrophic—this word Zakharov called the situation of the RF pension fund making a statement on the RF Supreme Soviet's Presidium session on March 23. The government has practically bankrupted the pension fund....Taking into account the second quarter of 1992 the government's debt to the pension fund will amount to R50 billion.

According to the chairman of RF pension fund Aleksandr Kurtin during 1991 and the first quarter of this year that debt to the pension fund amounts R25.4 billion. The RF central bank provides loans to the pension fund at 10 per cent annual interest and starting April, according to Kurtin, it plans to increase the interest to 50 per cent annually.

Mikhail Zakharov suggested to discontinue financing of government's debts, and also noted that subsidies to children of less than three years of age should not be paid

out of the pension fund: This is the social security's function. Besides, according to Zakharov, in the nearest future the Supreme Soviet's decision will be drafted concerning removal of the state's social security fund from being under control of trade unions.

Regional Affairs

Tatarstan Favors Sovereignty, Opposes Treaty

LD2303142992 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1242 GMT 23 Mar 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Nikolay Sorokin]

[Text] Kazan, 23 March [dateline as received]—Tatarstan's immediate political task is the conclusion not of a federation but of a direct treaty with Russia on the principles of a delegation of powers downwards, Mintimer Shaymiyev, the President of Tatarstan has stated. He was speaking here today at a news conference devoted to the referendum on state sovereignty which took place in the republic on Saturday [21 March].

According to the preliminary data 81.6 percent of all of the republic's citizens who have the right to vote took part in the referendum. Of these 61.4 percent were in favour of a sovereign Tatarstan.

This treaty, Shaymiyev said, will make provision for issues of Tatarstan's international links as well as political and economic matters. According to the president of Tatarstan, issues of defence and security as well as guarding the borders will be delegated to Russia.

As far as the Federation Treaty is concerned, if it were to sign this, Shaymiyev considers, Tatarstan would lose its sovereign nature.

'Massive Pressure' Overcome

LD2303184292 Moscow POSTFACTUM in English 1635 GMT 23 Mar 92

[From the "Politics" section]

[Text] Kazan—Tatarstan President Mintimer Shaymiyev is against signing the federative treaty: Its provisions are unacceptable for Tatarstan.

On March 23 at the news conference in Kazan the President of the Republic of Tatarstan also said that the treaty with Russia should be prepared before beginning the RF [Russian Federation] congress of people's deputies.

Referring to the referendum's results the President of RT [Republic of Tatarstan] stated that never before, even during the stagnation time, did the republic feel such pressure from the Russian leadership which he called openly massive pressure. However, according to Shaymiyev, the tremendous level of people's activity was the cause of the referendum's main result: people preserved the traditional international friendship. Shaymiyev expressed hope that now, probably, the level of political passion among the people would go down and there will be a possibility to seriously address the economy.

According to Shaymiyev, the positive results of the referendum in Tatarstan and consistent policy of the RT would prevent Russia's drifting away from the truly democratic direction of development. The referendum, stated Shaymiyev, offers a road towards the RF renewal: We will not allow for such a situation when the reappearance of the rigid control center is possible.

Shaymiyev believes that among those who answered negatively to the referendum's question were, first of all, workers of defense enterprises which are afraid of losing jobs that may happen if the mutual relations between Kazan and Moscow turn to the worse.

Shaymiyev rejected the attempts to present the maneuvers of the Privolzhsko-Uralskiy Military District, neighboring Tatarstan, which were held prior to the referendum, as a pressure. The commanders of these maneuvers got in touch with the Tatarstan leadership in advance. Shaymiyev also said that the rumors about the alleged taking out of firearms because they can get into the hands of the extremist elements are ungrounded. The president stated that this is a regular planned replacement of the armaments.

'Democratic Principles' Upheld

LD2303181492

[Editorial Report] Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian at 1500 GMT on 23 March broadcasts a four-minute report from Kazan by its correspondent Dzhodar Taminov on the 23 March news conference by Tatarstan President Mintimer Shaymiyev on the 21 March referendum about Tatarstan's sovereignty.

According to Taminov, Shaymiyev drew three main conclusions. First, and most important, no intercommunal strife took place, and no trouble was expected anyway; second, the referendum was a display of commitment to democratic principles, as the people themselves decided their fate; third, the referendum will help to revive Russia, while maintaining its integrity as a state.

Taminov reports: "It was important to be able to uphold democratic principles. The voice of Tatarstan, President Shaymiyev says, has prevented the creation of a new, powerful center."

Taminov continues: "Now, of course, the interesting question is whether Tatarstan will secede from the Russian Federation or sign a federation treaty. Shaymiyev replied that there are trains from Moscow, and he is surprised that no delegation from Moscow has yet arrived in Kazan with congratulations and with calls for further talks on ironing out the remaining disputes over the wording of the federation treaty. A treaty

delegating powers downwards is possible, President Shaymiyev commented, any other way, and we would be restricting ourselves."

Radio Russia's parliamentary correspondent Nikolay Artemyev then asks Mikhail Mityukov, chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Commission on Legislation, to comment on the postreferendum situation. Mityukov notes that the wording of the ballot papers and the results are open to various interpretations. He also notes that "in large cities and some rayons the referendum provided a no vote. Also, one-fifth of the voters did not turn out. This means that many people doubt, first, that the question was properly worded and, second, that it was possible to give an unambiguous answer. Finally, they also had serious doubts over the intentions of the politicians in Kazan."

Khasbulatov, Mariy El Industry Leaders Meet

PM2403102392 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 23 Mar 92 First Edition p 1

[TASS report: "Ruslan Khasbulatov in Mariy El Republic"]

[Text] The working visit of Russian parliament head Ruslan Khasbulatov to the Mariy El Republic is continuing. The chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet visited the "Truzhenitsa" stitched and embroidered goods factory. This enterprise is interesting not only for its output—unique works by needlewomen skilled in folk embroidery—but also for its experience of cooperation with local schools. For instance, for nine years now the senior graders from the Yoshkar-Ola No. 4 secondary school have been the factory's partners, deciding together questions of the production and sale of goods.

Of course, the talk with the factory workers also touched on the problems of the collective. And there are many of them: Primarily the extremely poor supply of textiles—many suppliers are not fulfilling their contract commitments—and most importantly the high prices for raw material.

Similar problems also face the collective of the "Sovitalprodmash" joint venture, which Ruslan Khasbulatov also visited.

After visiting the city of Volzhsk—the center of the republic's industrial complex—the head of the Russian parliament left for Yoshkar-Ola.

Addresses Region's Unemployment

LD2303124392 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya Ostankino Television First Program Network in Russian 0900 GMT 23 Mar 92

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Correspondent S. Yashin] The working visit by the head of the Russian parliament to Omsk Oblast and the Mariy Republic is being seen by observers as preparation for the forthcoming Congress. Russia's Supreme Soviet deputies will have to decide where they stand on a whole range of documents which should be aimed at stabilizing the economy. The reforms proposed by the Russian Government are encountering numerous problems at local level, especially in that most industrial enterprises, for example in the Mariy Republic, are today on the verge of closedown due to falling deliveries of raw materials and parts. The workers are worried about tomorrow, because thousands of people are already facing the possibility of unemployment.

[Khasbulatov] All the reasons are with us ourselves in the higher echelons of administration, primarily the government and its lack of effect, it's obvious. The Russian parliament should also accept its share of the responsibility, of course, and play a more active role. [video shows Khasbulatov being ushered into a parliamentary-type hall, speeches being made and listened to; Khasbulatov on a tour of a factory; Khasbulatov being interviewed]

Previews Congress

LD2303124592 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1900 GMT 23 Mar 92

[Text] The speaker of the Russian parliament Ruslan Khasbulatov has said that the Congress of People's Deputies of Russia opening in Moscow on 6 April will be keynoted by greater responsibility. Ruslan Khasbulatov was speaking upon the end of his tour of the Mariy republic on the Volga river where he looked into fundamental reforms to bring about a market economy. Khasbulatov said that these days the lawmakers spent most of their time working on the draft of Russia's new constitution which is going to be presented to the Congress for consideration.

Voronezh Governor, Representative at Odds

PM2403103092 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Mar 92 Morning Edition p 2

[Report by Valeriy Mirolevich: "Not Even Flattery of Yeltsin Helped"—first paragraph is IZVESTIYA introduction]

[Text] On 18 March B. Yeltsin issued a decree on the dismissal of Voronezh governor V. Kalashnikov. The laconic presidential decision—all it mentions is the distribution of cars among the local nomenklatura—supplements a report by our correspondent that was transmitted to the editorial office before Kalashnikov was actually removed from his post.

Voronezh—The results of a sociological survey carried out by the Russian Institute of Public Opinion (a former branch of the All-Union Center for the Study of Public Opinion on Social and Economic Questions) have been published in Voronezh. More than 60 percent of those

questioned in Voronezh believe that governor V. Kalashnikov should not remain in his post. And only 10 percent believe that he can continue to lead.

The collection of signatures has begun at enterprises and organizations in the city for an appeal to the president to recall the governor. The actual "car affair"—the administration's scandalous actions in distributing cars among the nomenklatura and the oblast leaders' active involvement in commercial structures—has receded into the background, as it were. (See IZVESTIYA No. 42, "Sociologists Punished for Leader's Low Rating").

The Voronezh people's anger grew following the news conference which V. Kalashnikov held on his return from Moscow and which was broadcast on oblast television. At it the governor admitted that some senior officials had been guilty of misuse of office. Then he accused the democratic deputies, the president's representative in the oblast, and the local press of actually wanting to discredit the oblast administration rather than eliminate the existing shortcomings.

Perhaps it was not worth dwelling on this claim, which is familiar to us as an ideological cliche of the Brezhnev-Suslov era. But it was the governor himself who developed the theme. He supported his conclusion with an equally familiar reference to the higher opinion, which he had sought in Moscow. Apparently that is also the view at the top, in Moscow. He referred to a meeting with the president, during which, he said, he not only obtained assurances of support for his actions, but also settled the matter of the removal of V. Davydkin, the president's representative in Voronezh Oblast, who, together with a group of deputies, had been investigating the car affair—an unpleasant business as far as the administration was concerned (See IZVESTIYA No. 47, "The Post of President's Representative Will Be Abolished").

On hearing all this it was hard to shake off the feeling that V. Kalashnikov had returned not from a deideologized capital, but from the CPSU Central Committee. The feeling was intensified when the working meeting with journalists ended like a ceremonial function. The governor ordered a portrait of B. Yeltsin, given to him by a local artist, to be brought in and he ceremonially presented it to the oblast museum. It is nothing special as portraits go and it would never have been in the museum were it not for the appreciative inscription on it, thanking Viktor Kirillovich for his steadfastness during the August events.

Despite the appreciative inscription the people of Voronezh doubt whether the governor and the president are on the same team. According to the sociological survey results, only one-fourth of those polled regard V. Kalashnikov as a champion of Yeltsin's policy. Probably that is why many did not believe that the president had decided to remove his representative for not allowing the administration to have a quiet life.

It turns out they were right. The word from the president's office and from the control administration is that there is no question of the representative's being removed.

The institution of representative is a thorn in the appointee's side. The independent feedback the president's services get from the territories through the president's representative prevents officials in the provinces and in the capital from doling out one-sided information and even sabotaging reforms. That is why there have been several attempts already to abolish the "prince's eye" on the pretext that this structure is superfluous to the power mechanism.

Without success.

Kabarda Congress Criticizes Federative Treaty

LD2003221492 Moscow TASS in English 1239 GMT 20 Mar 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Gennadiy Kipkeev]

[Text] Nalchik March 20 TASS—The Congress of the Kabarda People, a major political force in the Kabardino-Balkarian Republic, the Northern Caucasus in Russia, blasted on Friday [20 March] the Russian Federative Treaty, initialled last week by representatives of Russian republics and territories, saying it is a direct threat to the national self-determination of Kabarda.

However, the congress which opened a session here today, said it stands for the preservation of the Russian unity, and is only against the wording of the treaty which "contradicts the interests of the people of Kabarda". If the treaty is ratified by the parliament of Kabardino-Balkaria, the congress will take efforts to revive the statehood of Kabarda and will press to reelect the parliament.

Two other major political forces in the republic in the Northern Caucasus are the National Council of the Kabarda People, which stands for the sovereignity of Kabarda, and the "United Kabardino-Balkaria" Public Movement.

Moscow Deregulates Prices of Staple Foods

LD2403121392 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1011 GMT 24 Mar 92

[Text] Moscow, 24 Mar (ITAR-TASS)—The Moscow authorities today repealed state price controls on a range of essential foodstuffs as part of the economic reform and price liberalization being conducted in Russia. An ITAR-TASS correspondent has learned that from now on free prices will apply in Moscow for such goods as sugar, salt, powdered milk, and bread. The instructions for this to happen are reported to be contained in an order sent by the city authorities to trade enterprises in Moscow.

An ITAR-TASS correspondent today visited several food shops and bakeries in central Moscow but saw no discernible increase in the prices for the above-mentioned goods. Russia began its reforms on 2 January this year, when prices for most manufactured goods and services were set free. This led to spiralling prices everywhere and declining living standards for the absolute majority of the public.

Until now, the prices of a range of staple foodstuffs and fuel and also rents have been controlled and maintained at comparatively low levels. Even so, they have risen somewhat. For example, after 2 January the price of one kilo of sugar in state sector outlets quadrupled, and today comes to eight rubles. The minimum wage in Russia is presently 342 rubles (less than $4).

The Russian Government has declared its intention to deregulate fuel prices in April, which will lead to another price spiral virtually across the board in industry and the service sector. A liter of gasoline is expected to cost nearly 10 times more.

New Moscow Guild Aims To Protect Businesses

PM2403104592 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 20 Mar 92 First Edition p 1

[Report from ITAR-TASS, ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA roundup under "News" rubric: "Guild of Industrialists Set Up"]

[Text] Moscow City Soviet, the government of Moscow, and independent entrepreneurs have announced the creation of a new city self-management component—the Guild of Moscow Industrialists. Organizing Committee Chairman Nikolay Zorov pointed out at a news conference held at Moscow City Soviet yesterday that the market relations taking shape spontaneously among enterprises are assuming abnormal forms of constraining exchange between the producer of the product and the supplier of the raw materials.

The disintegration of the country's political and economic unity has sharply affected the working of enterprises. The established economic ties have been forfeited—which has led to a reduction in production volumes and a sharp slump in entrepreneurial activity. In this situation the guild is taking on responsibilities of defending the rights and interests of Moscow enterprises and entrepreneurs before the government and the public with a view to ensuring guarantees of their independent economic activity.

Siberian 'Separatism', Reaction Analyzed

MK2403101592 Moscow KOMMERSANT in Russian No 12 16-23 Mar 92 p 1

[Viktor Titov and Oleg Medvedev report: "Deunification of Siberia With Russia: Clink Clank, Clink Clank, I Hear the Sound of Fetters"]

[Text] A congress of Siberian deputies of all levels is to be held 27-29 March in Krasnoyarsk. And although local separatists will scarcely succeed in placing on the agenda the question of Siberia's state independence, the government reaction to the vague rumors that some of the delegates would demand the creation of a Siberian republic was swift: On 16 March Sergey Shakhray, leader of the Russian State Political Administration, declared that krays and oblasts will not receive the status of states under the Federation Treaty.

The initiator of the deunification [rassoyedineniye] of Siberia with Russia was Boris Perov, cochairman of the Independent Siberia Party and a member of the working group to prepare for the congress. He proposed a whole program that envisages adopting a declaration on Siberia's state independence "and abolishing all organs of colonial Russian power at local level" and calling on the world community to recognize the Siberian Republic; electing a president of the republic and placing all enterprises, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the KGB under his jurisdiction; and creating the republic's own army. Perov demands that a commission be set up to estimate the damage caused to Siberia by the center, after which an appropriate suit would be filed against the European part of Russia via international judicial organs.

In the economic sphere Perov's party demands the introduction of a legislative ban on participation by foreign forms in prospecting for and extracting minerals and the abolition of all acts of privatization on Siberian territory. Siberian correctional establishments, (at present) common property of the CIS, should be filled only with local inmates.

It is the final point of this plan that observers regard as most feasible: Tomsk Oblast Prosecutor Khusain Ponomarev has had a preventive conversation with Perov and threatened to institute criminal proceedings. As Valentin Sobolev, chief of the Russian Federation Security Ministry Administration for Tomsk Oblast, told a KOMMERSANT correspondent, in the event of specific actions directed toward Siberia's breakaway, "the administration will take appropriate action." And Siberian security officers told KOMMERSANT's correspondent that there is a need for a tougher cadre policy on the president's part vis-a-vis heads of administration who support disintegration processes.

Nevertheless, it may be too soon for the Siberian deputies to start learning the song "And two fine secret policemen took me from Siberia to Siberia": The congress is planning merely to discuss questions of Siberia's legal, economic, and social status, the draft Russian Federation Constitution, and ways of coordinating the activity of the region's soviets. These are scarcely actions attracting criminal penalties. Most probably the congress will reach agreement about nothing: In Krasnoyarsk there will be a conflict between the standpoints of extreme supporters of autonomy from regions rich in strategic raw materials (Krasnoyarsk and others) and of

moderate delegations from areas existing on subsidies (Altay). In the opinion of some Siberian businessmen, it is the dissatisfaction of the leaders of regions rich in raw materials with the Russian Federation leadership's tax policy that is the main motive force behind the upcoming congress. Admittedly, both rich and poor may be united by a common calamity—the Siberian authorities have been deprived of the opportunity to swell their budget through privatization, since the overwhelming majority of Siberian enterprises which worked exclusively for the defense sector have passed into federal ownership.

As Vyacheslav Novikov, chairman of Krasnoyarsk Kray Soviet (who back in the summer of 1991 tried to set up a Yenisey Republic), told KOMMERSANT's correspondent, the upcoming congress, at which the 17 member territories of the "Siberian Agreement" association will be represented, may prompt the Russian Federation leadership to speedily grant krays and oblasts the status of subjects of the Federation. Novikov is sure that, without a push from the Siberian congress, territories' rights will not be incorporated in the Russian Constitution. But so far the Siberians have only prompted a tougher stance on the part of Russian Federation leaders. Thus Yuriy Moskvich, representative of the Russian Federation president in Krasnoyarsk Kray, believes that Siberians want to preserve communist reservations on their territories. In his opinion, the initiators of the congress of Siberian soviets represent the interests of three forces: the military-industrial complex, the party nomenklatura, and the comprador bourgeoisie, which is making money out of brokerage activity and speculation in raw materials.

On 16 March Sergey Shakhray firmly declared that "krays and oblasts will not receive the status of states" under the Federation Treaty and that the "Federation Treaty does not grant subjects of the Federation the right to secede from it." It has been learned from competent sources that the Russian Federation government apparatus has prepared for the president a memorandum "On Disintegration and Urgent Measures To Combat Separatism" which claims that "in the last two months there has been a sharp increase in pressure from administrations within the Russian Federation" aimed at securing benefits for individual regions. According to the estimates of the authors of the memorandum, the reduction in budget revenue as a result of benefits regarding export duties totals 100 billion rubles, the redistribution of power in favor of the territories "will entail the economic and political disintegration of the country," and "continuation of the ostrich-like policy of ignoring this process condemns the country to swift disintegration with catastrophic consequences." The memorandum proposes stopping top-level meetings with heads of regional administrations in order to discuss the president's draft decisions on special conditions of economic activity in particular regions—a shot aimed at Khasbulatov, who is tremendously fond of charitable visits to the regions.

Siberians Protest Planned Hydroelectric Station

LD2303121592 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1000 GMT 22 Mar 92

[Text] Areas of Altay Kray and Novosibirsk and Tomsk oblasts along the River Ob could be turned into an environmental disaster area by the construction of the Katun hydroelectric station. The dangerous consequences of going ahead with the project are highlighted in a statement released by a large group of Siberian scientists. The statement has drawn the attention of the Novosibirsk Soviet of People's Deputies. An appeal to Russia's president and Supreme Soviet chairman has been adopted asking for the Katun hydroelectric station not to be built.

National Affairs

Defense Minister on Territorial Claims, Arms

LD2303235592 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 2200 GMT 23 Mar 92

[By UKRINFORM correspondent Nikolay Zaik]

[Text] Kiev, 24 Mar (TASS)—Tactical nuclear weapons have been removed from the armaments of military units and have been concentrated at special reliably protected bases. From the moment that Ukraine's president adopted the decision on halting the transportation of nuclear weapons from the republic's territory they have been at the bases and are not being sent anywhere. This was reported by Ukraine's Defense Minister Colonel General Konstantin Morozov at a news conference here on 23 March.

Answering questions, Konstantin Morozov stressed that Ukraine does not have territorial claims on any country and does not see any one of them as its potential adversary.

Problems concerning cuts to armed forces in Europe, the Black Sea Fleet, and the transfer to the homeland of officers that are natives of Ukraine and who are doing military service in other republics of the former union were also raised. There are no serious disagreements between Russia and Ukraine on military questions, the defence minister said in conclusion. There are various approaches to solving individual questions, but they too should not cause alarm among other peoples.

Parliament Official on National Economic Policy

LD2303213892 Moscow POSTFACTUM in English 1942 GMT 23 Mar 92

[From the "Politics" section]

[Text] Kiev. Vladimir Grinev, deputy chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet: In fact, greater significance is being given to the role of the state in the program of the Ukrainian national economic policy, which means a change of course.

If the Supreme Soviet...adopts the principles of the national economic policy of the Ukraine, this will mean introduction of the economic urgency state. I will speak against it. If the president wishes, let him take responsibility himself, rather than sanctify the decision under the guise of the Supreme Soviet, Grinev told PF [POSTFACTUM] on March 23, while commenting the project of the principles of the national economic policy of the Ukraine, presented by Aleksandr Yemelyanov, Ukraine's secretary of state on questions of economics. The project is to be discussed at a closed session of the Ukraine's Supreme Soviet on March 24. A report is also to be presented by the national bank at the session on March 24.

Crimeans Collect Enough Referendum Signatures

AU2403125292 Kiev Radio Kiev International Service in Ukrainian 1400 GMT 23 Mar 92

[Text] Quite soon, the Supreme Council of Crimea will set the date for holding the Crimean referendum, as the KRYMSKAYA PRAVDA newspaper has informed. According to the newspaper, 200,000 signatures have already been collected in support of the holding of the referendum that is expected to determine the fate of the peninsula. Let me remind you that, in accordance with the Law on the Holding of the Referendum, it was necessary to collect 180,000 signatures.

A mass rally of Crimean Tatars took place in Simferopol. Before it began, a hymn of Crimean Tatars was sung. The participants in the negotiations with the Ukrainian leadership who returned from the action Kiev-92 [not further identified] declared that the Crimean Tatars demand that their national-territorial autonomy be restored in the Crimea. This was stated in the resolution adopted at the rally.

The participants in the rally also expressed their decisive protest at the actions by the Kiev militia regarding the pickets in front of Ukraine's Supreme Council and demanded that those to blame be punished.

It was decided at the rally to send another 200 persons to the capital of Ukraine, because the action Kiev-92 is continuing.

Majlis Releases Statement on 19 Mar Clash

LD2303130492 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0900 GMT 22 Mar 92

[Text] The majlis of the Crimean-Tatar people distributed a statement on 21 March in relation to the clashes which took place between the militia and pickets in Kiev on 19 March. Ludmila Mavrina has the details in her report.

[Mavrina] The reason for the clashes, as previously reported, was the intention of the demonstrators to set up a tent town in parliamentary square, in front of the building of the Supreme Soviet.

The statement, addressed to Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk, says, in particular, that the Ukraine authorities, by bloodily repressing a peaceful rally of envoys of the Crimean Tatar people on 19 March drew the applause of the chauvinists in Crimea who favor separation from Ukraine. We expected more reason for the Ukraine authorities, if only for the sake of their own interests. We are convinced that all the democratic forces of the independent Ukraine agree to this. The attempt to talk to the national movement of the Crimean Tatars by the means of repressions will never bring the results the authorities expect to see. We propose that an investigation be carried out immediately and that criminal proceedings are instituted against those guilty of beating up the democrats.

The statement was signed by the chairman of the majlis, Mustafa Dzhemilev.

According to demonstrators, two pensioners were gravely injured on 19 March. Ala Bekirova was left with a fractured collar bone and Delyara Rafatova has two ribs broken.

Incidently, the tent town of the Crimean Tatars was after all set up in the morning of 21 March. In this instance, the law and orders bodies did not prevent this from happening.

Cabinet of Ministers Creates Fund for Conversion

AU2403090992 Kiev URYADOVYY KURYER in Ukrainian No 10 (56), Mar 92 p 11

["Regulations on the State Fund for Promoting Conversion. Approved on 22 February 1992, by Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers Resolution No. 79"]

[Text] 1. The State Fund for Promoting Conversion (hereafter "Fund") has been created to finance measures for promoting the conversion of military production in Ukraine's defense and machine building complexes.

2. The Fund will be able to function with the help of the following measures:

deductions amounting to 3 percent of the prime cost of manufactured goods (labor and services) that are produced by enterprises of the defense complex, as stipulated by the program for extraordinary measures to stabilize the economy of Ukraine and extricate it from the crisis;

50 percent of the sums of profit from selling those unfinished facilities that were meant for manufacturing and developing military technology and weapons and that cannot be used in civil construction;

10 percent of amortization deductions for full renovation of the fixed assets of those enterprises and organizations that are liable to conversion (with their consent);

a part of the capital that has been obtained from selling military technology and weapons released in the process of reduction of the Armed Forces (the size of deductions is established in each individual case by the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers);

special-purpose allocations from the republican budget;

voluntary donations by Ukrainian and foreign juridical and physical persons, and from other earnings.

3. The capital of the Fund will be used for the following purposes:

reconstruction and technological reequipment of military production to adapt it to manufacturing civil products, including consumer goods;

research and design work associated with the elaboration of new science-intensive items of civil production;

implementation of measures for social protection of those workers who are engaged in the elaboration and production of military technology and weapons;

compensation for losses due to writing off remaining commodity and material values, unfinished products, assembly parts, and finished special products that cannot be sold or used in civil production;

compensation for losses due to writing off fixed assets of enterprises of the defense complex or their halting and also due to maintaining capacities that are necessary for the development and production of military technology and weapons.

4. Ukraine's State Committee for the Defense Industry and machine building is in charge of distributing the Fund's capital;

5. The procedure for receiving, accounting, and utilizing the capital of the State Fund for Promoting Conversion is specified in the instruction that has been adopted by Ukraine's Ministry of Finance and Ukraine's State Committee for Defense Industry and Machine Building in coordination with the National Bank of Ukraine.

6. The capital of the Fund that has not been used in the current year is not liable to confiscation.

Moldova

President Smirnov Issues Statement on Fighting

LD2303143592 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1330 GMT 23 Mar 92

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Here now a report from the government press center of the Transdnestr Moldovan republic [as heard]. At 1100 today the defensive positions of Transdnestr guardsmen came under intensive fire near the villages of Drodskoye and Pogrebye, south of Dubossary. The fighting was still in progress at 1320. Igor Smirnov, president of the Transdnestr Moldovan republic, has released an official statement which says that despite the cease-fire agreement, Moldovan armed units are failing to stop provocative sorties that are causing civilian deaths. I remind you that that is according to a statement by Igor Smirnov.

Another report from the government press center in Transdnestr: During the night of 22-23 March, a unit of the republican guard came under attack and grenades and firearms were used.

Interior Minister Makes Appeal

LD2403153192 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1421 GMT 24 Mar 92

[by ITAR-TASS correspondent Fedor Angeli]

[Text] Chisinau, 24 Mar (TASS)— Moldovan Interior Minister Konstantin Antoch has appealed to the republican parliament "to stop the war". The Ministry of Internal Affairs supports the Moldovan president's policy of resolving the conflict in the Dnestr area by peaceful means, he said, speaking today in the parliament.

According to him, Interior Ministry personnel nowadays are subjected to attacks from all directions, including the press, radio, and television. This does not help to maintain police morale at the required level.

Konstantin Antoch also pointed out to deputies that mobilization of the Dnestr area guard, which is acquiring most modern types of weapons, is continuing on the left bank. A police department in the town of Bendery is under siege from illegal formations from of the Dnestr area.

Transfer of Former Soviet Troops Discussed

LD2403000792 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1820 GMT 23 Mar 92

[BY ITAR-TASS correspondent Valeriy Demidetskiy]

[Text] Chisinau, 23 Mar (ITAR-TASS)—Questions of the transition to Moldovan jurisdiction of troops units of the former USSR which are deployed here, were discussed here today during talks between Colonel General Boris Pyankov, deputy commander in chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, and representatives of the republican Defense Ministry. It is proposed that hardware and ammunition for the national army will be supplied to the republic in exchange for subunits which are classed as "strategic" being withdrawn from Moldova.

According to Moldovan Defense Minister Lieutenant General Ion Kostash, the hardware and weapons of the CIS units which are stationed here are quite sufficient to kit out the national troops. It was explained to the ITAR-TASS correspondent at the republican Defense Ministry that the recent statement by Romanian President Ion Iliescu that he is prepared to support Moldova in the creation of its armed forces in no way means supplying the republic with arms but merely helping to train military specialists.

More on Troops Transfer

AU2403111492 Bucharest, ROMPRES in English 1014 GMT 24 Mar 92

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES 24/3/1992—Colonel General Boris Pyankov, commander-in-chief of CIS unified forces, is in Chisinau for talks with the defence minister of the Republic of Moldova, Lieutenant-General Ion Kostas on placing military units and sub-units of the former Soviet Armed Forces stationed in Moldova under its jurisdiction, MOLDOVA PRES announces.

On 20 March, Moldova's President Mircea Snegur signed a decree under which military units are put under Moldova's jurisdiction.

Military Counterintelligence Transferred

LD2103203492 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1600 GMT 19 Mar 92

[Text] The Moldovan Government has handed over to the republic's Ministry of National Security the administration of military counterintelligence of the command of troops of the South-Western area. The command headquarters, located in Chisinau, of these troops of the former USSR has been disbanded. The recently created Moldovan Defense Ministry has been accommodated in its building.

Controversy surrounds this government decision. In the opinion of Moldovan military personnel, counterintelligence should be in their hands. Specifically, such a view has been expressed by General Ion Costas, the republic's defense minister.

The Ministry of National Security cites the experience of other countries and declares that military counterintelligence officers should not be subordinate to a department that they have to monitor.

It only remains to add that it is not yet known how the argument will end between the services of Mueller and Schellenberg, as they have been jokingly dubbed for journalists.

Opposition Criticizes Policy Toward Separatists

AU2103192792 Bucharest, ROMPRES in English 1911 GMT 20 Mar 92

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 20/3/1992—In a declaration issued in Chisinau, Friday, March 20, the Council of the Christian Democratic Popular Front reproaches President Mircea Snegur with the tactics adopted and the endless concessions he has made in front of Moscow's and the separatists' pressure, a policy that has further increased the country's inner crisis.

Under the conditions when the empire's former structures were lagging apart, when the separatists and other supporters of the putsch were in a state of confusion and the public opinion asked that they be summoned to answer for their deeds, President Snegur hurried to assume the merits for its failure, forgetting to liquidate their consequences for the Republic of Moldova, reads the declaration.

By ignoring the will of the Great National Assembly, confirmed by the supreme legislative body, and without consulting parliament or informing the public opinion, President Snegur participated in the CIS formation, says the document adding that what the president had asserted proved not to be so, namely that by Moldova's adherence to CIS, it will benefit from the advantages of a unique economic space, maintaining, at the same time, its territorial integrity.

The declaration of the Christian Democratic Popular Front underlines that, the president's inconsistent decisions have encouraged separatist forces and given them time to organise themselves and arm thousands of criminal elements.

Russia in 'Delicate Position' on Events

PM2303135592 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Mar 92 Morning Edition pp 1, 3

[Viktor Volodin report: "Pondering Compromise in Tiraspol. Moscow Silent While 'Romanianization Syndrome' Leads Left Bank Into Ukraine's Embraces"]

[Text] The conflict in eastern Moldova has become embroiled in a complex web of contradictions. A solution is being prevented by the blood being shed in the armed confrontation on the Dnestr between the Russian-speaking Left Bank and the republic's Romanian-speaking population.

Although, according to ITAR-TASS reports, there is now a relative calm there, clashes between guards in the Dnestr area, the volunteer Cossacks supporting them, and the Moldovan police and Special Purpose Police Detachments could flare up again with renewed force at any moment.

Other countries could be drawn into the conflict, which would inevitably have an impact on the fate of Moldova itself, the contiguous Ukraine, and the prestige of the Russian leadership, which once assumed the role of defender of Russians throughout Commonwealth territory. Romania is closely monitoring how the tragic events in the Dnestr area could develop. Moldovan President Mircea Snegur has stated that an appeal for help to Romania is possible. In an interview with BBC and Hungarian Television correspondents, he noted that, since Cossacks are involved in the Dnestr conflict and since the Russian Federation leadership has not replied to Chisinau's protest telegram, Moldova is entitled, as a UN member, to request international support—including from Romania. Nonetheless, Mircea Snegur noted that Moldova advocates that the Dnestr conflict be resolved solely by political means.

The Romanian Government is also proposing that the conflict be resolved through dialogue. As Romanian Foreign Minister Adrian Nastase, who recently paid an official visit to Moscow, stated, his government does not believe that it is possible to cut through the "Gordian knot" of the Dnestr area using military force. A few days ago Romanian President Ion Iliescu appealed to the Russian and Ukrainian Governments in conjunction with Moldova and Romania to urgently embark on resolving this clutch of contradictions. "Romania will support all proposals leading to a peaceful settlement of the conflict and the safeguarding of Moldova's territorial integrity while observing the rights of ethnic minorities," the president stated.

It is indisputable that Bucharest's official view of the Moldova problem is by no means shared by all political forces in Romania. The echo of the armed clashes in the Dnestr area has been like a Cossack lash whipping up the Romanian opposition, who advocate Romanian-Moldovan unification as speedily as possible. A number of parties have even sent President I. Iliescu a strict ultimatum to send Romanian troops into Moldova "to protect the Romanian population from the imperial forces of occupation." But the president—who just as categorically rejected this proposal which was likely to lead to Romania's international isolation—managed to calm feelings.

Following Romania and Moldova, a stance on the Dnestr conflict has been taken by Ukraine, which, on President L. Kravchuk's orders, has taken measures to protect the state border with Moldova. According to a report from a representative of the Ukrainian National Guard Command, special purpose maneuvers [manevrovyy] groups tasked with preventing Ukrainian territory being used for movements of Dnestr and Cossack armed detachments have already been sent into "hot spots" on the border.

Judging by everything, Ukraine's resolute refusal to provide any support for the Tiraspol leaders has led to confusion in their ranks and forced them to seek a compromise. REUTER reports in this connection that fear of Ukrainian nationalism is making the Dnestr leaders seek ways for talks with the Moldovan Government. "Our flight from Romania could lead the Dnestr

area to the Ukrainian flag and into the embrace of Ukrainian nationalists," Grigoriy Marakutsa, a representative of the Dnestr Republic parliament, stated in an interview with REUTER. "We would like to live in a federal Moldova with a federal constitution. Moldova should recognize that for centuries we have been bound to Russia by stronger ties than those binding us to Romania," he noted.

It is probably too soon to draw any conclusions from this. Moldova is hardly likely to agree to a federal system for the republic. Taking Romania's unitary structure as a model, it bases its positions on maintaining the unity and indivisibility of the republic's territory while observing the rights of ethnic minorities. What Chisinau can offer the Dnestr area and the Gagauz Republic is the creation of a separate region [uyezd] centered on Dubossary with the status of a free economic zone. No specific statement has yet been made by the Russian leadership, which is in a delicate position, in my view. If it supports the Russians in the Dnestr region it will fall out with Moldova and push it into unification with Romania. If it sides with Chisinau it will incur the wrath of millions of Russians. Of course, silence is a position too. It is sometimes, however, far more costly than a weighty statement.

Romanian Foreign Minister Arrives in Chisinau

AU2203163192 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1100 GMT 22 Mar 92

[Text] The Romanian foreign minister, Mr. Adrian Nastase, arrived in Chisinau, and at this hour he is holding talks with the foreign minister of the Republic of Moldova, Nicolae Tiu, on bilateral issues and on ways of promoting common position in the general European process—our Chisinau correspondent Gabriel Ionescu reports.

Quoting the spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Moldova, our correspondent reports that the two foreign ministers will leave this afternoon for Helsinki where the CSCE meeting will begin on Tuesday, 24 March.

Country Financially Blocked by Russian Bank

AU2003132092 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 0906 GMT 20 Mar 92

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 20/3/1992—Moldova has found itself blocked financially, stated from the rostrum of the parliament Valeriu Muravschi, prime minister of the Republic of Moldova. The operations performed by the Central Bank of Russia, an institution which holds, for the time being, the monopoly of the money supply throughout the territory of the CIS, led to a financial blockage in the activity of most of the economic units in the republic. The prime minister said that on March 1 the republic had not been reimbursed the about two billion rubles for the foodstuffs delivered abroad, as the contracts stipulated.

Taken as a whole, the debts of partners from other republics are put at approximately 4.5 billion troubles, MOLDOVA-PRES reports.

Bank Protests Action of Central Bank of Russia

AU2003143692 Kiev Radio Kiev International Service in Ukrainian 1500 GMT 19 Mar 92

[Text] The National Bank of Moldova has lodged a sharp protest against the actions of the Central Bank of Russia. The protest is due to the fact that the Bank of Russia has opened an account in Tiraspol at the center for the transfer of credits. The statement that has been published assesses the actions of the Central Bank of Russia as a violation of the international norms and rules. The National Bank of Moldova demands that the Central Bank of Russia rescind this decision and close the aforementioned account.

Kazakhstan

Economic, Military Reforms Signed With Russia

LD2403100892 Moscow TASS in English 0834 GMT 24 Mar 92

[Text] Uralsk March 24 TASS—The Kazakh-Russian inter-governmental meeting ended here on Monday [23 March] with the signing of a number of agreements and an inter-governmental commmunique. The meeting was preceded by the extensive work of groups of experts to elaborate the new mechanism for maintaining bilateral relations in the economy, agriculture, the bank business, power engineering and communications.

Summing up the results of the meeting at a press conference, Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Gennadiy Burbulis, who headed the Russian delegation, said: "Our credo is that reforms being enacted today are vitally needed and feasible."

He said a protocol of the joint meeting of the two independent states' governments is another proof that Russia and Kazakhstan carry on long-standing cooperation and will coordinate efforts to advance their economies.

Evaluating this historic meeting on the border between Europe and Asia, Kazakh Prime Minister Sergey Tereshchenko described it as an important milestone in further solidifying military-political and economic cooperation between the two fraternal states.

"We tried to set a good example of mutually advantageous cooperation in this dire moment when the economy is plagued with crisis to the other sovereign member-states of the Commonwealth. One would like to hope that the Uralsk meeting will significantly improve the life of the Kazakh and Russian peoples in the transition period," Tereshchenko said.

Talks Viewed

PM2403113792 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Mar 92 Morning Edition p 1

[Vasiliy Kononenko report: "Russia and Kazakhstan Rebuild Burned Bridges"]

[Text] G. Burbulis, Russian Federation secretary of state and first vice premier; First Vice Premier Yegor Gaydar; Vice Premiers Aleksandr Shokhin, Mikhail Poltoranin, and Valeriy Makharadze; ministers; and department leaders arrived in Uralsk 23 March.

The aim of the trip is to hold a business meeting between authorized government delegations of two independent states—Russia and Kazakhstan—the idea for which was elaborated during contacts between Presidents B. Yeltsin and N. Nazarbayev.

This small city, founded back in the 17th century as a fortress city, is to this day dominated by the Russian-speaking population. The Russian delegation was met by Kazakh Prime Minister S. Tereshchenko. Opening the session, he stressed Kazakhstan's interest in the immediate restoration of bilateral links with Russia, as the economies of both are strongly integrated. On behalf of the Russian delegation, G. Burbulis expressed the hope that the Uralsk meeting, which is taking place on B. Yeltsin's direct recommendation, will give momentum to the multifaceted relations between Russia and Kazakhstan.

In theory, the meeting agenda can be divided into two groups: questions requiring urgent solutions, and questions of strategy in relations between the states. These include measures on the economic regulation of commitments to interrepublic product and goods deliveries; the transfer to Kazakhstan of material and technical resources to supply the military-industrial complex and basic sectors of the national economy; the procedure for delivering precious metals, diamonds, and precious stones; pricing policy—questions of establishing a price ceiling on products from monopoly enterprises; the coordinated transition to new prices for energy sources; financial and banking activity; the mechanism for servicing the republic's internal debt and freezing assets in the former USSR Vneshekonombank [Bank for Foreign Economic Activity]; the principles governing transit freight cargoes; participation in investment in sectors of the national economy; and questions stemming from the Russian Government memorandum on economic reform.

It is expected that a decision of record will be adopted on the meeting's results envisaging, in particular, a 10-day deadline for issuing suppliers and consumers with guidelines on mutual product deliveries and quota restrictions established by intergovernmental agreement, and defining by 15 April the two republics' corresponding share of the state debt on former USSR Gosbank [State Bank] balance sheets and the procedure for extinguishing it. The sides also examined the question of dividing up former USSR gold reserves and the diamond and currency fund, and certain Armed Forces problems.

Joint Corporations Set Up

LD2403025292 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1800 GMT 23 Mar 92

[Text] A protocol on the creation of five technological corporations based on Russian and Kazakh enterprises was signed today in Uralsk at a joint meeting of the Russian and Kazakh Governments. These corporations will be Titan, Karaganda, Magnitogorsk, Alyuminiy, and Yeltekh. The protocol contains an appeal to the Governments of Ukraine and Tajikistan to include enterprises in these republics in the Titan technological corporation. According to Aleksandr Titkin, Russian minister of industry, joint work by republican governments of the

former USSR, or CIS states, on setting up such structures is necessary to restore a single economic space.

Decree Compels Officials To Declare Incomes

LD1803215992 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1221 GMT 18 Mar 92

[By KAZTAG correspondent Konstantin Borodinov]

[Text] Alma-Ata, 18 Mar (TASS)—For the purpose of preventing corruption in the state structures, all officials of Kazakhstan's bodies of state power and administration are obligated to declare their incomes. They are, moreover, banned from receiving gifts in any form from enterprises, organizations, and citizens in connection with the fulfillment of their official duties. This is stated in a decree of President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan published today on stepping up the struggle against organized forms of crime, as well as on activating the work to prevent and to halt corruption.

In accordance with the decree, a state finance monitoring committee under the Cabinet of Ministers will soon start to operate.

The document permits the law and order agencies to obtain information relating to the activity under investigation, on all types of bank operations, irrespective of the forms of property, as well as data from tax inspections, customs, and financial bodies.

President: Privatization Pace 'Unsatisfactory'

OW1903014592 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1403 GMT 18 Mar 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Excerpt] Speaking at the opening of the international conference "Privatization in Kazakhstan: Problems and Prospects" in Alma-Ata Wednesday [18 March] Kazakhstan's President Nursultan Nazarbayev stated that 25-35% of state property in Kazakhstan should belong to private owners thus guaranteeing independence, democracy and stability in the republic.

The two-day conference was organized by the Kazakh Institute of Management, Economy and Forecasting.

Nazarbayev noted that "since the pace of privatization has been unsatisfactory, I will issue a special decree on the matter on March 19". In the president's opinion, slow pace of economic reform in Kazakhstan should be attributed to resistance from the local conservatives. In this connection, Nazarbayev relies more on the heads of regional administration of whom, in his words, "70% are new people". "I ordered them to dismiss officials hampering economic reform with their actions, the president said. [passage omitted]

Produce Processing Included

LD2403140192 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1200 GMT 23 Mar 92

[Text] All facilities processing farm produce in Kazakhstan are to be privatized this year. In keeping with a decree by President Nursultan Nazarbayev the facilities are turning into companies in which the shares and bonds will be mostly owned by the work collectives. At the same time their shares will be widely distributed among cooperative farm members, workers of state farms and individual farmers. Under a general program of agrarian transformations, the Kazakh government supports a mass movement of private farmers. The farm cooperatives are more and more often turned into associations of free individual farmsteads.

Uzbekistan

President Karimov Comments on Existence of CIS

PM2303102992 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 23 Mar 92 First Edition p 1

[Report from roundup of ITAR-TASS and ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA reports: "Uzbekistan President: CIS Exists and Will Exist"]

[Text] The results of the Kiev meeting attest that the "Commonwealth of Independent States exists and will exist," Uzbekistan President Islam Karimov has stated. At the same time, in an interview with the first television channel, he noted that during the meeting "there were moments when it was very difficult to overcome differences on fundamental issues." Each CIS state, the Uzbekistan president stressed, will find it very hard to emerge alone from the crisis just as it is impossible to break the ties which have formed over decades between the peoples and republics of the former Union.

Karimov Said To Order Arrest of Opposition

MK2103140092 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 21 Mar 92 p 3

[Islamic Revival Party press service report under the "News in Brief" rubric: "Uzbekistan"]

[Text] An operation to arrest Muslim opposition leaders began in Namangan during the night of 17-18 March. Uzbek President Islam Karimov has launched an open attack on the Muslim self-government movement in Fergana valley. Having signed the CSCE agreement in Helsinki 25 February and stated in interviews with journalists that Uzbekistan intends to be "a Europe-oriented country that observes human rights," he primarily attempted to conceal the contents of his visit to Finland from the Uzbek people. Apart from a vague mention that a visit had actually taken place, no other information was circulated via CIS channels. As we have learned from Islamic Revival Party sources, just before his departure for Finland Karimov gave a television

interview in which he bemoaned the growth in the influence of "Islamic fundamentalists in Central Asia" and promised to oppose it. The start of the repression coincided with another event: Oil has been struck just a few kilometers away from Namangan—the center of Islamic opposition in Fergana valley. According to preliminary assessments by specialists, the deposit is of international significance. Karimov arrived in Namangan 17 March to see for himself and spent a day there. The night after his departure the mass arrests of leaders of the Islamic self-government and "Birlik" movements began. According to information from opposition activists, the names of 71 people figure on the arrest lists, of whom the authorities have managed to seize 19. The rest have gone underground. The Islamic center in Namangan, which is located in the former city party committee building, has been ransacked. The center's property has been thrown out into the street. At the moment Namangan is being patrolled by reinforced Ministry of Internal Affairs details.

Syrian Foreign Minister Arrives for Talks

JN2303185192 Damascus SANA in Arabic 1800 GMT 23 Mar 92

[Text] Moscow, 23 Mar (SANA)—Foreign Minister Faruq al-Shar' arrived in Tashkent this evening on a two-day visit to Uzbekistan within his tour of a number of CIS republics.

Uzbek Deputy Prime Minister Rahim Rahbov and First Deputy Foreign Minister 'Abd-al-Fattah Suhaybayif headed those welcoming the foreign minister. He was also welcomed by senior officials of the Uzbek Foreign Ministry and other ministries.

Official talks are scheduled to begin tomorrow morning between the Syrian side headed by the foreign minister and the Uzbek side headed by the deputy prime minister.

The foreign minister is accompanied by a delegation made up of a number of officials from the industry, agriculture, information, transport, education, culture, and electricity sectors.

Some Troops Outside Republic Recalled

PM2003152392 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Mar 92 Morning Edition p 1

[Shakhabutdin Zaynutdinov report: "Uzbekistan Recalls Soldiers"]

[Text] The Uzbek Supreme Soviet Presidium has adopted a resolution on recalling within one month servicemen drafted from the Republic of Uzbekistan and currently serving in troop units stationed on the territory of states which are not members of the CIS (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Georgia) or which are setting up their own armed forces (Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova), and in the Transcaucasus Military District and the Caspian Flotilla.

There is no need to explain why. Let us add that servicemen who are citizens of Uzbekistan will continue to serve in subunits of the Turkestan Military District, the republic Ministry of Internal Affairs troops, and the national security service...

Armenia

Mediation Efforts on Nagorno-Karabakh Reported

Regional Attempts 'Exhausted'

LD2403095192 Moscow TASS in English 0659 GMT 24 Mar 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Mikhail Kochetkov]

[Text] United Nations March 24 TASS—Addressing a press conference at the U.N. Headquarters on Monday [23 March], Armenian Parliament Leader Babken Ararktsyan said if the ceasefire which was achieved as a result of mediation efforts by the Iranian Government and special envoy of the U.N. Secretary-General Cyrus Vance that went into effect in Nagorno-Karabakh on March 20 is not complied with, a further escalation of the conflict is inevitable.

"Obviously, all regional opportunities for settling the Karabakh problem have been exhausted. International mediation efforts and interference are the only means that can guarantee political stability in the region. Until there are no such guarantees, the present ceasefire will certainly prove to be short-term," Ararktsyan stressed.

He emphasised the Armenian Government welcomes efforts by neutral parties and international organisations to put an end to the bloody conflict and expressed gratitude for the vigorous quest for solving the problem on the part of the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the United Nations.

"We are especially satisfied with the decision to form multi-national peace-keeping armed forces, which was passed by the Commonwealth heads of state, and the visit of U.N. representative Cyrus Vance to the region," he said. He expressed hope that the ceasefire will be honoured and that it will be followed by talks between the Azeri Government and elected leaders of Nagorno-Karabakh.

Ararktsyan emphasised the importance of observing the ceasefire as the top-priority measure. Then the blockade of the region by the Azeri side should be lifted and measures be taken to monitor the ceasefire by international observers and the peace-keeping force, he said.

'Courage' Shown at CIS Meeting

LD2103215992 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya Ostankino Television First Program Network in Russian 1800 GMT 21 Mar 92

[Interview with Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosyan by correspondent V. Nazaryan on board aircraft on 20 March; from the "Novosti" newscast—recorded]

[Text] [Ter-Petrosyan] The Council of Heads of State may be said to have displayed courage today, courage in the sense that it touched on two very delicate issues when it discussed the problems of Nagorno-Karabakh and the Dnester region. A decision was made that, in the event of a request by the parties to the conflict, the CIS could introduce its forces into the zone of the Karabakh conflict.

[Nazaryan] And if one of the parties, Azerbaijan for instance, does not agree?

[Ter-Petrosyan] Well, you know, this also has political significance. If one side to a conflict invites such forces, then the refusal of the other side in itself means that its cause is unjust. So this is a very delicate issue, and Azerbaijan is unlikely to refuse. That would mean Azerbaijan proving to the whole world that it is conducting an unjust fight against Nagorno- Karabakh.

Russia To Continue Seeking Peace

LD2003223992 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1353 GMT 20 Mar 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Tigran Liloyan]

[Text] Yerevan, 20 Mar (TASS)—Russia intends to continue, both independently and within the framework of the international community, its efforts to broker the settlement of the problem in Nagorno-Karabakh. This was stated by Vladimir Zemskiy, head of a group of special representatives of the Russian Federation's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The group left Armenia today where it had been engaged for three days in talks with the leadership of the [Armenian] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, representatives of the Supreme Soviet, and in the office of the president of this republic on ways to peacefully settle the Karabakh problem.

He noted in an interview with the ITAR-TASS correspondent that the sides confirmed their mutual adherence to the CSCE and positively assessed the possibility of including the United Nations and other international organizations and individual states concerned in resolving the problem.

According to the Russian representative, the sides arrived at a single view that it is necessary to immediately implement the accords reached on 20 February in Moscow at a meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia. If the very first prerequisites—a cease-fire, insuring the delivery of humanitarian aid, and finally the start of a negotiating process—are fulfilled this will facilitate the global settlement of the problem, Zemskiy stressed.

Azerbaijani Troops Concentrate on Border

LD2403093192 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0900 GMT 24 Mar 92

[Excerpt] Armenian radio reported today that a large concentration of Azerbaijani detachments and equipment is forming near the republican border. The radio report cited the Armenian minister of foreign affairs,

who said the Azerbaijani side evacuated the population from the villages of Kedabek and Tauz. This testifies to the fact that Azerbaijan is preparing for major combat operations aimed at trying to drag Armenia into the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, the program claimed. [passage omitted]

Evacuations Mean 'Wide-Scale Military Action'

LD2303215492 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya Ostakino Television First Program Network in Russian 1500 GMT 23 Mar 92

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] According to information from the Armenian Interior Ministry, the concentration of army formations is under way in Azerbaijan's Kadabekskiy and Tauzskiy Rayons. Local residents are being evacuated from villages in that area. According to the Armenian side, this demonstrates Azerbaijan's intention to begin wide-scale military action in the near future. When Azerbaijan speaks about the evacuation of the civilian population, however, Baku explains this differently: The Azerbaijan side calls this the desire to save people from being attacked by Armenian armed detachments.

Azerbaijani Reserve Mobilization Reported

NC2003212192 Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian 1215 GMT 20 Mar 92

[Text] Yerevan 20 Mar (ARMENPRES)—The chairman of the Azerbaijani Supreme Soviet has issued a decree calling for reserves between the ages of 20 and 40 to be mobilized.

Military sources report that the leadership of Nakhichevan has instructed Azerbaijan People's Front activists operating in Dzhulfa and Ordubad to step up their work to encourage desertions from the CIS Armed Forces and border guard units stationed in Nakhichevan. The activists have also been empowered to help the deserters find tickets for their respective destinations.

President Details Position on Nagorno-Karabakh

PM2303164992 Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 21 Mar 92 pp B1, B8

[Interview with Armenian President Ter-Petrosyan by Luisa Meireles in Yerevan; date not given]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Meireles] What is Armenia's stance on the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict?

[Ter-Petrosyan] Armenia should play a secondary role and leave the main role to Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan. The talks between ourselves and the Azerbaijanis will lead nowhere if they do not talk first. We will agree with any decision they make.

[Meireles] One of the criticisms made of you is that you would not recognize the independence proclaimed by the territory.

[Ter-Petrosyan] We should not be the first country to do so. We are doing our utmost for international recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh, and if any country grants it, we will follow its example. We wish to avoid anything that could be interpreted as interference in Azerbaijan's internal affairs, in order not to exacerbate the tension between our states.

[Meireles] How are relations between Armenia and Turkey?

[Ter-Petrosyan] Over the past 18 months we have succeeded in surmounting the psychological barriers which had existed for 70 years and in making progress, but we disagree over the Karabakh problem. The Turkish Government says that it cannot disregard public opinion in its country. The statements made by a certain political figure (President Turgut Ozal, who asserted that it was necessary to "frighten the Armenians a little") are not in keeping, however, with the stances adopted by Ankara in bilateral talks with our representatives.

[Meireles] How do you explain Russia's ambiguous role?

[Ter-Petrosyan] It is the 1918 syndrome which is reappearing. Russia is too preoccupied with its internal problems to grasp the importance of the interests at stake in the region.

[Meireles] How do you view the situation of the military personnel of the former USSR who remain in Armenia?

[Ter-Petrosyan] There is a danger of their being used as a factor to exacerbate the political situation. Although I believe that they will never be in a position such as in Yugoslavia, there is a possibility of the leaderships making decisions without consulting us.

[Meireles] The CSCE has called a special meeting on Nagorno-Karabakh. What do you expect of this initiative, bearing in mind that Armenia has already requested UN and NATO intervention?

[Ter-Petrosyan] Armenia has never requested anything from either the United Nations or NATO. There was a CSCE mission to Armenia, which drafted a report including proposals concerning the cease-fire and the sending of international observers. The most important thing is that the need to bring representatives of Nagorno-Karabakh into the talks is mentioned for the first time.

[Meireles] Did the visit by UN special envoy Cyrus Vance produce results?

[Ter-Petrosyan] The visit was paid on Butrus Ghali's initiative with the aim of gathering information. Unfortunately, I have a feeling that the involvement of several international organizations is causing a dispersal of forces when it is time for their consolidation.

Adviser Explains Conflict

AU2303153792 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 23 Mar 92 pp 144-145

[Interview with Gerard Y. Libaridian, adviser of Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosyan, by unidentified DER SPIEGEL reporter; place and date not given: "We Must Not Permit Genocide"]

[Text] [DER SPIEGEL] Mr. Libaridian, to whom does Nagorno-Karabakh belong?

[Libaridian] To the people who live there. In 1921 the area was joined with Azerbaijan, which the people have never accepted. With its 70-year policy of colonization, Azerbaijan has never given the Armenian inhabitants reason to change their minds. Armenia does not have any territorial claims on Azerbaijan. The people of Nagorno-Karabakh must decide themselves on their fate. This will be acceptable to us.

[DER SPIEGEL] But in 1989 the Armenian parliament decided on unification with the enclave.

[Libaridian] We have changed our policy, we are no longer looking for unification. We only want Azerbaijan to guarantee the individual and collective civil and human rights in Nagorno-Karabakh.

[DER SPIEGEL] Then why is there war between Armenia and Azerbaijan?

[Libaridian] It is a war of the government of Azerbaijan against part of its population on its territory. Azerbaijan insists on the principle of territorial integrity....

[DER SPIEGEL] ...this is a norm accepted by international law.

[Libaridian] But it cannot be an absolute right, if it is used to depopulate a region. The Armenians there insist on self-determination. Without international guarantees very little seems possible. We have already made a compromise by no longer making any territorial claims. But Azerbaijan must recognize the fact that Armenians live in Nagorno-Karabakh and must live there.

[DER SPIEGEL] Can you imagine a mini state of Nagorno-Karabakh?

[Libaridian] Yes. If Azerbaijan continues to use force, the Armenians there will fight. Where are they supposed to go to? We do not have room. We already have 800,000 homeless in our country, victims of earthquakes and deportations.

[DER SPIEGEL] By renouncing unification, has Armenia bowed to the inevitable?

[Libaridian] We have suffered through a lot in our history, just think of the persecution by the Ottomans. Now we are developing good relations with Turkey, we do not even request Turkey to recognize the genocide of the Armenians. On the other hand, we must not permit another genocide to be committed on our people. If Azerbaijan understands this, negotiations can begin.

[DER SPIEGEL] Who is on Armenia's side, after the traditional protector Russia is gone and the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS] has withdrawn its troops?

[Libaridian] The enormous changes as a result of the turning toward democracy have changed our people's psychological makeup. We are no longer looking for friends outside; we want to live where we are without being bothered by others, and we want to develop our security through good relations with our neighbors. In addition, we hope that in the 1990's we will be able to rely on international mechanisms—the CIS, the United Nations, or regional organizations.

[DER SPIEGEL] Does the population support this course?

[Libaridian] So far we have not had any nationalist mass demonstrations as in Azerbaijan. There the lack of a strong leadership has made the various parties take to the streets to surpass each other with patriotism. This means that no one can start serious negotiations. In our country this is possible at the moment but it will not last forever.

[DER SPIEGEL] Azerbaijani Prime Minister Hasanov said that he sees a 50:50 chance of war.

[Libaridian] As a mathematician he is perhaps good at making estimates. We have done everything to avoid war. Karabakh, however, was blocked by Azerbaijan. All through the winter, they did not have gas, electricity supply was such that often we did not have electricity even in our republic. Trains were stopped. Normally, all this would be a case for war.

[DER SPIEGEL] Which side was supported by the troops of the center in Moscow?

[Libaridian] Last year it was extremely difficult for us to watch how the USSR forces helped the Azerbaijanis to deport Armenians from Karabakh. Or this February, when they fired 250 missiles a day on Stepanakert and destroyed the city. This has led to a brutalization, atrocities are everyday occurrences. If Azerbaijan were finally to negotiate and guarantee international rights, we, on our part, could make the leaders of Nagorno-Karabakh accept a solution that would satisfy everyone.

[DER SPIEGEL] Why did Armenian units attack the Azeri village of Khodzhaly at the end of February and thus exceed the goal of self-defense?

[Libaridian] The best thing would be if an independent commission were to investigate the events. In Khodzhaly the Azerbaijanis reportedly hid missiles and artillery, which were used against Stepanakert and the airport. Apparently, the Armenian fighters surrounded the village; however, they left a corridor for civilians to escape.

The Azerbaijani fighters used this corridor to break through with their weapons.

[DER SPIEGEL] How many casualties were there among the civilians?

[Libaridian] There was fighting. Innocent people were killed. I do not rule out that Armenians committed atrocities. It is a fact that the population there has been brutalized, dehumanized over the past two years. This has consequences, and the people do things that they would not do under normal circumstances.

[DER SPIEGEL] Yerevan has more fighters than Baku.

[Libaridian] We do not have more fighters than Baku, the Armenians are only better organized. They defend their houses and villages in Nagorno-Karabakh, they do not come from Yerevan.

[DER SPIEGEL] Where do they get weapons from?

[Libaridian] There is an open market in the former Soviet Union. Weapons are stolen, bought, produced. One main depot of the USSR troops was in Agdam. Last months the Azerbaijanis conquered it. Eight million tonnes of explosives were stored that—this is enough for five years. We requested the CIS to neutralize its depots so that we do not come under pressure. Without success.

[DER SPIEGEL] How much progress have you made in establishing an Armenian National Guard?

[Libaridian] We do not want to have our own army, and Azerbaijan should not have one, either. But if Azerbaijan establishes one, we do not have any other choice. Against whom should the Azerbaijanis use an army? Against Iran, against Russia? No, against Armenia—they have already used their armed forces against us. Our National Guard has been established since last year; now we have 1,500 to 2,000 young men, who are mostly deployed as guards along the border. We would feel much safer in a collective security system. However, of course we have plans for the case that such a system cannot be established.

[DER SPIEGEL] As a historian, you once wrote that Azerbaijani nationalism has been "filled by pan-Turkish ideologies." Do you fear Turkish efforts to unite all peoples who speak a Turkic language, including those in eastern Turkestan?

[Libaridian] The danger seems to exist. Nations with weak governments are prone to such ideologies, in particular if the people are right in the middle of the process of finding their national identity. The pan-Turkish idea is much more attractive for Azerbaijan then for Turkey. We are extremely worried about statements from Ankara, in which Turkey considers the Azerbaijanis as Turks. With these statements Ankara has left the ground of neutrality. However, I think that such statements are partly aimed at their own people, because after the events in Khodzhaly there was unrest in the streets in Turkey. We do not mind that the Turks feel close to the Azerbaijanis. Pan-Turkish efforts, however, will not gain ground—just like the pan-Arabic philosophy.

[DER SPIEGEL] What are the prospects for Armenia coming to an understanding with Turkey?

[Libaridian] Our cultures once touched in the past. All this might come back, despite the genocide committed during World War I. We have already joined President Ozal's Black-Sea initiative. At the moment we do not feel like a Christian nation in a sea of Muslims. We want a sense of normality; we want to negotiate from state to state. We need them—perhaps a bit more than they need us.

[DER SPIEGEL] And what can the community of peoples do specifically to reestablish peace in the Caucasus?

[Libaridian] First of all, we must come to a lasting cease-fire. Therefore, the international community of peoples should exert pressure on Azerbaijan, which has broken every agreement so far. So far there have not been any sanctions. Azerbaijan has been accepted into the United Nations, the CSCE, and other international organizations. With this the international community violated its own principles.

President Contrasts Ties With Iran, Turkey

LD2303144192 Moscow TASS in English 1412 GMT 23 Mar 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Tigran Liloyan]

[Text] Yerevan March 23 TASS—"It is the cornerstone of our foreign policy to promote normal relations with our neighbours, primarily with Iran and Turkey," Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosyan told the 4th Congress of the ruling Armenian All-National Movement on Sunday [22 March].

Turning to Armenian-Iranian relations, Ter-Petrosyan stressed that both states had common political interests and that relations between them were now "developing normally and at an accelerating pace". "We shall very soon feel the positive results of these relations," he stated.

Noting that relations between Armenia and Turkey were "much more complicated", the president stressed that both states were obviously interested in establishing mutually profitable commercial, economic, scientific and cultural relations. Moreover, he said that the promotion of such relations should not be thwarted by attempts of one of the sides to dictate its political terms to the other.

According to Ter-Petrosyan, there have been several statements by Turkish officials contradicting this principle, although Ankara had declared its agreement with such an approach.

Ter-Petrosyan believes some Turkish circles are trying to speculate on the Karabakh issue to obtain political dividends. "One gets the impression," Ter-Petrosyan

noted, "that the Karabakh issue is gradually turning into a sort of Turkish internal political problem."

"This is a dangerous tendency," Ter-Petrosyan said. He believes the Turkish Government is "so far able to balance out the pressure exerted on it and to prevent the Karabakh issue from obstructing the normalisation of Armenian-Turkish relations".

Azerbaijan

Government Responds to Armenian Protest on Arms

NC2303140992 Baku Radio Baku Network in Azeri 2000 GMT 22 Mar 92

[Text] Armenian Foreign Minister Raffi Ovanesyan conveyed a protest note to the Azerbaijan Foreign Ministry on 21 March. This gentleman who [words indistinct] claimed that the Azerbaijan [word indistinct] has acquired arms from the (?military school) in Mingechaur and that the stolen arms will be used against the Armenians in Karabakh and Armenia. Shamelessly, Ovanesyan demanded that the arms be returned quickly.

The Armenians are forgetting the large amounts of arms they have stolen.

Iran Convinces Baku To Ease Economic Blockade

NC2203163092 Paris AFP in English 1541 GMT 22 Mar 92

[Text] Tehran, March 22 (AFP)—Azerbaijan has agreed to ease its economic blockade of both the disputed enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh and of Armenia, in response to Iranian mediation, official Tehran Radio reported Sunday [22 March].

Armenia has insisted on the lifting of blockades ahead of talks with Azerbaijan on ending the bloodshed in Karabakh. It has also called for residents of the mainly Armenian enclave to be included in negotiations.

According to Tehran Radio, Azeri Prime Minister Gasan Gasanov told Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Mahmud Va'ezi in Baku on Saturday that his country would ease its economic sanctions against the Armenians.

Va'ezi has been shuttling between the two former Soviet republics following a draft agreement signed by Armenian and Azeri officials in Tehran on March 15 calling for a ceasefire, exchange of prisoners and lifting of sanctions.

Informed sources here said Iran was working to convene a meeting between the Azeri and Armenian presidents as a means to secure a formal ceasefire and the start of direct negotiations.

Clashes in the Christian Armenian enclave in Azerbaijan have eased since the draft accord was signed in Tehran. Around 1,500 people have been killed in four years of fighting over the status of Nagorno-Karabakh.

A French aid envoy, Bernard Kouchner, completed the delivery of seven tonnes of medical supplies and powdered milk to Stepanakert, Karabakh's main town, and returned Sunday to Agdam, just outside the enclave.

Kouchner, French minister for humanitarian action, was due to return later to Baku which he left Friday with the relief convoy.

The medical supplies were distributed to the hospital at Stepanakert where most residents are living in cellars without electricity or running water.

On the journey into the enclave, the convoy was painstakingly searched and some of the consignment removed and sent back to Baku, said an AFP correspondent accompanying Kouchner.

Iran To Continue Mediation in Nagorno-Karabakh

LD2403140892 Moscow TASS in English 1336 GMT 24 Mar 92

[Text] Moscow March 24 TASS—Although the ceasefire agreement is in force in Nagorno-Karabakh, localised armed clashes continue in the enclave. Calmness has established on the greater part of the region. However, several villages came under artillery and machine-gun fire in the past 24 hours, a spokesman in the Nagorno-Karabakh Interior Ministry department told ITAR-TASS. One man was killed and one injured in the attack.

According to reports received from the conflict-torn area, the Iranian side, whose representatives act as mediators-observers, intends to take new and more effective steps towards a peaceful settlement in Nagorno-Karabakh by March 27 when the ceasefire accord expires.

Mamedov Meets With Visiting CSCE Delegation

NC2103204092 Baku Radio Baku Network in Azeri 1800 GMT 21 Mar 92

[Text] Azerbaijani Supreme Soviet Chairman Yakub Mamedov received the visiting CSCE delegation, headed by [name indistinct]. After welcoming his guests, Mamedov briefed them on the situation in Karabakh, informing them that for more than two centuries Azerbaijanis have been immigrating from the lands of their forefathers. More than 100,000 Azerbaijanis were expelled from Armenia during [words indistinct] in the 20th century and more than 200,000 Azerbaijanis were moved out from the lands of their forefathers in Armenia as of 1988. Mamedov also explained that the Azerbaijani people are determined to establish an independent state. The main objective of this state is to establish relations with neighboring and the other countries in the world. As a UN member, Azerbaijan is complying with all UN principles.

The guests thanked Mamedov for the sincere welcome accorded them in Azerbaijan. Ziyad Samed-zade, first deputy chairman of the Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet;

Tamerlan Karayev, deputy chairman of the Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet; and Foreign Minister Guseyn Sadykhov attended the meeting.

French Official Begins Humanitarian Mission

PM2403095092 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Mar 92 Morning Edition p 4

[Report by Konstantin Eggert: "French Secretary of State Begins Humanitarian Mission to Karabakh"]

[Text] On the evening of 18 March Bernard Kouchner, French secretary of state for humanitarian action, arrived in Moscow. On 19 March, after talks at the Russian Foreign Ministry and CIS Armed Forces General Staff, he flew to Baku, whence he will try to get to Stepanakert.

It will be Kouchner's third visit to the Transcaucasus. His task is to organize safe corridors for the delivery of food and medical assistance to the inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh. This important mission was given to France by the CSCE as part of the peace settlement plan proposed by that organization. As well as the creation of humanitarian corridors, it includes, as is known, a ceasefire, an embargo on supplies of weapons to the warring sides, the dispatch of a group of independent international observers (well-known politicians and public figures, preferably) to the region, and an exchange of prisoners and hostages. On the fulfillment of these conditions, the plan is to start talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

"We realize that the creation of aid corridors is only a possible first step on the path of reconciliation. We have no guarantees of success. But it is impossible to remain on the sidelines any longer," Kouchner told a small group of journalists who had waited for him at the French ambassador's residence.

The wait was rewarded by an unexpected announcement by B. Kouchner: According to him, Turkey intends to convince the Azerbaijani leadership of the need to launch a direct dialogue with representatives of the Armenian population in Karabakh. The secretary of state received this information during talks with Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet Cetin in Istanbul, his last stop before Moscow. B. Kouchner noted the Turkish diplomatic chief's extremely positive attitude toward all peace initiatives, whatever their origin, and he described the general mood of Ankara officials as "exceedingly constructive."

Talking about Russia's role, the secretary of state stressed that, in his view, it remains a "factor for peace in the region." Nonetheless, from what Kouchner went on to say, one should draw the conclusion that the Russian Federation is seen by the CSCE more as a party capable of giving organizational and technical assistance in terms of transport and people, than as an influential force in the sphere of Transcaucasus diplomacy.

Asked by IZVESTIYA about his attitude toward the Iranian initiative on Karabakh and the possibility of a coordinated effort by the CSCE and Tehran, Bernard Kouchner replied: "I welcome any steps, as long as they contribute to peace. Obviously, one wishes all peace initiatives were coordinated, but, believe me, it is not that easy. Even within the CSCE not everything runs smoothly."

Mamedov on Nagorno-Karabakh, Ties to CIS

PM2303153892 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 21 Mar 92 p 1

[Interview with Yakub Mamedov, chairman of the Republic of Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet, by N. Belan in Baku; date not given: "War Is Tormenting Us"—first two paragraphs are SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA introduction]

[Text] Yakub Mamedov is not a professional politician. Time and his pain at the fate of his people and homeland have made him a politician. He is a pediatrician by training. He defended his doctoral dissertation in Moscow in 1982 and was then elected to the Azerbaijan Academy of Sciences. He is married with two sons and a daughter.

I was the first Russian journalist to whom he granted an interview.

[Belan] Yakub Dzhavadovich, at the time of our present conversation Cyrus Vance, the UN secretary general's special representative, is in Baku. What do you expect from this visit?

[Mamedov] Above all, he can promote a cease-fire and give a boost to the talks process. Mr. Vance is a prominent politician and an experienced diplomat, and we know of his fruitful efforts to settle conflicts that have arisen in various parts of the world. Therefore we hope that his coming to Azerbaijan will also help to unravel the complex knot of the Karabakh problem.

[Belan] What are Azerbaijan's conditions for settling it?

[Mamedov] This is the fifth year that our land has been tormented by war, the fifth year that the blood of totally innocent, peaceful people has been shed. All this time Azerbaijan has done nothing but yield and lose. We now have 56,000 refugees just from Nagorno-Karabakh, and they have left behind their homes, everything that was gained by their fathers and grandfathers and by their own labor, and also what was built by the efforts of the Republic of Azerbaijan and its people. I find it hard to speak of the precise scale of the economic harm suffered by us, but it is huge. Well, what measures and scales can be used to assess people's grief or the pain of that Khodzhaly tragedy? Or the ruined lives of the 200,000 Azerbaijani refugees who were historically resident on the territory of Armenia.

[Belan] What is your view of the possibility of UN troops being sent in to settle the conflict?

[Mamedov] They are not needed here. Nagorno-Karabakh is our internal problem. As regards the United Nations and other international organizations, they can exert their influence by means of talks and other means. Only not military means. We advocate that independent observers should come on a peaceable mission.

[Belan] Presidents Yeltsin and Nazarbayev have proposed creating an interstate deterrent force within the CIS framework. What is your attitude to this?

[Mamedov] A negative one. Because we have already seen for ourselves that CIS troops take a one-sided stand. The latest example was the actions of the 366th Regiment, whose hardware and even personnel participated—we have proof of this—in the destruction of the Azerbaijani city of Khodzhaly. Some of this combat hardware, left behind in Nagorno-Karabakh, is still being used against our villages and peaceful population.

[Belan] How is the creation of the Azerbaijani army going?

[Mamedov] A national army has not yet been created and exists only on paper. This has been hindered not by the intrigues of external enemies but by our internal dissension and contradictions. Difficulties over creating a national army will exist as long as there are people in whose interest it is to preserve a tense sociopolitical situation in the republic.

[Belan] I understand: The Karabakh conflict determines the political atmosphere in Azerbaijan. But how would you assess it as a whole? Social Democratic Party Chairman Araz Alizade, for example, believes that "there was a coup d'etat at the last Supreme Soviet session." I have heard other, very different opinions too.

[Mamedov] President A. Mutalibov's resignation cannot be described as a coup d'etat. After all, why do we consider this an everlasting post for someone?

As regards the situation in the republic, it is very grave and tension is growing daily. The war is not the only reason for this. There are very powerful political forces within the republic which are using the Karabakh card and the failures of the Azerbaijani leadership for their narrow selfish purposes and which wish to seize power on this wave. Today the republic is in danger of breaking up into individual regions and individual cities, but this does not worry them. They are muddying the water by starting provocative rumors, and they even arrange dirty provocations and act according to the principle: the worse, the better.

I must also honestly say something else. The economy of our republic is in a state of profound crisis. Again the war is just one of the reasons. You could say that nobody has tackled the economy thoroughly in recent years, and it serves to enrich just one group of people.

[Belan] Some of the powers of your republic's Supreme Soviet have been transferred to the National Council. But I know that there are calls to continue this process and even to dissolve the Supreme Soviet. What is your position?

[Mamedov] The thing is that the National Council was set up at the suggestion of the opposition, which declared that our parliament was elected under the old laws and that conservative forces and very many representatives of the nomenklatura ended up in it. I, too, was one of those who actively supported the creation of the National Council.

It has worked hard and done a great deal. But, because of the complex sociopolitical and economic situation, it began to get distracted from the chief thing—lawmaking work—and became increasingly absorbed in resolving current and even vitally important problems. Naturally, this gave rise to criticism and even calls, on the one hand, to abolish the National Council and, on the other, to strengthen it, to revise its composition, to endow it with great powers, etc.

But this is what must be borne in mind. Just individual voices are being heard in favor of dissolving the Supreme Soviet. The main calls are to abolish the institution of the presidency. But I believe that this question should only be resolved in favor of establishing strong authoritative power in the republic, whatever form it might take.

[Belan] How is the formation of the provisional coalition government going?

[Mamedov] With great difficulty. Its composition has not yet been submitted to me.

[Belan] Demands are now being made to "come to a decision on the Treaty on the CIS and the Joint Troops of the Commonwealth," i.e. to support the National Council's position and annul A. Mutalibov's signatures on those documents that he signed. What is your view?

[Mamedov] I favor Azerbaijan's full independence, and I would not like our people to end up once again as part of some bloc or association like the former USSR. But we ought to build our relations with the CIS sensibly and take account of the experience of other countries which have ended up in a situation similar to ours.

On the other hand, what should we do in such a situation, what attitude should we take to the CIS? We are suffering a misfortune, war has come to our land, but not one CIS member country has expressed its attitude to this in any way. How can this be explained to the people?

[Belan] Pardon me, Yakub Dzhavadovich, I may have misunderstood something. I know that you are receiving aid from abroad in connection with the Khodzhaly tragedy, and medical supplies are being sent for the injured. Is there any aid from the CIS countries?

[Mamedov] None. Not only have we received no medical or material aid—we have not even received moral assistance. On the contrary, they have made out, at best, that nothing happened. Russian Television and the "Vesti" program have constantly misrepresented these events. People not only in the world but also in the republics of the former USSR still do not know about this unprecedented tragedy of the Azerbaijani city of Khodzhaly. Azerbaijan has found itself powerless in the face of the news blockade created around it.

[Belan] How would you describe relations between Russia and Azerbaijan today?

[Mamedov] Historically we have always been very close. We have strong economic, cultural, and human ties which, despite everything, cannot be broken. We cannot even imagine being able to lead a normal life or to develop without Russia. We see and feel, however, that there are evidently people in and around the Russian Government who would like to spoil our relations. They are making every effort to this end. I am an optimist, however, and I firmly believe that our friendship and fraternal relations will stand this test.

I would like to take this opportunity to once again convey to the Russians [rossiyane] our kindest feelings and most sincere and friendly wishes. It is our historical lot to live next to one another, to live together, and Baku time is the same as Moscow time. This cannot be changed, however hard some people might try.

Emergency Supreme Soviet Session Resumes

LD2403113392 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0900 GMT 24 Mar 92

[Excerpts] An emergency session of the Azerbaijani Supreme Soviet continues its work today after a two-week break. Azer Khalilov reports from Baku:

[Khalilov] It is known that the session was convened in connection with a sharp escalation of violence in Nagorno-Karabakh marked by the genocide of the Azerbaijani population in the town of Khodzhaly. The fact that republic officials failed to take steps to ensure the safety of civilians in Nagorno-Karabakh and in areas bordering on Armenia led in the end to the resignation of the Supreme Soviet and the republic president. Thus, one of the main demands of public opinion in the republic was met.

The agenda of the second part of the emergency session includes the following questions: the future form of state power in the republic, the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, and measures for putting an end to Armenian aggression. Deputies are to discuss the expediency of the existing institution of presidential power in Azerbaijan. Representatives of the democratic forces bloc-the Independent Azerbaijan [Nezavisimyy Azerbaijan], which forms the opposition in the parliament, at least, will advocate the abolition of presidential power. [passage omitted]

The democratic opposition is in favor of handing full power to the National Council and leaving the Supreme Soviet with the only one right of adopting the constitution. The opposition has also agreed to participate in a coalition government which is being set up for the first time in the Caucasus. It seems that the discussion of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict will be most sensitive. The point is that 200,000 Azeris who were forced to leave their places of residence in Armenia have been joined lately by an army of refugees numbering over 100,000. They include Azeri refugees from the Nagornyy part of Karabakh and over 57,000 refugees from Azerbaijani areas bordering on Armenia.

Update on 'Tense' Situation in Border Rayons

NC2303202892 Baku Radio Baku Network in Azeri 1800 GMT 23 Mar 92

[Text] The situation in Azerbaijan's border rayons remains tense. Bekir Eyyubov, head of the Kazakhskiy Rayon Executive Authority, has informed our correspondent by telephone that armed Armenian units continued to fire on the towns of Ashagy Askipara, Yukhary Askipara, (Mokhanlar), [name indistinct], and Kheyrimly in the past two days. The Armenians have been using military vehicles of the CIS 7th Army units based in Armenia in their attacks. Three people were killed when their vehicle was hit by a shell in Ashagy Askipara on 21 March. The vehicle, used to provide mobile emergency aid, was leaving the town when it was hit. Two and a half hours later, a bus going from Ashagy Askipara to Kazakh was hit. Two people were killed and four were wounded in the incident.

Leading officials of Kazakhskiy Rayon met with their counterparts in Armenia's Idzhevanskiy Rayon on 22 March to discuss the question of calling a cease-fire. A car ran over a mine on the road between [name indistinct] and Khatarly less than seven hours after this meeting. Two people were killed and three others were wounded in the incident. Meanwhile, one person was killed when [name indistinct] was shelled by artillery units on the same day. Armed Armenian units fired on all the border towns in Kazakhskiy Rayon from 2300 until midnight. The situation was relatively calm from midnight last night until this morning. The general situation, however, remains tense. Large groups of armed Armenian units and tracked military vehicles have assembled in Armenia along the Kazakhskiy Rayon's entire border. Every possible measure is being taken in Kazakhskiy Rayon to confront the aggressor. The situation in the rayon requires the support of the entire republic.

According to a disclosure by the Azerbaijan Popular Front Information Center, the self-defense regiment based close to the Goris-Lachin highway section in Lachinskiy Rayon was fired on from the opposite side for several hours. The firing began at about 0530 today.

Meanwhile, armed Armenian units based in the mountainous region in Karabakh fired on Kyshlakh, Dzhabrailskiy Rayon, last night.

Armed Armenian units fired on the towns of Kirazly, Shilly, and [name indistinct], in Agdamskiy Rayon, with artillery and Alazan rockets from 0100 until daybreak today. Colonel Kurbanov, head of the Karabakh Internal Affairs Department, has disclosed that the fire came from the direction of Khodzhalinskiy Rayon. Nearly 15 houses were destroyed as a result of the attack. Several people have been wounded. Additionally, armed Armenians killed Asker Kasarov, a shepherd, and drove off nearly 200 of his sheep.

Ten days have passed since the tragic incidents in the towns of Surkhavend, (Daraklylar), Beshirler, (Bashguneykaya), (Ortaguneykaya), Kasumbeyli, and Malikly in Agdara Rayon. Aliyev, head of the Agdara Rayon Executive Authority, has informed our correspondent that armed Armenian units attacked and captured these towns on 12 March. Twenty-two people were killed. The bodies of 17 of them remain in (Bashguneykaya) and (Ortaguneykaya). About 20 people were wounded and six people have been missing. The household effects of about 5,000 people have been ransacked and destroyed. The armed Armenian brigands drove off nearly all the cattle.

Karabakh Committee Views Khodzhaly 'Genocide'

NC2303143092 Baku Radio Baku Network in Azeri 2000 GMT 22 Mar 92

[Text] The objectives of the Karabakh Committee, which has been established in Uzbekistan, are as follows:

1. Support for Azerbaijan in defending its territorial integrity.

2. Removal of CIS military units from the Turkic republics.

3. Termination of the imperialist act of genocide against the Turkic republics.

The Zholtoksan [National Democratic] Party and the [name indistinct] Party in Kazakhstan, the Peoples Democratic Party of Turkmenistan, and the Azerbaijan, Tatar, Uighur, and Chuvash cultural centers in Tashkent are members of the Karabakh Committee.

In its latest meeting, the committee assessed the tragic situation created in Khodzhaly in Azerbaijan as an act of genocide against the Turkic world as a whole. The committee adopted an appeal to the United Nations and urged Uzbekistan President Islam Karimov to sever Uzbekistan's relations with Armenia. The representative of the Zholtoksan Party disclosed that a group of doctors will be dispatched to Karabakh on 25 March.

People's Front Leader New Defense Minister

PM2203192392 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 20 Mar 92 p 2

[O. Tekhmenev report: "Azerbaijan: New Appointments"]

[Text] Doctor of Mathematical and Physical Sciences Ragim Gaziyev, one of the informal leaders of the Azerbaijan People's Front [APF], was recently appointed Azerbaijan's minister of defense. The APF had long been seeking his appointment to this post. It should be pointed out that the very fact of the appointment confirms yet again the APF's increased influence on the republic's power structures. Before being appointed minister of defense, Ragim Gaziyev was commandant of Shusha.

The minister appeared on republic television the day before yesterday. He declared that it is time to get accustomed to the idea that a real war is being waged and it is stupid to organize national mourning every day for everyone who has died in it. It is far more important to summon up strength and, as far as possible, fight worthily. R. Gaziyev also said that he will not allow a single one of the 500,000 Russians resident in Azerbaijan to be harmed.

Georgia

Shevardnadze Interviewed on Republic's Future

PM2403114492 Paris LIBERATION in French 20 Mar 92 p 19

[Interview with Georgian State Council Chairman Eduard Shevardnadze by Natalie Nougayrede in Tbilisi; date not given]

[Text] Tbilisi—[Nougayrede] How long had you been planning your return to Georgia?

[Shevardnadze] My return was not planned in advance. Despite the fact that Zviad Gamsakhurdia, the former president, insulted me and accused me of many things, I never answered him. I always said that he had been elected by the people and I respected that situation. The first time that I spoke out was on 2 September when shots were fired during a demonstration and people were killed. Some people said everything had been planned in Moscow. Those suspicions are unfounded.

[Nougayrede] How were you able to be appointed chairman of the new State Council in such a short time?

[Shevardnadze] I obtained this post because the situation in Georgia is really very difficult. A section of the public here has confidence in me and thinks that my appointment was one of the only possible solutions.

[Nougayrede] Do you think that your appointment as head of state was democratic?

[Shevardnadze] No. But it was more democratic than continuing with the former Military Council. I have announced that the next elections should be held this fall at the latest. This decision was made by the State Council. After the elections, order should be restored. But until then, a political stabilization is necessary.

It is true that my return to Georgia was a sudden decision. If you consider my political interests alone it was a risky decision. A politician who returns to his country in such circumstances runs the risk of being destroyed. Other people might have waited. But Georgia is virtually on the brink of civil war and I could not afford to follow just my personal interests.

[Nougayrede] Does Gamsakhurdia still have a chance of returning to Georgia?

[Shevardnadze] At the request of the government and the public prosecutor, a judicial enquiry is under way into the crimes committed by Zviad Gamsakhurdia. As soon as that inquiry is over, international experts will give their verdict on the objectivity of the results. I am not competent to judge whether or not Gamsakhurdia will return. If the results of the inquiry show that he is not guilty, nobody will touch him and the legal system will defend him.

[Nougayrede] Is it really possible to say that there is a civil war in Georgia?

[Shevardnadze] The civil war is not yet over and not only in Zugdidi (city which has fallen under the control of Gamsakhurdia's troops—LIBERATION editor's note). The situation is explosive in other regions, too. The population is very divided, the atmosphere is very tense. These problems must be tackled and resolved. We have reached an agreement (on a cease-fire—LIBERATION editor's note) with Zugdidi. If this agreement is not respected, Zviad Gamsakhurdia will have to intervene. But I think that the agreement will be respected because the people are tired.

[Nougayrede] If Zugdidi does not honor this agreement, do you envisage military intervention?

[Shevardnadze] I am opposed to any kind of military intervention. But I am not the only one to decide that. The national guard also has its interests to defend. Several of its men have been killed in Zugdidi. The national guard is not a regular army. Some guards may not obey orders. That is why the agreement with Zugdidi must be implemented as soon as possible.

[Nougayrede] What is the state of your negotiations with Moscow on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from South Ossetia (the region of Georgia which is demanding to be joined to Russia—LIBERATION editor's note).

[Shevardnadze] There are no results at present. Those troops absolutely must leave South Ossetia. But we must first draw up a timetable for that withdrawal. We do not want to hound those soldiers and officers. The withdrawal of the troops must be done painlessly.

[Nougayrede] You refuse to allow Georgia to join the Commonwealth of Independent States. Why?

[Shevardnadze] Because public opinion in Georgia is opposed to that. CIS membership would not be seen as something positive. That is why I am demanding the rapid signing of a bilateral treaty with Russia. I think that that is much more important than joining the CIS. We do not want to make a hasty decision on the CIS.

[Nougayrede] In what way does the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan affect Georgia?

[Shevardnadze] Georgia could become very concerned by that conflict. The Transcaucasus is threatened by a Lebanon-style phenomenon. That is why we are asking the West to establish more intensive contacts with the states in this region. For instance, with a view to organizing a summit among these three states.

[Nougayrede] You have requested Western aid for Georgia. Why should the West help a country which still has no legitimate government?

[Shevardnadze] If the West comes to our aid, we will find it easier to establish a legitimate government.

[Nougayrede] What kind of economic reform do you plan to introduce in Georgia?

[Shevardnadze] I have many problems on my hands. This country's finances and economy have been destroyed to such an extent. For the time being, creating our own currency would not do anything for us. We may do it in the future. Today we must above all prevent famine. I do not know how we will get through next winter. If we do not find additional resources, it will be terrible. We do not even have a budget for 1992.

[Nougayrede] How will you convince the Georgians that you have really changed since the days when you were first secretary of the Communist Party in Georgia?

[Shevardnadze] By my actions. Today I am a fierce defender of the market economy. I was one of those who fought to establish real political pluralism in the Soviet Union. I was also one of the leaders of the democratic movement. I will not depart from those principles. At my age, you can no longer change. Believe me, I will not turn into a dictator! (Laughs—LIBERATION editor's note)

[Nougayrede] What personal importance do you attach to your return to power in Georgia?

[Shevardnadze] This is a very important and significant point in my life. If democracy wins here, it will be crucially important. Georgia may be a small country but it has a say on the international stage.

Ioseliani Welcomes Shevardnadze's Return

LD2203221692

[Editorial Report] Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian at 0800 GMT on 21 March broadcasts a

program entitled "Plus 11." The program contains a 10-minute item on the general situation in Georgia since the arrival of Eduard Shevardnadze, and which consists mainly of vox pop interviews. The item also contains a 90-second interview with Dzhaba Ioseliani, deputy chairman of the Georgian State Council, on Shevardnadze's return. Ioseliani says:

"The arrival of Shevardnadze is a major factor, not only economicically but politically as well. We were in reality in isolation, in international isolation, because of the so-called presidential administration, the chaos, the anarchy, the dictatorship—one cannot call it dictatorship, it is anarchy and dictatorship all together. Because of this we are now suffering and the arrival of Shevardnadze will, I think, have a very strong influence.

"I was the initiator of this invitation and I had prepared this matter for a long time. Now we will see what will happen. We must have friendly relations and treaties with everyone. Now it is necessary—it is impossible to continue; we will not renew any previous treaties but work on a new basis, a natural, humane one, on the basis of international treaties and our traditions, good traditions. That is how it will be with Russia and the other republics."

Situation Reportedly 'Stabilizing' in Zugdidi

AU2403083992 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian 0300 GMT 24 Mar 92

[Text] Information from Zugdidi. As our correspondent has informed us, the situation in the town is stabilizing. Cadets of the militia higher school, together with local militia workers, are controlling the situation. There have been no serious crimes during the last few days. The population is anxious to elect the town's new leaders by democratic means and for them to start work as soon as possible.

Removal of 'Russian Occupation Army' Urged

OW2103164492 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1546 GMT 21 Mar 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Irakliy Tsereteli, a leading member of Georgia's National Congress, has called for starting at once negotiations with Russian leaders on the status of the "Russian occupation army" and for removing it from Georgia. Talks on Georgia's joining NATO should begin at the same time, he told IF's [INTERFAX] correspondent. According to him, this would be the best mechanism of protection for Georgia after its withdrawal from the politico-military space of the CIS.

In comments on the outcome of the routine session held by the Congress on Saturday [21 March] I. Tsereteli said that the session discussed "the political situation in Georgia and the ways to reorganize the Congress's presidium". "Despite the one-sided cancellation of the March 17 agreement with the State Council by the Georgian opposition, the Congress believes that the dialogue should continue", he stressed.

Council Discusses Crime, New National Army

OW2103050792 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1436 GMT 21 Mar 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] On March 19, Georgia's State Council discussed measures to combat crime, the forthcoming recruitment to the national army and electricity supplies.

Interior Minister Roman Gventsadze said that since the beginning of the year crime rate had grown by 26 per cent against the same period of 1991. He said that this came as a result of the law enforcement bodies' forced inactivity caused by the appropriation of their functions by the national guard and by the Mkhedrioni grouping which acted unprofessionally in this area.

The State Council has taken the decision to set up a special coordinating council, run by the Georgian Procurator's Office, for delimiting functions between the governmental troops and law-enforcement bodies.

Discussing electricity supplies, the State Council admitted that the situation in this area had improved and electricity was coming from Azerbaijan and Turkey.

The State Council did not take any specific decision on the recruitment to the national armed forces. It will resume the discussion of the issue in the near future.

NDP Leader Views Monarchy as 'Essential'

AU2003145992 Tbilisi DRONI in Georgian 6 Mar 92 p 6

[Interview with Giorgi Chanturia, leader of the National Democratic Party, NDP, by Tamar Nadareishvili; place and date not given: "A Monarchy... Out of Need?"]

[Text] **The not so short visit by Giorgi Chanturia and Temur Zhorzholiani to Spain and Italy and relations with representatives of the Bagrationi family there have resulted in a fair amount of gossip. Batoni [Georgian polite form of address] Temuri is chairman of the Monarchist (Conservative) Party and his position toward the question of the restoration of the Bagrationi royal dynasty is easily understandable. The current so-called monarchist aspirations of the National Democratic Party (NDP) leader were quite unexpected for us. It was precisely on this issue that we spoke to Giorgi Chanturia on his return home.**

[Nadareishvili] Batoni Gia, what was your assessment of His Highness Giorgi's [heir to the Georgian throne] open letter to the Georgian people that was published by SAKARTVELOS RESPUBLIKA in its issue of 29 February?

[Chanturia] I understand the reason why he wrote this letter: His Royal Highness wants to be king.

[Nadareishvili] The address does not leave such an impression.

[Chanturia] That is understandable. Giorgi did not directly write such a thing. He said in a private conversation that he needed a guarantee that he would reign.

[Nadareishvili] Do you not wish to reply?

[Chanturia] No. Enough was said about this in Spain.

[Nadareishvili] However, this is probably of more interest to people in Georgia. One way or another, the address will undoubtedly be a subject for discussion.

[Chanturia] So be it. A fair amount of scandal surrounded this family before we set off to Spain. Only one Bagrationi stands apart from such news. As regards Giorgi and Mariam [sister of Giorgi], the Spanish press frequently prints their rude insulting statements about one another. We were faced with the fact.

We do not want to bring a king here. It was our intention to bring the children, their sons, here to learn the language and to be brought up as true Georgians. Only then, by way of a referendum, would the most worthy of them be chosen. Of course, if this would accord with the wishes of the nation. Giorgi hid his own children away, one was sent to America and the other to Malaga. I did not meet Giorgi and did not want to because of his contacts with Gamsakhurdia. Articles were published in the Spanish press bearing the following kind of headline: "Chanturia Opposes His Royal Highness Giorgi." Giorgi was in Malaga and then wanted to come to Madrid to meet Zhorzholiani. He expressly invited journalists to the meeting as he thought that I, too, would be there and wanted this fact to be recorded. He was trying to meet me as he wanted to be given the opportunity to say that Chanturia also asked him to be king. He said directly that if he was given guarantees that he would be king, he would come but they would have to wait until the situation was stable in Georgia. In short, once everything was organized and put in order, he would arrive astride a white horse. Whatever persons made him a promise (Gamsakhurdia and Asatiani), let them bring him over and put him on the throne. I personally had wanted to establish contacts with Bagrati [brother of Giorgi and Mariam] and Mariam. True, I was disturbed by Mariam's statement in which she said that Georgia had had Queen Tamar [1184-1213; ruler of Georgia at the height of its power] and, therefore, why couldn't she become queen.

[Nadareishvili] In today's complicated political situation, politicians and, in general, all persons whose words are listened to by the people have to be particularly careful when making statements. You will agree that the spread of false and unfounded ideas can have regrettable results.

[Chanturia] Indeed. I stated before that I was not a monarchist. However, I believe that the existence of a monarchy in Georgia is justifiable. In this case, the nation's interests must come before party interests. In my opinion, a constitutional monarchy is essential for us. Georgia, in many respects, resembles Spain, where both the left and right voted for King Juan Carlos. Many countries in Europe have a monarchy but it does not hinder genuine democracy there. Of course, we need not be in a rush. We need to create a Western type of democracy here. In such a serious situation, Georgia will not be able to survive for long. A monarchy will help us overcome these difficulties. We must make sensible use of the considerable contacts that the Bagrationis have. It is through the Bagrationis that the doors of other countries will be opened wide for us and this will make it easier for us to survive this difficult period. I can say the same about Shevardnadze and, in general, all Georgians who have the power to help Georgia.

[Nadareishvili] If I have understood correctly, you view a monarchy not as an end in itself but as a means to an end.

[Chanturia] Yes, I see it as a means to an end.

[Nadareishvili] Therefore, you would not support the idea of a monarchy if the need did not arise?

[Chanturia] No. In any case, not now. You know, the Georgians are a theatrical people. They like to maintain their traditions like the English. For us, a monarchy would be a bridge to the past.

[Nadareishvili] That means, it is a decoration.

[Chanturia] The word decoration has the wrong ring to it. It will be more like the facade of a finished building.

[Nadareishvili] In what way is a monarchy preferable to a parliamentary republic?

[Chanturia] I cannot see a significant difference between the two. A constitutional monarchy is the same as a parliamentary republic. Simply, such a state has a monarch as its head. If there is no monarch, one is left with a republic.

[Nadareishvili] A monarchy is associated with the principle of a family elite. How do you view this?

[Chanturia] An elite is only acceptable if it is an intellectual elite. Naturally, I am opposed to a family elite.

[Nadareishvili] Can a monarchy exist without there being a family elite?

[Chanturia] Of course it can. Take, for example, England.

[Nadareishvili] I would like to ask you about the Bagrationis living in Moscow and St. Petersburg. Have you not tried to establish contacts with them?

[Chanturia] The Bagrationis in Spain legitimately have the strongest claim to the throne. Their ancestor, Irakli

Bagrationi, was the sole lawful heir to the throne. Naturally, we have to choose the most worthy, who, in my opinion, is Bagrati's son, Ioane.

[Nadareishvili] Is there no hope for the Bagrationis in Italy?

[Chanturia] No, although they are genuine Bagrationis and a fine family.

[Nadareishvili] Is there any connection between your party interests and the idea of a monarchy?

[Chanturia] This is impossible. The point is that we are not monarchists. Even in our party we have those who are opposed to a monarchy.

[Nadareishvili] There are certain people who think that your party is seeking to fulfill its own political aims by establishing a monarchy in Georgia. It is natural that a king who has been placed on the throne with your help will be more inclined to listen to you.

[Chanturia] This will not happen. It is impossible for someone to govern over the king as he himself is the ruler.

[Nadareishvili] In that case, the king will no longer be playing a ceremonial role. If no one governs over the king and he himself rules, then he is an autocrat, whereas under a constitutional monarchy he is, to all intents and purposes, a puppet.

[Chanturia] Juan Carlos is neither an autocrat nor a puppet. He engages in actual politics and this does not in any way restrict the democratic institutions in Spain.

[Nadareishvili] You will agree with me that the protection of human rights should be the cornerstone upon which the choice of a form of government should be based. In your opinion, to what extent will a monarchy guarantee human rights?

[Chanturia] Let us remind ourselves where the declaration on human rights, the famous habeas corpus, was first drawn up: in monarchist England. I consider a monarchy to be a guarantee of political stability and, accordingly, a guarantee of human rights as well.

[Nadareishvili] More so than a parliamentary republic?

[Chanturia] Yes.

[Nadareishvili] How do you personally view your calling?

[Chanturia] My calling is politics. I have devoted my life to it, it is my destiny, and I hope that I will worthily follow this path to the end.

Unified Television System Favored

LD2103194892 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya Ostankino Television First Program Network in Russian 2100 GMT 19 Mar 92

[Video report by N. Gongadze from Tbilisi, including recorded remarks by V. Khundadze, director of Georgian Television and Radio Department—from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Excerpts] A poll carried out two years ago by Georgian television's audience-research service revealed that 85 percent of inhabitants favored having Moscow programs available. But what is the people's view now that Georgia is not a member of the Commonwealth? [passage omitted]

[Khundadze] My personal view is that there is a need to create a unified television space. The inhabitants of our republic are not prepared to remain in isolation. I believe that transmissions from the Ostankino Company will be disseminated throughout Georgia. By so doing we would be meeting a demand from the non-Georgian population of the republic as well.

Lithuania

Official Says Radiation Levels Remain Normal

LD2403100492

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian at 0930 GMT on 24 March carries a regular crime program hosted by Vidas Linkevicius.

One of the topics covered is today's accident at the St. Petersburg nuclear plant. Linkevicius phones Stasys Motiejunas, head of the radiometry laboratory at the Environment Protection Department. During their conversation Motiejunas says that, so far as radiation in Lithuania is concerned, "no deviation from the normal situation has been noted".

Telegram Sent to Shakhray on Withdrawal

LD2403045592 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 1900 GMT 23 Mar 92

[Text] The Lithuanian Supreme Council Center of Information and Analysis reports that today Ceslovas Stankevicius, deputy chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council, sent a telegram to Sergey Shakhray, deputy prime minister of the Russian Federation. The telegram reads, among other things, that the presence of the military units of the former Soviet Union on the borders of the Republic of Lithuania and the refusal to hand the border crossing points to the services of the Lithuanian Defense Ministry runs counter to the pledges made by the Russian Federation to respect the sovereignty and the laws of the Republic of Lithuania .

Ceslovas Stankevicius, head of the Lithuanian state delegation for the negotiations with the Russian Federation on the complete withdrawal of the former Soviet Armed Forces, pointed out in his telegram that the Lithuanian leadership gave a positive assessment to President Boris Yeltsin's decree of 18 March this year which points out that military units of the former Soviet Union [break in reception] guard the external state border of the member states of the CIS.

The telegram stresses that the signing of this document should serve the undelayed pulling back of the above military units from the state border of the Republic of Lithuania [words indistinct].

The head of the Lithuanian delegation expressed his belief that from now on the final handing over of the border protection installations would proceed [passage indistinct].

Landsbergis Welcomes Russian Defense Ministry

OW2103080392 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1830 GMT 20 Mar 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Lithuanian parliament leader Vytautas Landsbergis has welcomed the emergence of Russia's Defence Ministry. About the withdrawal of former Soviet troops from Lithuania, the Lithuanian parliament leader said in an interview on Lithuania Radio that after the army had become subordinate directly to President Yeltsin, the situation improved.

Landsbergis said the lack of control of millions of soldiers made the army dangerous not only to Lithuania, but the whole world. That was one of the obstacles to troop withdrawal negotiations. "Currently it is clear that all questions must be taken to President Yeltsin and that his orders will be obeyed", Landsbergis said.

He also voiced the hope that with the President of Russia it would be possible to conclude an agreement on the army's withdrawal from Lithuania at an earlier date.

Envoy in Moscow Cited on Relations With Russia

LD2403141192 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 2200 GMT 23 Mar 92

[Excerpts] [Correspondent Roma Pakeniene] Lithuania is prevented from concentrating on setting up the state by the presence of Soviet troops, its economic dependence on Russia, and the conservative forces which are once again emerging in that country. The negotiations on the withdrawal of troops are difficult and hardly moving forward; economic agreements are reached with a considerable difficulty, so all this makes very many people think that the Russian government wants to exert political and economic pressure on Lithuania or even draw it into some sort of union again. The possibility of a threat from the East has not been rejected in Lithuanian political circles. At the same time it is maintained that relations between Vilnius and Moscow are not without difficulties. Egidijus Bickauskas, Lithuania'sprovisional charge d'affaires in Moscow, believes that the threat from the East is serious enough, although he does not regard the present relations between Lithuania and Russia as anything unusual:

[Bickauskas] I think that these relations have developed in a particular way. They are as good as could be expected, because the situation in Lithuania and Russia is not a standard one, taking our history into consideration. Therefore,it goes without saying that there are many disagreements both in the way we see our future and in catering for our interests. [passage omitted]

[Pakeniene] Egidijus Bickauskas does not think that the CIS as such has any claims or plans with regard to Lithuania. However, according to him, Russia has not yet lost hope of preserving a rather substantial influence in this region —and primarily military influence. This is to be achieved by delaying the withdrawal of the Russian armed forces from the territory of Lithuania as long as possible.

The Lithuanian charge d'affaires in Moscow maintains that the negotiations on the withdrawal of the troops

must be conducted in a very subtle way while preserving good-neighborly relations and at the same time pushing the army out of Lithuanian territory as quickly as possible. [passage omitted]

[Bickauskas] It is very difficult to conduct any negotiations when, for example, one does not have, shall I call it, the lay-out of the military units which are deployed in Lithuania, indicating specifically the number of servicemen, the kind of arms and the location of their deployment. Simply, it is difficult to make decisions on the possible date.

Finally, the fact that the Russian side has not yet named a specific date when they intend to withdraw the troops also impedes the negotiations. Let us say they named the year 2000 as the date—that would be some basis for negotiations and at least a reason to laugh at this date. It seems to me that they do not reveal the date rather deliberately.

[Pakeniene] Speaking about the threat to Lithuania from the East, Egidijus Bickauskas linked it first of all with the Russian conservative forces becoming more active. This threat is real enough, although, according to the interlocutor of Vilnius radio, this is not yet a matter of the next few months.

[Bickauskas] There is no doubt that these forces are rising and that they are rising with the hope of restoring the Russian state as such. And while having in mind the Russian state they also see the presence of Lithuania,Latvia, and Estonia in the Russian state. [passage omitted]

These forces have not yet matured and have not yet united. However, I would not reject the idea that this could happen in the very near future, because the so-called great Russian chauvinism has raised its head and can be seen every day. After all, I am convinced that this is also influenced by the events in Tatarstan and Chechnya, which inded compel Russia and the Russians to consider where after all their Russia is. [passage omitted]

And then the fear of the collapse of this state emerges subconsciously in the Russian mind, and one automatically begins to think about the return to the old state, the state as it was until 1918. [passage omitted]

Russia To Discuss Military Damage Compensation

OW2103080592 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1830 GMT 20 Mar 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Russian experts agreed to discuss compensation for damages caused by Soviet military presence in Lithuania. However, Lithuanian and Russian experts did not reach an agreement on the time period for the withdrawal of forces, a member of the Lithuanian group Gediminas Serksnys said at a briefing in Vilinius Thursday [19 March]. The Russian and Lithuanian experts met in Moscow March 18-19.

Serksnys said the Lithuanians were not given exact information on the number of forces stationed in Lithuania. He says the military wants to manipulate the forces within the republic and add additional subdivisions.

Serksnys also said that the experts discussed four documents prepared by Lithuania. One of them, a protocol on the technical and organizational order for the withdrawal of forces, was agreed upon. The Russian experts advanced 9 documents.

Russia Asked To Renew Talks on KGB Archives

OW2103080492 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1830 GMT 20 Mar 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] A member of the Lithuanian government committee on the return of KGB archives Vidmantas Ziewelis appealed to Russia to renew talks on the return of the archives. The letter to the Russian Security Minister Viktor Barannikov [name and title as received] proposes that Russia name the time and date for the meeting.

Landsbergis Talks With Belarus' Shushkevich

LD2103094692 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Russian 1300 GMT 18 Mar 92

[Excerpt] Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Supreme Council of Lithuania, had a telephone conversation yesterday with Stanislav Shushkevich, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Belarus. Supreme Council press representative Audrius Azubalis gave details to journalists at a briefing today.

[Begin recording] [Azubalis] The conversation lasted for around 10 minutes and a draft trade agreement was discussed. Both sides recognized that [words indistinct]. Vytautas Landsbergis also expressed his concern that the process of defining the border between Lithuania and Belarus is in need of impetus and that we are getting the impression that the lack of impetus has its origins on the Belarussian side. Vytautas Landsbergis expressed the concern that some people in Lithuania might start to feel apprehensive and could link this process, which is not going as energetically as we would like, with a recent REUTER report on remarks supposedly made by Belarussian Foreign Minister Kravchenko.

For his part, Stanislav Shushkevich said there should be no obstacles to defining the border between Lithuania and Belarus and again informed Supreme Council Chairman Vytautas Landsbergis that immediately after this report appeared on REUTER, Kravchenko himself....

[Unidentified correspondent, interrupting] You mean the report on the alleged Belarussian territorial claims against Lithuania?

[Azubalis] Yes, he denied this report when he was in Helsinki, where Belarus signed an act of the Helsinki agreement. It was there that he denied this report.

Vytautas Landsbergis also reminded the chairman of the Belarus Supreme Soviet of the 5 January Baltic Council document in which the Council appealed to heads of CIS states to recall their citizens serving in the former Soviet army from the territory of the Baltic states. Stanislav Shushkevich answered this by noting that this process is already under way with Latvia. Our neighbors are ahead of us here, mainly because the Latvians provided precise figures on how many Belarussian citizens are serving there and so on. It was easier for Belarus to begin and develop the process of recalling its citizens from Latvian territory.

[Correspondent] Did this involve only officers?

[Azubalis] No, it involved servicemen in general. So it is up to us, the Lithuanian side, to prepare lists of how many Belarussian citizens are serving with the former Soviet army in Lithuania.

At the end of the conversation both parties also exchanged opinions on the need to continue the already existing tradition of working meetings at the highest level, arriving at the decision that such a meeting should take place in the near future.

[Correspondent] As we know, at the Jurmala session of the Baltic states, representatives of all 11 sates of the CIS—independent states—were sent letters requesting assistance in the rapid withdrawal of troops of the former USSR from the territory of the Baltic states.

[Azubalis] This was also mentioned in the conversation. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Discusses Border Issue

LD2403034192 Vilnius Radio Vilnius International Service in Lithuanian 2200 GMT 23 Mar 92

[Text] Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian parliament, spoke on the phone with Stanislav Shushkevich, chairman of the Belarussian parliament, this morning for a second time in a week.

According to the BALTIC NEWS SERVICE, Stanislav Shushkevich said, among other things, at a news conference that took place in Minsk today, that an agreement had been reached concerning the marking of the state border. According to the leader of the Belarussian parliament, the border marking posts will be installed in accordance with the juridical border of the states.

The leaders of the parliaments had agreed on holding a working meeting. Apart from the issue of the settlement of the state borders, the issues of the preparation of a trade agreement and the issue of recalling the Belarussian young men serving in the former Soviet Army deployed in Lithuania are on the agenda of relations between Lithuania and Belarus.

Official Says No Serious Border Disagreements

LD2103205392 Vilnius Radio Vilnius International Service in Lithuanian 2200 GMT 19 Mar 92

[Text] Zenonas Kumetaitis, deputy chairman of the state commission to reestablish the Lithuanian borders, told a correspondent that there are no serious disagreements with the neighboring countries with regard to the state boundaries. Negotiatioins with the Russian Kaliningrad Oblast are based on the 1928 Lithuanian-German agreement. According to this agreement the border along the Nemunas and Sesupe Rivers virtually corresponds with the present situation, and so far there are disagreement only about some localities.

Meanwhile the Lithuanian-Belarus border established by Soviet documents is extremely confusing and complicated. Lithuania's experts expect very few problems with Latvia because territorial claims between these two sides were resolved before the war.

It is intended, in establishing the Lithuanian state border, to reject Soviet iron curtain principles and to use the border as a barrier to the transit of narcotics, contraband, and other negative phenomena.

Debates Over Direct Rule, Elections Detailed

LD2103120592 Vilnius Radio Vilnius International Service in Lithuanian 1200 GMT 19 Mar 92

[Excerpts] The Supreme Council decided yesterday to extend direct rule in Salcininkai and Vilnius rayons for another six months. It also decided that a specific election date for local councils would not be announced at this stage. The election date will be announced after the Supreme Council discusses the issue in depth in September. On 12 September it will be exactly one year since direct rule was introduced in this area. The law permits the introduction of this type of rule for a one-year period. As a reminder, the Vilnius, Salcininkai, and Snieckus Councils were dismissed last September because of their anticonstitutional activities in open support for the Soviet putsch. The direct government rule appointed government's commissioners in these rayons at that time.

The Polish parliamentary faction, the Polish Union, and other Polish political activists maintain that this decision violated the rights of the Polish minority because it was deprived the minority of representation in government structures. Quite often one tends to forget that the apylinke councils [smallest administrative units in Lithuania] have never been dismissed, that they have been functioning and are carrying out the economic reforms quite successfully. Local residents do not think that their rights have been violated, although they understand that the rayon councils are necessary.

Polish activists whose loyalties are inclined toward the Republic of Lithuania, including some members of parliament, admit that the councils were justifiably dismissed. They demand, however, that new elections be held as soon as possible. [passage omitted]

The provisional parliamentary commission investigating the situation in these rayons and submitting proposals to the parliament concerning the possible date of elections proposed last week to prolong direct rule for another half a year. The members of the commission, however, could not come to a unanimous decision concerning the announcement of the election date.

Two draft decisions were therefore submitted to the parliament, one proposing that the elections be held only after the issue was discussed at the Supreme Council in September and the other proposing that a concrete election date be fixed, for example this 22 November. Under both proposals the period of the direct rule would exceed one year. However, according to Commission Chairman Eugenijus Petrovas, the law would not be violated in this case because it states that the period can be extended under extraordinary conditions. [passage omitted]

There are two more important reasons which compelled the chairman of the commission to change his mind and to propose that the elections be postponed. Patrovas having earlier believed that the elections could take place this summer.

[Begin Petrovas recording] I would say that certain blocking forces which exist between the councils—the local councils—and the people put me strongly in a different state of mind. It even made me change my mind; I thought it would be possible to hold the elections sometime in June. Basically, there are two such forces, one of which is the former deputies of the dismissed councils. At the moment they are even setting the tone at the sessions. It surprised me when the deputy of the former Vilnius council took the floor instead of the deputy of the local apylinke council. [end recording] [passage omitted]

The second force which is also acting against the Republic of Lithuania is the Polish Union, which includes a considerable number of former CPSU activists who have been advocating anti-Lithuanian policies. [passage omitted]

The adoption of the law on desovietization and the beginning of criminal proceedings against the council deputies and other officials who acted against the Republic of Lithuania was another precondition for the elections. Up to now, however, not a single beginning of criminal proceedings has been recorded, nor has the law on desovietization been adopted.

Although it was earlier believed that a six-month period of direct rule would be enough, it has become clear that this period is too short, Eugenijus Petrovas said. [passage omitted]

Polish Deputy Czeslaw Okinczic maintains that Lithuania will not be accepted to the European Council if the elections for the Salcininkai and Vilnius rayon councils are not held. The deputy claims to support this argument with the opinions of the secretary general of the European Council and even the secretary general of NATO. According to Czeslaw Okinczic, the international prestige of our state would be seriously marred by a delay in holding elections. [passage omitted]

Lithuanian Supreme Council Chairman Vytautas Landsbergis voiced a similar opinion during the debates. He maintained that passions over this region have been stirred once again in Lithuania, Belarus, and Russia. The idea of the Vilnius region seceding from Lithuania is again being openly advocated, an idea that people will continue to consider in the runup to elections and thereafter. I do not think that the world is more interested in a new hotbed of conflict than in economic reforms being carried out quietly, the leader of parliament said.

Polish Foreign Minister Lodges Protest

OW1903143192 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1403 GMT 19 Mar 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Polish Foreign Ministry has sent the Lithuanian Government a protest note accusing it of having failed to restore local councils in Vilnius and Salcininkai districts having a mainly Polish-speaking population.

The councils were disbanded by decision of the Lithuanian parliament, which accused them of anti-Lithuanian activity during the August putsch of 1991.

At the same time, Polish Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski said in the Sejm that Poland should expand its contacts with the Baltic countries "in spite of the obstacles caused by the policy of Lithuania towards its Polish-speaking population."

Poles Picket Parliament Building

LD2003214592 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1800 GMT 19 Mar 92

[Text] The bitterness, a feeling of hurt and injustice among the Poles living in the Vilnius region are still present because of the deferral of the date of the elections to the Polish Self-Government Council, and also the course of the reprivatization of land, which to the Poles is unsatisfactory. Just as they did yesterday, Poles today organized a picket outside the parliament building in Vilnius.

The Lithuanian populace is also not satisfied with the process of land privatization and reprivatization. Representatives of the Union of Landowners are also organizing pickets. They are demanding the return of land taken away from them after the war, and are protesting the extension of city boundaries.

Ministry Refrains From Comment

OW2103084092 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1421 GMT 20 Mar 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Lithuanian Foreign Ministry is still refraining from comments on Poland's protest and expects that Poland would make an official statement. As BF [BALTFAX] was told in the Lithuanian Foreign Ministry, temporary charge d'affairs of Lithuania in Poland Dainius Junevicius was summoned to the Polish Foreign Ministry Wednesday [18 March]. He was told there that Poland protests Vilnius' failure to fulfil its promise to hold new elections to local councils of the Vilnius and Salcininkai regions of Lithuania populated predominantly by the Poles.

The Lithuanian government dissolved the above mentioned councils on charges that they had supported the August coup attempt in 1991. On March 17 the republican parliament extended its direct rule in these regions for half a year more. It was originally introduced last September for half a year.

As BF learned at the Lithuanian Foreign Ministry department for Eastern and Central Europe, elections to local councils of Lithuania are an internal affair of that republic. The department believes such protests will not affect the signing of a treaty on friendship and cooperation between Lithuania and Poland. The exact date of the signing has not yet been set.

Last January the foreign ministers of the two states signed the declaration on neighborly relations.

Landsbergis Comments on Situation in Georgia

OW1703034092 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1855 GMT 16 Mar 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The head of the Lithuanian parliament Vytautas Landsbergis believes it is necessary to hold free elections in Georgia under observation of UN representatives. In his opinion, this is one of the solutions to the problems arousing [word as received] from confrontation between supporters of the ousted president Zviad Gamsakhurdia and the present Georgian authorities. Landsbergis' position in relation to the situation in Georgia has been announced at a briefing in Vilnius by the Lithuanian parliamentary press secretary Audrius Azubalis.

Landsbergis states that Lithuania has no intention of changing its position on recognition of Georgia's independence. Lithuania recognized Georgia as an independent state on December 20, 1990, but did not establish formal diplomatic relations with it. The head of the Georgian State Council Eduard Shevardnadze who recently returned to Georgia has repeatedly spoken in favor of holding free elections in the republic.

Diplomatic Relations Established With Vietnam

LD2003232492 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 1900 GMT 20 Mar 92

[Text] A joint communique has been signed in Moscow on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Republic of Lithuania and the Vietnam Socialist Republic. The communuque was signed by Egidijus Bickauskas, the Lithuanian acting charge d'affaires in Moscow, and [name indistinct], acting charge d'affaires of the Vietnamese Socialist Republic.

Army Commander Criticizes Government Decree

LD2003112792 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 1900 GMT 18 Mar 92

[Text] Lithuanian Prime Minister Gediminas Vagnorius has received an official letter from Colonel Frolov, the Vilnius garrison commander of the former Soviet Union's army. The letter states that the decree of the Lithuanian Government on the former Soviet Union's military enterprises in Lithuania is unilateral and contradicts Russian-Lithuanian negotiations. The view is expressed that it is essential to stop this decree until the leadership of the Vilnius garrison receives an order on the handing over of these establishments and enterprises to the Republic of Lithuania.

A reply by Government Secretary Kestutis Cilinskas states that the units of the former Soviet Union still deployed in Lithuania must observe the laws and other acts of Lithuania. It is noted that lately the soldiers of the former Soviet Union have increasingly been engaged in robbery and the illegal sale of military property. The Lithuanian Government, striving to ensure the observance of the republic's laws and defending the interests of the state, has instructed the Ministry of National Defense to protect [indistinct words].

Government Cash Shortage 'Extremely Serious'

OW1903142492 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1403 GMT 19 Mar 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] There are constant delays in the payment of wages, salaries, and pensions in Lithuania. The government, which discussed the problem yesterday, came to the conclusion that it was unable to solve it completely. Nor could an adequate solution be provided by the Bank of Lithuania. The reason was an extremely serious shortage of cash in the republic. The government recommended the bank to give priority to the payment of pensions.

Vagnorius: D[illegible] Bank Policy

LD2203035392 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in English 2230 GMT 19 Mar 92

[Text] Lithuanian Prime Minister Gediminas Vagnorius has said that the current shortage of cash in this country

was due to an unbalanced banks policies [as heard] when credit resources and interest were not increased along with surging prices and pay. In the past two months the state was forced to delay paying out salaries and retirement pensions since there was no cash in the banks (?vaults).

At today's news conference Gediminas Vagnorius assured newsmen that the government was ready to implement measures for normalizing the circulation of money. Speaking about his recent visit to Stockholm, Mr. Vagnorius said that Sweden has approved its investment in the Baltics project with $30 million allotted to Lithuania. The Canadian Government also decided to provide Lithuania with a $10 million credit, that will be used for acquiring modern farming equipment.

Prime Minister Vagnorius Holds News Conference

Optimistic About Industrial Prospects

LD1303232192 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 1900 GMT 13 Mar 92

[Excerpt] Lithuania's economic situation is difficult because of disrupted supplies from the CIS countries. However, there is some hope that the agreements on exchanges of goods concluded recently with Russia will be observed and the production situation should improve. This is the view expressed by Prime Minister Gediminas Vagnorius at a news conference at the Government Building today.

At the same time, he noted that in honoring its obligations toward the other side the Government of Lithuania is adjusting its response when the partners are not keeping to their word.

Implementation of reforms is also giving rise to certain objective difficulties. Thus one can not agree with the opinion of the opposition that these have bogged down.

Economic reforms, the prime minister said, are developing solidly and will not stop.

Talking about financial matters and in reply to a question about why pensions and salaries are not being paid on time, the prime minister observed that regardless of the budget deficit, revenues are attaining a balance with expenditures. However, there is a shortage of liquidity.

Representatives of the Bank of Lithuania are currently in the process of resolving these questions with the Russian Central Bank. It is abnormal that in view of the shortage of liquidity, Russia is covering Lithuania's accounts. Of course, in resolving this question the Bank of Lithuania should adopt a more decisive stance. The other shortcoming lies in the fact that [words indistinct] increasing credit from the countries.

The prime minister denied the critical suggestion that supposedly earlier promises not to limit exports from Lithuania are being disregarded and he also gave more specific information noting that the list of licensed or other goods prohibited from being taken abroad has been scaled down to a minimum. The prohibition on resale elsewhere of fuel and raw materials which the state acquires through exchanges and centralized orders in other countries should be understood. Otherwise this would inflict harm on one's own state.

The time is not far distant when we will purchase everything freely and will sell whatever we desire quite freely. Morever, basic consumer goods are even currently being taken abroad without restriction.

The prime minister also replied to questions concerning social security possibilities, collective buying out of [word indistinct] land, and attracting foreign investments, and expressed the opinion that the Supreme Council will, at long last, adopt decisions that will permit the Government to campaign more actively against violators of law and order, including state officials who misuse their official status. [passage omitted]

Crisis Due To Supply Cuts

OW1503094992 Moscow BALTFAX in English 0844 GMT 15 Mar 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Prime Minister of Lithuania Gediminas Vagnorius believes that one of the main reasons for the economic crisis in Lithuania is the stoppage of supplies from the Commonwealth countries. On March 13 he held a news conference in Vilnius. However, he said, the situation will improve if the recently reached agreements with Russian on mutual supplies will be implemented.

The premier warned that Lithuania will take response measures in relation to partners failing to abide by the agreements. He also said that in case Russia raises fuel prices, Lithuania will increase prices of food and its products supplied to Russia. For the time being, he noted, "there is no certainty in Russia itself in the question of raising prices of coal and other fuels". However, asked by reporters what consequences may follow fuel price hikes, Vagnorius acknowledged that they could heat up social tension.

EBRD President: Republic To Enter Institution

OW2103163192 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1532 GMT 21 Mar 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Lithuania is the 44th country to enter the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development [EBRD], says a message by the Bank's President Jacques Attali received by the Lithuanian Foreign Economic Relations Ministry Friday. Attali's message also confirms that Lithuania has made its first deposit in the Bank.

Soviet Bank Closure Traps Citizens' Funds

LD1903221292 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 2200 GMT 17 Mar 92

[Text] The Government of Lithuania has noted that it will defend the interests of those members of the republic's population who have been harmed by the cessation of the activity of the Soviet Foreign Economic Relations Bank's republican system.

According to a decision by the leadership of the former Soviet Union bank, banking operations have been discontinued as of 15 March. The bank's Vilnius affiliate and others within the former Soviet republics are being liquidated. Some currency holdings and juridical individuals' funds, also of Lithuanian citizens, remain at this bank's Vilnius affiliate.

According to one of the experts of the Vilnius affiliate of the bank, the overall currency sum held by the Moscow bank of funds belonging to Lithuanians is very large. The basis of these deposits is inheritances received from relatives in the West. During the Soviet period, only the Moscow bank and its affiliates handled and saved inheritances from the West.

Over the weekend, the bank affiliate discontinued paying out funds to its clients. Those who failed to withdraw their money in time demonstrated outside the Lithuanian government building on 16 March.

The government press bureau today published a statement noting that the Republic of Lithuania will defend the interests of its population in resolving questions on the return of their deposits and funds from the former Soviet bank or the [word indistinct] of its rights and obligations.